Assessment of the risk posed to Singapore by the emergence of artemisinin-resistant malaria in the Greater Mekong Subregion

Objective@#To assess the public health risk to Singapore posed by the emergence of artemisinin-resistant (ART-R) malaria in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).@*Methods@#We assessed the likelihood of importation of drug-resistant malaria into Singapore and the impact on public health of its subsequent secondary spread in Singapore. Literature on the epidemiology and contextual factors associated with ART-R malaria was reviewed. The epidemiology of malaria cases in Singapore was analysed. The vulnerability and receptivity of Singapore were examined, including the connectivity with countries reporting ART-R malaria, as well as the preparedness of Singaporean health authorities. Sources of information include international journals, World Health Organization guidelines, data from the Singapore Ministry of Health and National Public Health Laboratory of the National Centre for Infectious Diseases, and the International Air Transport Association.@*Results@#The importation of ART-R malaria into Singapore is possible given the close proximity and significant travel volume between Singapore and the GMS countries reporting artemisinin resistance. Singapore’s vulnerability is further enhanced by the presence of foreign workers from neighbouring endemic countries. Nonetheless, the overall likelihood of such an event is low based on the rarity and decreasing trend of imported malaria incidence. With the presence of Anopheles vectors in Singapore, imported cases of drug-resistant malaria could cause secondary transmission. Nevertheless, the risk of sustained spread is likely to be mitigated by the comprehensive surveillance and control system in place for both infected vectors and human cases.@*Discussion@#This risk assessment highlights the need for a continued high degree of vigilance of ART-R malaria locally and globally to minimize the risk and public health impact of drug-resistant malaria in Singapore.

The Singapore Field Epidemiology Service: Insights Into Outbreak Management / 예방의학회지

Field epidemiology involves the implementation of quick and targeted public health interventions with the aid of epidemiological methods. In this article, we share our practical experiences in outbreak management and in safeguarding the population against novel diseases. Given that cities represent the financial nexuses of the global economy, global health security necessitates the safeguard of cities against epidemic diseases. Singapore's public health landscape has undergone a systemic and irreversible shift with global connectivity, rapid urbanization, ecological change, increased affluence, as well as shifting demographic patterns over the past two decades. Concomitantly, the threat of epidemics, ranging from severe acute respiratory syndrome and influenza A (H1N1) to the resurgence of vector-borne diseases as well as the rise of modern lifestyle-related outbreaks, have worsened difficulties in safeguarding public health amidst much elusiveness and unpredictability. One critical factor that has helped the country overcome these innate and man-made public health vulnerabilities is the development of a resilient field epidemiology service, which includes our enhancement of surveillance and response capacities for outbreak management, and investment in public health leadership. We offer herein the Singapore story as a case study in meeting the challenges of disease control in our modern built environment.

The imminent threat of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in Singapore

The global emergence of multidrugresistant (MDR) tuberculosis (TB) and extensively drug-resistant (XDR)-TB threatens to derail the efforts of TB control programmes worldwide. From 2000 to 2010, 161 pulmonary MDR-TB cases (including six XDR-TB cases) were reported in Singapore, and of these, 80% occurred among the foreign-born, with an increasing trend seen after 2004. Among new pulmonary TB cases, the highest incidence of MDR-TB occurred among patients from Myanmar (8%), followed by Vietnam (4.4%) and China (2.3%), while among those previously treated, the highest incidence was found in patients from Vietnam (50%), followed by Indonesia (33%) and Bangladesh (33%). Although the proportion of Singapore-born pulmonary TB cases with MDR-TB has remained comparatively low (0.2% and 1.3% in new and previously treated cases, respectively), there is no room for complacency. Top priority must be accorded toward the proper treatment of drug-susceptible TB cases under strict programme conditions so as to prevent the development of MDR-TB in the first place.

Evaluation on the effectiveness of the national childhood immunisation programme in Singapore, 1982-2007

<p><b>INTRODUCTION</b>We undertook a study to evaluate the effectiveness of the National Childhood Immunisation Programme (NCIP) over the past 26 years by reviewing the epidemiological trends of the diseases protected, the immunisation coverage and the changing herd immunity of the population during the period of 1982 to 2007.</p><p><b>MATERIALS AND METHODS</b>The epidemiological data of all cases of diphtheria, pertussis, poliomyelitis, measles, mumps, rubella and acute hepatitis B notified to the Communicable Diseases Division, Ministry of Health (MOH) from 1982 to 2007 were collated and analysed. Data on tuberculosis (TB) cases were obtained from the TB Control Unit, Tan Tock Seng Hospital. Cases of neonatal tetanus and congenital rubella syndrome (CRS) among infants born in Singapore were identified from the Central Claims Processing System. The number of therapeutic abortions performed for rubella infections was retrieved from the national abortion registry. Coverage of the childhood immunisation programme was based on the immunisation data maintained by the National Immunisation Registry, Health Promotion Board. To assess the herd immunity of the population against the various vaccine-preventable diseases protected, the findings of several serological surveys conducted from 1982 to 2005 were reviewed.</p><p><b>RESULTS</b>The incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases covered under the NCIP had declined over the last 26 years with diphtheria, neonatal tetanus, poliomyelitis and congenital rubella virtually eliminated. The last case of childhood TB meningitis and the last case of acute hepatitis B in children below 15 years were reported in 2002 and 1996, respectively.</p><p><b>CONCLUSION</b>The NCIP has been successfully implemented as evidenced by the disappearance of most childhood diseases, excellent immunisation coverage rate in infants, preschool and school children, and high level of herd immunity of the childhood population protected.</p>

Twentieth century influenza pandemics in Singapore

<p><b>INTRODUCTION</b>Singapore was substantially affected by three 20th Century pandemics. This study describes the course of the pandemics, and the preventive measures adopted.</p><p><b>MATERIALS AND METHODS</b>We reviewed and researched a wide range of material including peer-reviewed journal articles, Ministry of Health reports, Straits Settlements reports and newspaper articles. Monthly mortality data were obtained from various official sources in Singapore.</p><p><b>RESULTS</b>The 1918 epidemic in Singapore occurred in 2 waves--June to July, and October to November--resulting in up to 3500 deaths. The 1957 epidemic occurred in May, and resulted in widespread morbidity, with 77,000 outpatient attendances in government clinics alone. The 1968 epidemic occurred in August and lasted a few weeks, with outpatient attendances increasing by more than 65%. The preventive measures instituted by the Singapore government during the pandemics included the closure of schools, promulgation of public health messages, setting up of influenza treatment centres, and screening at ports. Students, businessmen and healthcare workers were all severely affected by the pandemics.</p><p><b>CONCLUSIONS</b>Tropical cities should be prepared in case of a future pandemic. Some of the preventive measures used in previous pandemics may be applicable during the next pandemic.</p>

Preparing for an influenza pandemic in Singapore

The national strategy against pandemic influenza essentially consists of 3 prongs: (i) effective surveillance, (ii) mitigation of the pandemic's impact, and (iii) render the population immune through vaccination. When the pandemic hits Singapore, the response plan aims to achieve the following 3 outcomes: (i) maintenance of essential services to limit social and economic disruption, (ii) reduction of morbidity and mortality through antiviral treatment, and (iii) slow and limit the spread of influenza to reduce the surge on healthcare services. The biggest challenge will come from managing the surge of demand on healthcare services. A high level of preparedness will help healthcare services better cope with the surge.

Epidemiology and control of SARS in Singapore

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was imported into Singapore in late February 2003 by a local resident who returned from a holiday in Hong Kong and started an outbreak in the hospital where she was admitted on 1 March 2003. The disease subsequently spread to 4 other healthcare institutions and a vegetable wholesale centre. During the period between March and May 2003, 238 probable SARS cases, including 8 imported cases and 33 deaths, were reported. Transmission within the healthcare and household settings accounted for more than 90% of the cases. Factors contributing to the spread of infection included the failure to recognise the high infectivity of this novel infection, resulting in a delay in isolating initial cases and contacts and the implementation of personal protective measures in healthcare institutions; and the super-spreading events by 5 index cases, including 3 with co-morbid conditions presenting with atypical clinical manifestations of SARS. Key public health measures were directed at prevention and control within the community and hospitals, and the prevention of imported and exported cases. An isolated laboratory-acquired case of SARS was reported on 8 September 2003. Based on the lessons learnt, Singapore has further strengthened its operational readiness and laboratory safety to respond to SARS, avian flu and other emerging diseases.