Integración y consolidación disciplinar en la biología y la psicología. Una perspectiva comparada / Disciplinary Integration and consolidation in Biology and Psychology. A comparative Approach

Resumen En su proceso de definición y consolidación, las ciencias de la vida se enfrentaron con la dicotomía sobre si la mejor manera de aproximarse a su objeto de estudio era seguir el modelo de la física -considerado el modelo científico por excelencia- o desligarse de este. La manera en la que este debate se decantó en cada disciplina tuvo consecuencias en el desarrollo posterior y en los alcances epistemológicos de las nuevas ciencias en consolidación. La comparación de la manera en la que se dio este debate en la biología y la psicología resulta relevante para entender la trayectoria de estas ciencias y sus posibilidades de integración disciplinar: la biología consiguió la unificación disciplinar integrándose alrededor de la teoría evolutiva, mientras que la psicología no consiguió exitosamente esa integración. Esto fue en parte por el intento de conectarse con las ciencias naturales a través de la fisiología, lo que, además, supuso un obstáculo para la comprensión e integración del principio unificador de la biología.

Abstract During the XIX century, different sciences were structured or consolidated in their modern form. Until then, biology, earth sciences, social sciences, and even physics, chemistry, and mathematics did not exist as autonomous disciplines as we know them today. In that century, the notion of "science" was utterly separated from natural philosophy, theology, and other forms of traditional knowledge. The consolidation of scientific disciplines was characterized by deep debates on the possibilities and methods of knowing the natural and human worlds. In their process of consolidation, all life sciences faced a dichotomy related to the best way to approach their object of study: should they follow the model of physics -considered the scientific model par excellence- or not take that model into account? This dichotomy provoked intense debates in all disciplines. The way this debate was resolved had lasting consequences in the subsequent development and the epistemological scope of the new sciences in consolidation. Comparing how this debate took place in biology and psychology is relevant to understanding the disciplinary trajectory followed by each science and the possibilities of integration in each field of knowledge. There is a generalized assumption in the history of psychology that the experimental paradigm adopted extensively in psychology at the end of the XIX century would have placed the discipline under the scientific status of natural sciences. However, in biology and psychology, there was a tension between a physiological-experimental paradigm and a historical-evolutionary paradigm. Understanding those debates within biology, and the comprehension of how biology achieved its disciplinary integration, shows why the experimental connection of psychology with physiology did not mean an explicit connection with the whole of the natural sciences. Disciplinary integration in biology was possible because of adopting the evolutionary principle under a historic paradigm instead of a physical-chemical one. That is why the experimental connection of psychology with physiology eventually became an obstacle for psychology in adopting the unifying principle of biology, the Theory of Evolution, as their basis for disciplinary integration. The first part of this article describes how two branches emerged in the process of consolidation of biology: physiological-experimental and historical-evolutionary. Each one had a different approach to its object of study, but both were necessary to form what is now modern biology. The second part focuses on unifying biology as a field of scientific knowledge, bringing the two branches of this science together under the evolutionary paradigm. The third part outlines the central debates in the consolidation of psychology as a scientific discipline at the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the 20th century. It introduces implications of how these debates on knowledge in psychology developed, as opposed to how it happened in biology. Finally, the difficulties of psychology connecting with the theory of evolution are addressed, as are the impossibility of integrating the different branches of the discipline.

História da genética no Brasil: um olhar a partir do Museu da Genética da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul / History of genetics in Brazil: a view from the Museu da Genética at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Aborda o contexto de criação do Museu da Genética, em 2011 no Departamento de Genética na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, em Porto Alegre, e apresenta sua estrutura e conteúdo. Argumenta-se que os materiais disponibilizados no Museu da Genética constituem uma rica fonte para pesquisas sobre a história da genética no Brasil (e da genética de populações humanas em particular) a partir da segunda metade do século XX, tema ainda pouco investigado, apesar da proeminência dessa área do conhecimento no Brasil.

This work addresses the context of the creation, as well as the structure and contents, of the Museum of Genetics (Museu da Genética), created in 2011 and located in the Department of Genetics of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul), in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The materials available at the Museum of Genetics are a rich resource for research on the history of genetics in Brazil (and especially the genetics of human populations) beginning with the second half of the twentieth century. Despite the prominence of the field of genetics in Brazil, little research has been done on this topic.

O que se traz para a vida e o que a vida nos traz: uma análise da equação etiológica proposta por Freud à luz das neurociências / What we bring to life and what life brings to us: an analysis of the ethiological equation proposed by Freud according to neurosciences

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir aspectos teóricos, clínicos e experimentais acerca da interação entre variáveis inatas e aprendidas com relação à origem e desenvolvimento de distúrbios emocionais. Apresenta-se inicialmente a equação etiológica proposta por Freud acerca das neuroses na virada do século XX e sua relação com a teoria da sedução. Apresentam-se também algumas evidências clínicas e experimentais que dão suporte à noção de equação etiológica. Estas evidências demonstram a importância de determinantes genéticos que regulam a atividade serotonérgica assim como a influência de eventos traumáticos que ocorrem dentro e fora do período crítico. A influência do ambiente, como por exemplo, o apoio social, pode também aliviar a expressão destes distúrbios emocionais. O trabalho busca também modelar matematicamente a equação etiológica através de uma regressão logística incorporando todos estes parâmetros.

The aim of this paper is to discuss theoretical issues as well as clinical and experimental evidences regarding the nature versus nurture debate of the origins and development of emotional disturbances. The etiological equation as proposed by Freud at the turn of the 20th century is presented. Clinical and experimental evidences, which support the notion of the etiological equation, are also presented. These evidences indicate the importance of the genetic makeup that regulates serotonergic activity as well as traumatic experiences that occur inside or outside the critical period. Environmental interactions, such as social support, can also relieve the expression of emotional dysfunction. A mathematical model of the etiological equation is presented through a logistic regression in which all these parameters are incorporated.