ABSTRACT
Objective:To construct and verify a model of excessive medical behavior clues enrichment, for the technical support for the safe and rational use of medical insurance fund.Methods:A model of excessive medical behavior clues enrichment was constructed by the rank assignment method. The inpatient transaction records of medical insurance for employees and residents in 5 tumor hospitals in Beijing from 2016 to 2019 were obtained to verify the validity of the model. The patients were grouped according to age and gender, and each transaction record was converted into a standardized score V(0-100 scores), all transactions were divided into 22 groups according to V value. The Cochran-Armitage trend test was used to analyze the variation trend of enrichment rate with the increase of V value. Chi-square test was used to compare the chargeback rates of different groups. The correlation between the standardized score V and the amount of chargeback was tested by Pearson.Results:There were 872 599 and 86 356 hospitalization transactions for employee and resident medical insurance patients, with included 1 164 and 103 chargeback records respectively. The average score and median of V-value of employee and resident medical insurance transactions were scores of 49 and 50 respectively.When V>0, the enrichment rates of the employee and resident medical insurance were on the rise with the increasing of V( Z=23.86, P<0.001; Z=11.02, P<0.001), the refusal rates among different groups was significant different( χ2=1 307.16, P<0.001)and the correlation between V value and the chargeback amount was statistically significant( r=0.29, P<0.001; r=0.30, P=0.003). Conclusions:This study established a clue enrichment model of excessive medical behavior based on the rank assignment method. By analyzing a large number of medical insurance transaction records, the model can focus on the medical insurance transaction with suspected excessive medical treatment behavior, and has a certain guiding role in the management of medical insurance fund.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE:To investigate the constraint mechanism on excessive medical behavior of doctors in Chinese medical market. METHODS:Under certain assumptions(suppose the hospital and the doctor's demands are consistent,the government and the patient's demands are consistent,etc),mixed game method(game theory)was used to analyze Nash equilibrium between government and doctors,between patients and doctors.The qualitative analysis was performed for these constraints based on the re-ality. RESULTS&CONCLUSIONS:The strict punishing mechanism and the choice right to doctor of patients and public satisfac-tion with the government can achieve the Nash equilibrium of game and effectively inhibit excessive medical behavior. The govern-ment should create a competitive environment to enhance the right of patients to select doctor and improve the relevant legal system on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility among all parties so as to strengthen the implementation of supervision. At the same time,the government should establish credit archives of the doctor to form effective reputation incentive mechanism to doc-tors,and proactively explore the patients participation mechanism based on reducing the cost of patient participation.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE:To investigate the constraint mechanism on excessive medical behavior of doctors in Chinese medical market. METHODS:Under certain assumptions(suppose the hospital and the doctor's demands are consistent,the government and the patient's demands are consistent,etc),mixed game method(game theory)was used to analyze Nash equilibrium between government and doctors,between patients and doctors.The qualitative analysis was performed for these constraints based on the re-ality. RESULTS&CONCLUSIONS:The strict punishing mechanism and the choice right to doctor of patients and public satisfac-tion with the government can achieve the Nash equilibrium of game and effectively inhibit excessive medical behavior. The govern-ment should create a competitive environment to enhance the right of patients to select doctor and improve the relevant legal system on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility among all parties so as to strengthen the implementation of supervision. At the same time,the government should establish credit archives of the doctor to form effective reputation incentive mechanism to doc-tors,and proactively explore the patients participation mechanism based on reducing the cost of patient participation.