ABSTRACT
Objective:To discuss the constraint mechanism of moral hazard from the supply side in the medical market of China.Methods:It analyzed the effectiveness of government regulation and of the influencing factors of the doctors and patients expected profits through the establishment 4 stage dynamic game model involved the doctors,patients and the government as the subject.Results:In the case of other conditions unchanged,the effective probability of government regulation would increase with the increase of profits made by excessive medical treatment,but would decrease with the increase of doctor's punishment cost and the increase of doctor's reputation value.Given the reasonable probability about medical treatment,the doctor's expected profits would increase with the increase of the value of a reasonable medical gain and doctor's reputation increase.The prospective profits of patients would increase as the doctor's profits increased,but decrease with the over-increased medical treatment.Conclusion:The effective restraint mechanism of moral hazard from the supply side of public hospitals in China included relax the price control,improve the market value of medical services,form effective doctor reputation incentive mechanism,reduce government supervision costs and improve government regulation on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE:To investigate the constraint mechanism on excessive medical behavior of doctors in Chinese medical market. METHODS:Under certain assumptions(suppose the hospital and the doctor's demands are consistent,the government and the patient's demands are consistent,etc),mixed game method(game theory)was used to analyze Nash equilibrium between government and doctors,between patients and doctors.The qualitative analysis was performed for these constraints based on the re-ality. RESULTS&CONCLUSIONS:The strict punishing mechanism and the choice right to doctor of patients and public satisfac-tion with the government can achieve the Nash equilibrium of game and effectively inhibit excessive medical behavior. The govern-ment should create a competitive environment to enhance the right of patients to select doctor and improve the relevant legal system on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility among all parties so as to strengthen the implementation of supervision. At the same time,the government should establish credit archives of the doctor to form effective reputation incentive mechanism to doc-tors,and proactively explore the patients participation mechanism based on reducing the cost of patient participation.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE:To investigate the constraint mechanism on excessive medical behavior of doctors in Chinese medical market. METHODS:Under certain assumptions(suppose the hospital and the doctor's demands are consistent,the government and the patient's demands are consistent,etc),mixed game method(game theory)was used to analyze Nash equilibrium between government and doctors,between patients and doctors.The qualitative analysis was performed for these constraints based on the re-ality. RESULTS&CONCLUSIONS:The strict punishing mechanism and the choice right to doctor of patients and public satisfac-tion with the government can achieve the Nash equilibrium of game and effectively inhibit excessive medical behavior. The govern-ment should create a competitive environment to enhance the right of patients to select doctor and improve the relevant legal system on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility among all parties so as to strengthen the implementation of supervision. At the same time,the government should establish credit archives of the doctor to form effective reputation incentive mechanism to doc-tors,and proactively explore the patients participation mechanism based on reducing the cost of patient participation.
ABSTRACT
An analysis of typical cases of the incentive-restraint mechanism in the development of medical alliances in China , discovered a number of problems as follows .These include poor top-level system design, delayed reform of the medical insurance payment system , poor performance of the two-way referral system, insufficient human resources and their unreasonable distribution , shortage of a performance appraisal and salary incentive system, and low patient support.In this regard, this paper put forward policy recommendations on the pathway to carry out the incentive and constraint mechanism of medical alliances , in terms of such aspects as top-level system design , medical insurance system , personnel and remuneration system, and two-way referral system .