ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE To provide reference for the regulation of electronic prescription circulation under the mode of “medical science + pharmacy”. METHODS Based on evolutionary game theory， a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed for related parties of electronic prescription circulation （government agencies， internet hospitals and third-party drug platforms） under the mode of “medical science + pharmacy”. The influential factors of the three parties’ strategy selection were analyzed and verified by simulation. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS The strategic choices of all parties in the game were affected by the other two parties. Reducing the cost of strict supervision or increasing the punishment for the other two parties would increase the probability of strict supervision of government agencies. Enhancing reputation losses， increasing penalties， and reducing the cost difference when choosing different strategies would have regulatory and binding effects on internet hospitals and third-party drug platforms. It is suggested that government agencies can introduce diversified supervision mode and establish an integrated “intelligent supervision + traceability” system； pay attention to the construction of reputation mechanism， and promote the coordinated linkage of all parties； increase the punishment for violations， provide policy support， reduce the cost of compliance behavior to promote the high-quality development of electronic prescription circulation under the mode of “medical science + pharmacy”.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE：To provide reference for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. METHODS ：Based on the evolutionary game theory ，the stakeholders of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the stage of drug safety supervision were identified ；the evolutionary game model was established so as to obtain the behavioral selection and evolutionary stability strategy of the each party through and put forward the suggestions for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS：Based on evolutionary game theory ，the three-party evolutionary game model of drug administration ，drug inspection and manufacturing enterprises was established. According to the model established in this study ，it could be concluded that：when the compliance cost of the production enterprise was less than the sum of the violation cost and the bribery cost minus the additional income ，or less than the sum of violation cost and punishment and reputation lossminus the additional income ，the manufacturing enterprises could achieve the equilibrium state of compliance production ；the supervision probability was inversely proportional to the supervision cost ，and strict inspection was inversely proportional to inspection cost ；compliance productivity rate and strict detection rate were in direct proportion to the intensity of supervision and penalties ；the higher the supervision probability was，the higher the strict detection rate was ，and the compliance productivity would gradually increase. It is proposed to link enterprise information files ，lay the foundation of four party cogovernance ；introduce the “cost-benefit”supervision system ，make reasonable use of the third-party inspection institutions ；clarify the boundary of personnel responsibility ，and use the intelligent system for real-time supervision so as to promote the improvement of drug safety supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Ba y Area.