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Resumo Este trabalho visa identificar o efeito da alocação de indivíduos, definidos na literatura como burocratas de médio escalão, na intermediação das relações entre a direção superior do Poder Executivo e as secretarias de Estado na relação principal-agente no âmbito da administração pública. Com base em entrevistas em profundidade com analistas de gerenciamento de projetos e metas, intermediadores da relação de agência entre a Casa Civil e unidades executoras de projetos da Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, foram examinados os efeitos de sua intermediação sobre os problemas de agência na estrutura hierárquica da administração pública decorrentes de diferenças de motivações e objetivos entre as partes, assimetrias de informação, propensões ao risco e distintos horizontes de planejamento. Os resultados mostraram os benefícios dessa intermediação para reduzir os problemas de agência, com efeitos sobre as diferenças de motivações e assimetrias de informação.
Resumen Este estudio tiene como objetivo identificar el efecto de intermediación desempeñada por funcionarios especializados, los burócratas del escalón intermedio, en la relación entre la dirección de la rama ejecutiva y las secretarías de Estado, considerando la relación principal-agente en la administración pública. Basado en entrevistas con analistas de proyectos y objetivos de gestión, los intermediarios de la relación entre la Casa Civil y unidades ejecutoras de proyectos de la municipalidad de Rio de Janeiro, se examinaron los efectos de su intermediación en la reducción de las diferencias en las motivaciones y objetivos entre las partes, las asimetrías de información y diferentes propensiones a riesgo y horizontes de planificación, con evidencias de efectos positivos sobre los dos primeros.
Abstract This article aims to identify the effects of mid-level bureaucrat's allocation in the intermediation of relations between the main authority of a city's executive branch and the city's secretariat, considering the principal-agent relationship in public administration. The study interviewed analysts responsible for goal and project management who mediate the agency relationship between the Chief of Staff and the executive bodies implementing projects put forward by Rio de Janeiro's City Hall, in order to examine the effects of the analysts' intermediation in terms of reducing agency problems. The agency problems referred to in the article are due to public administration's hierarchical structure, resulting from the differences in motivation and goals of the actors, information asymmetries, risk propensity and different planning horizon. Results show this intermediation is positive to reduce agency problems, impacting in terms of difference in motivation and information asymmetries.
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Humans , Male , Female , Organization and Administration , Public Administration , Executive , EconomicsABSTRACT
Circulation of traditional Chinese medicinal materials, as the vital part of the TCM industrial chain, plays an important role in the connection of agriculture link and industry link of traditional Chinese medicinal materials, which has influence on the healthy development of the whole TCM industrial chain. Because circulation activities mainly include exchange and storage activities instead of manufacturing real products, they are much more difficult to be managed compared with producing activity. This would lead to problems in circulation of traditional Chinese medicinal materials, and impose negative effects on TCM industry. Based on scale economy theory, information asymmetry theory and cobweb model theory, this article analyzed the problems in circulation of traditional Chinese medicinal materials, discussed the deep reasons behind these problems, and proposed relevant suggestions for optimization.
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Objective:To change the disorderly competition of home medical equipment market, explore market management approach, and improve the level of public health protection.Methods: Based on the perspective of asymmetric information theory, the analysis of the market problems is made to study the information gaps between government, businesses and consumers.Results:According to the asymmetric information among market participants lead many problems of home medical instrument market, puts forward some measures to promote the domestic medical equipment market develop healthily and rapidly. Conclusion: Government, businesses and consumers should work together to give play to the role of market signals, promote of the healthy and rapid development of the home medical equipment market.
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To establish the control model of medical insurance in hospitals, so as to improve the effectiveness of internal operation for medical insurance fund. Methods: Using the utility theory to establish the control model, with which the medical service provider is individual rationality constraints and incentive compatibility constraint. Results: The bonus coefficient and punishment coefficient can be calculated by means of evolutionary programming. Conclusion: The control model of hospital internal medical insurance fund is useful in controlling the medical insurance expense, it also provides the guidance and references for performance management and internal operation.
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Objective To establish a multi-incentivemodel for doctors based on themedical services supply chain theory, so as to provide reference for improving the incentive mechanisms for doctors and for promoting the quality of medical services. Methods Based on the asymmetric information of principai-agent model, the study developed the incentive model of doctors' behavior with output and surveillance indicators, deduced the formula for incentive intensity, and analyzed the influencing factors of incentive intensity. Results According to the obtained incentive model, the incentive intensity to the doctors and medical service suppliers was mainly correlated with external evaluation and internal surveillance results of medical service quality. Conclusion The key points for high quality medical service are to establish the external evaluation indicator and intensify the internal supervision and assessment to guide the behaviors of doctors.
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Objective: To analyze the influencing factors of investment management of hospital intangible assets, so as to provide countermeasures for establishing and optimizing the investment management system of hospital intangible assets. Methods: Taking hospital reputation as an example, we analyzed its role in the investment management of hospital intangible assets and the maintenance of hospital reputation in an economic perspective using Shapiro model and game theory. Results: The factors, such as the blueprint of hospital, efficiency of medical quality information transmission, and cost variance, all influenced the reputation of hospital. Conclusion: In the health care field, stable property right system should be established and market information agents should be cultivated. The administrative actions of involved departments should abide by the related regulation and the running system of hospitals should be optimized.
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OBJECTIVE:To put forward some suggestion to improve drug bidding system in China.METHODS:The process of drug bidding system reform and its common problems were analyzed.Game theory and information asymmetry theory were adopted to analyze the root of the problems and to put forward suggestions.RESULTS:Governments indiscriminately expanded the goals of bidding policy and strengthen price factor.They neglected important steps such as logistics distribution.Current single evaluation system can not count the medication order exactly.Delayed received payment of medical institution resulted in many problems of drug purchase.CONCLUSION:Centralized drug bidding system should be improved and enhanced.It also should be connected with relevant medical system reform to standardize drug circulation channels,reduce drug price and reduce the burden of patient.
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OBJECTIVE:To put forward strategies to evolve the current drug bidding system.METHODS:The objective and efficacy of the drug bidding system was analyzed;and the reasons for the poor efficacy of the system were analyzed using the information asymmetry theory in economics,and the system was compared with its US counterpart.RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS:The drug bidding system in China should adopt such model in which the payers are chosen as agency and charge from the entrusting party.It is a systematic project to standardize drug circulation channels,reduce drug price and reduce the burden of patient,which can't be tackled by drug bidding system only.
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The formation mechanism of converse selection and moral hazard of college nepotism is discussed in terms of the information asymmetry theory,and several suggestions are also presented to avoid nepotism. A college-teacher employment system should be well established to manage and supervise the information about teachers,and there should be regulations for teachers' practices.
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The specialization of medical science determines the objective existence of asymmetric information in medical and health industry.These different understandings in the psychological and behavioral area influenced the development of physician-patient relationship.Medical personnel should look squarely at the professional attributes and dare to play a leading role.Meanwhile,the exchange of the role of patient and medical personnel,understanding patient,clearing of communication channels and enlarging patients′ means of communication will promote harmonious relations between doctors and patients.
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There are serious moral hazards in medical insurance because of information asymmetry.Moral hazards can make different degree influence on the medicare supply,demand and supervision of usage.From the 1960s,scholars have much research and discussion on the different main body that be of moral hazard,on the influence of moral hazard to welfare,on the measure of moral hazard and on the methods that how to control moral hazard.This paper summarizes the related viewpoints and conclusions that come from the above four aspects.
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As a common issue,information asymmetry has been a hot topic in the micro-economy field.It is also prominent in clinic as well as the medical insurance.The low efficiency and unfairness caused by information asymmetry will lead to a series of ethical problems.To solve the problems,the construction of moral system and rule are needed.
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Objective:To analyze the influencing factors of investment management of hospital intangible assets,so as to provide countermeasures for establishing and optimizing the investment management system of hospital intangible assets.Methods: Taking hospital reputation as an example,we analyzed its role in the investment management of hospital intangible assets and the maintenance of hospital reputation in an economic perspective using Shapiro model and game theory.Results: The factors,such as the blueprint of hospital,efficiency of medical quality information transmission,and cost variance,all influenced the reputation of hospital.Conclusion: In the health care field,stable property right system should be established and market information agents should be cultivated.The administrative actions of involved departments should abide by the related regulation and the running system of hospitals should be optimized.