Impact of DRG Payment on the Length of Stay and the Number of Outpatient Visits After Discharge for Caesarean Section During 2004-2007 / 예방의학회지

OBJECTIVES: The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)-based payment on the length of stay and the number of outpatient visits after discharge in for patients who had undergone caesarean section. METHODS: This study used the health insurance data of the patients in health care facilities that were paid by the Fee-For-Service (FFS) in 2001-2004, but they participated in the DRG payment system in 2005-2007. In order to examine the net effects of DRG payment, the Difference-In-Differences (DID) method was adopted to observe the difference in health care utilization before and after the participation in the DRG payment system. The dependent variables of the regression model were the length of stay and number of outpatient visits after discharge, and the explanatory variables included the characteristics of the patients and the health care facilities. RESULTS: The length of stay in DRG-paid health care facilities was greater than that in the FFS-paid ones. Yet, DRG payment has no statistically significant effect on the number of outpatient visits after discharge. CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study that DRG payment was not effective in reducing the length of stay can be related to the nature of voluntary participation in the DRG system. Only those health care facilities that are already efficient in terms of the length of stay or that can benefit from the DRG payment may decide to participate in the program.

Prospects of the DRG payment system in China / 中华医院管理杂志

Widely accepted in other countries,DRG payment is also referred to in China now and then.The authors reviewed the status quo of medical payment in China,as well as the practices and studies of DRG payment overseas.Based on such studies,the paper probed into the feasibility of DRG application in China,in terms of policy environment,application demand,research basis and technical conditions.Proposed in the paper are ranges of application,possible roadblocks and countermeasures for the application in China,aiming to promote the research,application and use of the method in China.

Impacts of DRG Payment System on Behavior of Medical Insurance Claimants / 예방의학회지

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the impacts of the DRG payment system on the behavior of medical insurance claimants. Specifically, we evaluated the case-mix index, the numbers of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, and the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes before, during and after implementation of the DRG payment system. METHODS: In order to evaluate the case-mix index, the number of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, we used medical insurance claim data from all medical facilities that participated in the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program. This medical insurance claim data consisted of both pre-demonstration program data (fee-for-service, from November, 1998 to January, 1999) and post-demonstration program data (DRG-based Prospective Payment, from February, 1999 to April, 1999). And in order to evaluate the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes utilized, we reviewed 820 medical records from 20 medical institutes that were selected by random sampling methods. RESULTS: The case-mix index rate decreased after the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program was introduced. The average numbers of different claim diagnosis codes used decreased (new DRGs from 2.22 to 1.24, and previous DRGs from 1.69 to 1.21), as did the average number of claim procedure codes used (new DRGs from 3.02 to 2.16, and previous DRGs from 2.97 to 2.43). With respect to the time of participation in the program, the change in number of claim procedure codes was significant, but the change in number of claim diagnosis codes was not. The corresponding rate of claim diagnosis codes increased (from 57.9% to 82.6%), as did the exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes (from 16.5% to 25.1%). CONCLUSIONS: After the implementation of the DRG payment system, the corresponding rate of insurance claim codes and the corresponding exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes both increased, because the inducement system for entering the codes for claim review was changed.