India China in Post liberalization

The bilateral relationship between India and China is often marked as rivalry and hostility in therecent past, had been warm and cordial for centuries. India was among a few non communist toaccord recognition to the new regime of China at its very inception in the year 1949. Even aftersigning of Panch Sheel, Chinese forces when continued disturbances on the Indian boarder thatreached at climax in the month of October, 1962, and it mounted a full-fledged armed attack onthe India-China border. In 1963 a treaty was signed between Pakistan and China by whichPakistan handed a large part of the Indian Territory in Kashmir illegally. China also supportedfully Pakistan during India – Pakistan conflict in 1965 and also in 1971. This makes therelationship between countries very toughed. This is the bone of contention for which IndoChina relation is deteriorated. The Chinese perspective towards India underwent a sea changein the later part of the post cold war period. India attempts to open its economy through itsambitious economic liberalization programme. Hence the Indo-China relation is explained in thecontext of Chinese perspective towards India, India China relation in post cold war era,strengthening of Indo-US relation, G-7 matter, economic liberalization, demolition of SovietRussia, South East Asia and their relationship in the context of WTO.

O agir econômico como motor da política de saúde na Alemanha: consequências para a prevenção e promoção da saúde / Economic behaviour as leitmotiv in health policy in Germany and its consequences for prevention and health promotion

Since the mid 1970s the health policy in Germany has focused on cost containment - precisely reduction of employer's contribution for statutory health insurance (SHI). However political parties and the government have also changed their strategies to achieve this aim. The grown structures of SHI concerned with financing, provision and management remained unaltered till the early 90s. The 90s are marked by a broad transformation of the health sector. Regulatory instruments have been developed to create financial incentives for all stakeholders (sickness funds, health care providers, insured/patients) to reduce expenditure in health sector. The transformation process is marked by normative principle of taking stakeholders as economic subjects acting rationally. The article aims at evaluating the desired/undesired impacts of this paradigm shift, where solidarity is surpassed by competition, co-payment and privatisation. It shows where this paradigm change can be observed and which instruments have been used for its realisation. It is also given an analysis on the reaction of important stakeholders to this change. Finally, it is demonstrated ,by using examples of prevention and health promotion that the only focus on economic models doesnït allow health policy to adequately meet the challenges set upon it.

Privatização e processo decisório / Privatisation et processus de décision / Privatization and the decision-making process

This article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector's reorganization. However, although all four adopted some degree of privatization, the process followed different paths and designs in each country. This variation can be explained by the different institutional contexts in which the reforms were carried out. Where there was concentration of power in the Executive, privatization was launched "earlier" and approved more quickly than in countries in which such concentration waslessintense. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple veto points and stakeholders with veto power did not impede the reform, but increased the cost of its unilateral adoption by the Executive, forcing the latter to negotiate and form a minimum consensus within the governing coalition.

Dans cet article, on examine les déterminants politiques de la privatisation dans le secteur de la téléphonie fixe dans quatre pays à partir d'une approche néo-institutionnelle. Ces pays ont subi des pressions assez semblables en faveur de la privatisation des entreprises de téléphonie qui convergeaient apparemment vers la réorganisation du secteur. Malgré leur adhésion à la privatisation, chaque pays a suivi des voies et des modèles divers. Cette variation peut s'expliquer à partir des différences de contexte institutionnel où les réformes ont eu lieu. La concentration du pouvoir exécutif a contribué à un début "précoce" de la privatisation approuvée dans un délai plus court que celui des pays où cette concentration était plus faible. La présence de plusieurs points de veto et de partenaires ayant pouvoir de veto, n'a pas empêché la réforme mais a accru le coût de son adoption unilatérale par le pouvoir exécutif, imposant la négociation et la formation d'un consensus mínimum au sein de l'alliance gouvernementale.