ABSTRACT
El juicio celebrado en Jerusalén en 1961 a Adolf Eichmann, el responsable de la logística necesaria para el exterminio perpetrado por los nazis, fue el escenario para dos evitaciones. La primera de ellas es la del propio acusado quien, amparándose en el argumento de la obediencia a órdenes superiores, desconocía su lugar en el exterminio. De este modo, se proponía como un mero engranaje. La segunda es la del propio derecho que no puede acusar por obediencia a órdenes superiores. Por ello, se recurrió a argumentos de contenido psicológico para condenar a quien, en verdad, era culpable de obedecer. Este trabajo pone de relieve a la obediencia como un problema culturalmente irresuelto en la medida que sirve de refugio para malestares diversos...
Adolf Eichmann's trial, that took place in Jerusalem in 1961, was the scenario of two fallacious arguments regarding responsibility/accountability. The first one was that of the accused himself who, invoking the argument of 'due obedience to superior orders', denied his responsibility in the part he played in the extermination, claiming to have been a mere clog in the wheel. The second fallacy, was the Law as a discipline, which states that those acting under due obedience to superior orders cannot be accused, which is why it resorted to psychological arguments to condemn a person who, in truth, was guilty of obeying. This work highlights due obedience as a culturally unresolved problem in that it serves as refuge for situations that arouse varying degrees of discontent and unrest