RESUMEN
The in-depth improvement of medical treatment is particularly important for the integrity, systema-ticity and synergy of the reform. Through the theoretical analysis of physician's incentive expectation, it was found that the doctor's behavior is continuously affected by the three pairs of motivational relationships, and the interrupted or distorted incentive relationship is not conducive to guiding the reasonable service delivery from physicians. In these three pairs of incentive relationship, the two reforms of medical insurance payment system and physician's salary system occupy an important position, and their degree of correlation is extremely high. Only when the two are effectively synergistic can the incentive compatibility" of public medical institutions and physicians be realized to achieve the expected results. The goal of is to make a change in the physician's behavior as expected by the health system in the reform.
RESUMEN
Physician payment system (PPS) is a principal incentive system to motivate doctors to provide excellent care for patients. During the past decade, physician remuneration in China has not been in proportional to physician's average work load and massive responsibilities. This paper reviewed the constitution of the PPS in China, and further discussed the problems and issues to be addressed with respect to pay for performance. Our study indicated that the lower basic salary and bonus distribution tied to "profits" was the major contributor to the physician's profit-driven incentive and the potential cause for the speedy growth of health expenditures. We recommend that government funding to hospitals should be increased to fully cover physicians' basic salary, a flexible human resource and talent management mechanism needs to be established that severs personal interest between physicians and hospitals, and modern performance assessment and multiplexed payment systems should be piloted to encourage physicians to get the more legitimate compensation.
RESUMEN
Physician payment system (PPS) is a principal incentive system to motivate doctors to provide excellent care for patients. During the past decade, physician remuneration in China has not been in proportional to physician's average work load and massive responsibilities. This paper reviewed the constitution of the PPS in China, and further discussed the problems and issues to be addressed with respect to pay for performance. Our study indicated that the lower basic salary and bonus distribution tied to "profits" was the major contributor to the physician's profit-driven incentive and the potential cause for the speedy growth of health expenditures. We recommend that government funding to hospitals should be increased to fully cover physicians' basic salary, a flexible human resource and talent management mechanism needs to be established that severs personal interest between physicians and hospitals, and modern performance assessment and multiplexed payment systems should be piloted to encourage physicians to get the more legitimate compensation.