Research on the doctors′ willingness of working at primary institutions and the economic incentive effect from the perspective of mental account / 中华医院管理杂志

Objective:To understand the incentive effect and influencing factors of the current economic incentive policy for medical alliances in Longhua District of Shenzhen(the alliance for short) on doctors′ willingness to work at primary medical institutions(the primary for short) from the perspective of mental account, and to explore the economic incentive effect of different economic incentive distribution methods on doctors′ willingness to work at the primary.Methods:The questionnaire was designed based on mental account theory. Random sampling was made in November 2019 for a questionnaire survey among doctors in two district-level medical institutions of the alliance in Longhua District of Shenzhen. The purpose was to analyze their inclination to work at the primary and their selection preferences for economic incentive distribution methods under the current economic incentive policy. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, and the influencing factors of doctors′ willingness to work at the primary were analyzed by χ2 test and binary logistic regression. Results:A total of 254 valid questionnaires were collected with an effective recovery rate of 90.7%. Among the respondents, 189(74.4%) were willing to work at the primary, 168(66.1%) chose to receive the economic incentives specifically for working at the primary, and 148 people(58.3%) hoped to receive such economic incentives immediately. Education background, self-rated economic income level of doctors and different payment methods of economic incentive for working at the primary had significant effects on their willingness to work at the primary( P<0.05). Conclusions:The current economic incentive policy of the alliance can meet the demands for economic incentives in terms of doctors′ material accounts, and doctors′ overall inclination to work at the primary was strong. If the amount of economic incentives is constant, doctors preferred to receive the economic incentives specifically, mainly affected by income accounts and additional income accounts. In addition, education and self-assessment of economic income level were important factors affecting the willingness of doctors to work at the primary, which may be affected by mental accounts other than material accounts.

Summarizing the Study on the Incentives Mechanism of Supplier Payment Reform Influencing the Physician Behavior / 中国卫生经济

Based on the related theories of physician behavior analysis, summarize and discuss the incentives mechanism of supplier payment on physician behavior and its inner mechanism, provide theoretical supports and political suggestions for further analysis on payment reform.

Impacto de la selección de los mecanismos de pago en la producción de atención de salud: ¿están en línea con los objetivos sanitarios? / Impact of payment mechanisms on health services production in Chile: are the mechanisms in tune with the health policy objectives?

Este trabajo intenta caracterizar de los problemas que contienen los incentivos, principalmente aquellos contenidos en los mecanismos de transferencia usados en Chile, que no se encuentran a la altura de los desafíos de la actual reforma, por lo que se requiere entrar en una fase de modificación importante. A la vez, se describe evidencia empírica que muestra efectos indeseados sobre la producción de prestaciones a nivel global, desde hace algunos años y desde 2005, con la implementación de la reforma y la introducción de las GES, asociados a los mecanismos de pago. Esto es, disminución general de la actividad del SNSS, aumento de las urgencias y de la compra externa tanto vía MLE como GES. La disminución de la actividad general del SNSS no implica una caída en la productividad ya que se produce un cambio en el case-mix de producción del sistema, incentivado por las GES y sus compromisos asociados. Esto último, puede estar reflejando problemas de acceso en lo no GES. Por último, se reseña de modo general, la propuesta que está siendo trabajada en el sector para modificar los sistemas de transferencia.

The current mechanisms of financial transfer in the Chilean Health Care System imply incentives that are not up to the challenges of the Health Reform initiated in 2002. According to the authors, important modifications are required. We present empirical evidence of the undesired effects of those mechanisms on the overall generation of health services in the last few years. Starting in 2005, the Health Reform introduced Explicit Guarantees (GES) for the Provision of certain services, and these are linked to the mechanisms of payment to the providers. There has been a general decrease in the activities of the National Health Services System, an increase of emergency care and in the purchase of external services via the Explicit Guarantees and also via the Free Choice option included in the public system. The reduction of the general activity of the public system is not matched by a fall in productivity: what we observe is a change in the case mix, which is induced mainly by the Explicit Guarantees scheme and its associated commitments. A reduction of access to non GES care may be under way. We describe the general outline of a proposed change in the financial transfer mechanisms, which is being discussed in the health sector.