RESUMEN
Objective: To analyze the behavior choices of county-level doctors in county-level and township service collaboration based on game theory, and provide basis for promoting county-level and township service collaboration. Methods: It established a game model for county-level doctors’ treatment plan selection in county-level and township service collaboration, and analyzed the profits and losses of coun-ty-level hospitals, doctors and patients. Results: The patient in the service collaboration would benefit the most, only if county hospital doctors were willing to collaborate and there were enough policy supporting collaboration, would the county hospital collaboration. Conclusion: At present, there was a lack of institutional constraints on doctors’ behavior in county-level and township service collaboration. The system of grading diagnosis and treatment was unreasonable. The costs and benefits of doctors in service collaboration were not equal. Doctors lacked motivation for collaboration. Since the doctor at the county-level income mainly depended on the incention of policies and performance, doctors at the county level under the condition of no cooperative was the optimal solution. From the perspective of game theory, to encourage county-level doctors to cooperate in service better, it needed to strengthen its comprehensive recognition of two levels of service collaboration, change the income structure and reduce the cost of service collaboration.