ABSTRACT
Background@#Conflict in the medical world in 2020 led to the rejection of the national examination for doctors. This study explained the process until the end of the national test refusal situation triggered in 2020 through the signaling game theory. The government has succeeded in requiring medical students to take the national exam. @*Methods@#To explain the rejection of the national examination, we first compose and show an example of two small non-signaling games where medical students know which type the government is of, then combine them to play a signaling game. @*Results@#The behavior of the government and medical students was examined through the signaling game model. In the context of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the government makes an ultimatum, whatever the type. And the medical students accept it. They judged that the government could not be expected to abolish the policy. If COVID-19 had not occurred, medical students would have been able to continue the confrontation. @*Conclusion@#The government instilled in the other party the perception that the government would not bend its policies because it was the surly type and would not be afraid of a strong confrontation. Through the image created in this way, the government was forced to accept the ultimatum by medical students. Academically, this study is to deal with the policy-making process through the signaling game theory. In the area of health care policy, this study suggests that various situations such as the type of government or the spread of COVID-19 can become important in addition to the rationality of the policy itself.
ABSTRACT
Background@#In this study, we compared the incidents of humidifier disinfectants and incidents of mild hepatitis in Japan to highlight the differences in government response in the health care field in terms of “chain of responsibility”. @*Methods@#We examined whether the three mechanisms of action and the chain of responsibility hypothesis were applied to compare the cases of Korea and Japan. The incident of Japan occurred in 1987 in Misawa city, Aomori prefecture. In the 1990s, the safety of blood products increased dramatically. However, relief for infected victims was neglected. Green Cross did not notify the parties. In Korea, in the spring of 2011, a number of lung disease patients were accidentally admitted to a hospital in Seoul, and a female patient with respiratory failure symptoms expired. The Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted animal tests and the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued an order for forced collection of humidifier disinfectants. @*Results@#In the case of Japan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare had to take responsibility for follow-up measures such as the investigation of the cause, so it was tied to a “chain of responsibility”. However, in the case of Korea, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was free from the chain. @*Conclusion@#Through the comparison between the cases of Japan and Korea, we confirmed that whether or not a government organization chooses to conceal responsibility depends on its past behavior, which is whether it is free from the chain of responsibility or not. Therefore, it was reaffirmed that an organization (ministry or department) free from the chain of responsibility must exist within the government.
ABSTRACT
Background@#In this study, we compared the incidents of humidifier disinfectants and incidents of mild hepatitis in Japan to highlight the differences in government response in the health care field in terms of “chain of responsibility”. @*Methods@#We examined whether the three mechanisms of action and the chain of responsibility hypothesis were applied to compare the cases of Korea and Japan. The incident of Japan occurred in 1987 in Misawa city, Aomori prefecture. In the 1990s, the safety of blood products increased dramatically. However, relief for infected victims was neglected. Green Cross did not notify the parties. In Korea, in the spring of 2011, a number of lung disease patients were accidentally admitted to a hospital in Seoul, and a female patient with respiratory failure symptoms expired. The Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted animal tests and the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued an order for forced collection of humidifier disinfectants. @*Results@#In the case of Japan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare had to take responsibility for follow-up measures such as the investigation of the cause, so it was tied to a “chain of responsibility”. However, in the case of Korea, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was free from the chain. @*Conclusion@#Through the comparison between the cases of Japan and Korea, we confirmed that whether or not a government organization chooses to conceal responsibility depends on its past behavior, which is whether it is free from the chain of responsibility or not. Therefore, it was reaffirmed that an organization (ministry or department) free from the chain of responsibility must exist within the government.
ABSTRACT
Since the government is fully aware of the specificity and importance of the healthcare field, it operates bureaucracy and affiliated organizations composed of many government ministries and experts and is also handling the related bureaus. However, recent incidents of humidifier disinfectant not only make these government activities unreliable but also cause disappointment to many people. Why did not the government take active measures to ensure product safety? But why was the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) able to speed up the identification of the cause and the recovery of the product? The purpose of this study is to clarify the behavioral mechanisms of government intervention by comparing the behaviors of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the KCDC. Then, we will discuss the desirable government structure.