ABSTRACT
The law N° 20.584 established the informed consent. This could suggest that patients have a right to refuse a blood transfusion. However, the dominant jurisprudence in protection claims filed against Jehovah Witnesses who rejected a blood transfusion, reveals that they do not have such a right. There were two exceptions in 2008, where courts acknowledged the patient's autonomy and denied the petition to authorize a blood transfusion. Most cases precede law N° 20.584. However, those cases which were upheld by the courts after the promulgation of the law, although few, follow exactly the same doctrine as before the appearance of this act.
Subject(s)
Humans , Religion and Medicine , Blood Transfusion/legislation & jurisprudence , Treatment Refusal/legislation & jurisprudence , Jehovah's Witnesses , Informed Consent/legislation & jurisprudence , Blood Transfusion/ethics , ChileABSTRACT
Background: The new regulation of patients' rights creates the right to informed consent, which allows accepting or refusing any medical treatment. Also, the patient has the right to be appropriately informed about a variety of aspects determined by the law. Patient's autonomy has limits. Artificial acceleration of death, euthanasia or assisted suicide are not permitted. The problem is that the law does not define those situations. The law provides the intervention of Ethics Committees when the doctor considers that the patient exposes himself to severe harm or the risk of death which would be avoided. This intervention impinges on patient's autonomy. Patients have the right to request discharge and medical facilities could discharge patients against their will if they do not accept medical recommendations. These limitations on autonomy should be explained because the law apparently makes the distinction between killing, letting die and the Double Effect Doctrine. There is plenty of literature questioning the validity of both. The law fails to regulate part of the medical practice, regarding life and death decisions. A lack of consensus could explain this omission. Doctors have a right to conscientious objection to some patient's requests.
Subject(s)
Humans , Informed Consent/legislation & jurisprudence , Patient Rights/legislation & jurisprudence , Personal Autonomy , Decision Making , Double Effect Principle , Euthanasia , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Informed Consent , Patient Rights , Physician's Role , Suicide, Assisted , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
The Bill of Rights for Patients provides the patient with autonomy for disposing of his life, enabling him to reject those treatments that unnecessarily prolong his life. However, the bill does not allow an artificial acceleration of death. Therefore, the bill does not permit euthanasia (at least, certain form of it) nor assisted-suicide. However, according to the practice of medicine and also Chilean doctrine, it is permitted to inject morphine to a patient to relieve his pain, even though that could hasten his death. In consequence, it is allowed for the patient to dispose of his life and also to inject in him morphine for pain relief, endangering his life, but neither euthanasia nor assisted-suicide is allowed. Is this coherent? According to Chilean doctrine, it could be coherent under the condition of accepting the distinction between killing and letting die and also the double effect doctrine. The problem is that there is abundant English literature in the realm of moral philosophy to disregard both conditions. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the Bill is not coherent and that the Chilean doctrine is based upon a distinction and a doctrine that are not acceptable.