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1.
Univ. psychol ; 15(3): 1-6, jul.-set. 2016. ilus
Artículo en Inglés | LILACS | ID: biblio-963181

RESUMEN

We synthesize the main findings from two studies that examined moral judgement abilities in people with autism, and in people with Down syndrome. In both studies, the way these people mentally combine information about the intent of a harmful act and the severity of its consequences when attributing blame to an offender was compared with that of typically developing controls. Adolescents and adults with autism or with Down syndrome were, practically to the same extent as controls, able to take into account both information pieces for attributing blame. It would be an exaggeration to imply that adolescents and adults with either autism or Down syndrome are severely immature in moral judgement based on the fact that they are usually not able to explain or justify their judgements with sophisticated philosophical arguments. By contrast, children with autism blame attribution appeared to be essentially based on consequence information. The finding that adolescents and adults with autism or Down syndrome are able to make moral judgements in a way that is not very different from adolescents and adults of the same age could influence the way these people are perceived, cared for, and attributed basic rights.


Sintetizamos las principales conclusiones de dos estudios que examinaron la capacidad de juicio moral en personas con autismo y en personas con síndrome de Down. En ambos estudios, la forma en que estas personas combinan mentalmente la información acerca de la intención que puede haber en un acto perjudicial y la gravedad de sus consecuencias cuando se atribuye la culpa a un delincuente, se comparó con la de un grupo control (con desarrollo normal). Adolescentes y adultos con autismo o con síndrome de Down fueron, prácticamente de la misma medida que los del grupo control, capaces de tener en cuenta ambas piezas de información para atribuir la culpa. Sería una exageración asegurar que los adolescentes y los adultos, ya sea con autismo o síndrome de Down son severamente inmaduros en sus juicios morales basado en el hecho de que por lo general no son capaces de explicar o justificar sus juicios con argumentos filosóficos sofisticados. Por el contrario, los niños con autismo que realizaron atribución de culpa parecían basarse esencialmente en la información sobre la consecuencia. El hallazgo de que los adolescentes y adultos con autismo o síndrome de Down son capaces de hacer juicios morales de una manera que no es muy diferente a la de los adolescentes y los adultos de la misma edad podría influir en la forma en que estas personas son perciben, cuidadas, y valoradas en sus derechos básicos.

2.
Chinese Journal of Behavioral Medicine and Brain Science ; (12): 861-864, 2015.
Artículo en Chino | WPRIM | ID: wpr-480879

RESUMEN

Objective To review psychopathic individuals' moral judgments and the underlying neural mechanisms in order to provide cognitive basis and the corresponding intervention for their socially deviant behavior.Methods Literatures were searched in Academic Search Premier,Science Direct,Highwire,PubMed and Wanfang database by July 2015.Index strategy:AB [psychopathy OR psychopathic] AND AB [moral judgments OR moral reasoning].Forty-seven articles including six in Chinese were chosen based on their abstracts and key words.Results 33 papers were adopted finally including 2 in Chinese.Most of the papers involved representative empirical studies within five years.Conclusion Compared with non-psychopathic individuals,psychopathic individuals are inclined to consider moral transgressions as more acceptable and are more inclined to make utilitarian moral judgments.Their impairment in moral judgments is associated with dysfunction in specific brain regions such as amygdale,dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,and ventromedial prefrontal cortex,and dysfunction in the basic brain system.Psychopathic individuals' moral judgment impairment needs to be examined within the frame of affect and their moral reasoning processes should be investigated in the future.

3.
Psicopedagogia ; 31(94): 21-34, 2014. tab
Artículo en Portugués | LILACS | ID: lil-720283

RESUMEN

Refletindo sobre a importância das virtudes no desenvolvimento moral, nosso objetivo foi investigar as concepções das crianças sobre o amor. Entrevistamos, individualmente, 40 crianças, de 6 e 9 anos, em uma escola particular de Vila Velha-ES, de acordo com o método clínico proposto por Piaget. Solicitamos que cada criança mencionasse exemplos de experiência de amor e, posteriormente, justificasse suas respostas. Os exemplos mais citados foram 'ações de amor para outrem' (como ajudar e cuidar) e 'amor por determinada(s) pessoa(s)' (pessoas da família e amigos, entre outros), que aumentaram com a idade; e 'ações com amor' (como brincar e beijar), que apresentaram um decréscimo. As justificativas ressaltaram, principalmente, a consequência positiva que o exemplo de amor propiciaria, especialmente, a si próprio, ou seja, um interesse próprio que aumentou com a idade. Salientamos que o sentimento foi mencionado tanto como exemplo de amor, como justificativa. Verificamos que a concepção que as crianças têm do amor é ampla, sendo importante, portanto, darmos ênfase no processo de formação dessa virtude, uma vez que o amor auxilia na formação moral. Assim, esperamos incentivar outros trabalhos e discussões sobre o amor, contribuindo para propostas de educação e auxiliando na formação moral das crianças...


Reflecting on the importance of virtues in moral development, our aim was to investigate children's concepts about love. We individually interviewed 40 children, 6 and 9 years old, in a private school in Vila Velha-ES, according to the clinical method proposed by Piaget. We asked each child to mention examples of experiences of love, and then later, to justify their answers. The examples cited were 'giving love to others' (such as helping and caring) and 'love for (a) particular person/ people' (family members and friends, among others), which increased with age, and 'actions with love' (like playing and kissing), which showed a decrease. The reasons pointed out, especially, the positive result that an example of love would provide, especially to them, that is, an interest in oneself that increased with age. We underline that the feeling was mentioned both as an example of love and as a justification. It was verified that the concept children have of love is wide, so it is important, therefore, to give emphasis on the process of formation of this virtue, since love helps in the moral formation. Thus, hopefully we encourage other works and discussions about love, contributing to proposals for education and assisting in the moral formation of children...


Asunto(s)
Humanos , Masculino , Femenino , Niño , Niño , Amor , Moral , Valores Sociales
4.
Salud ment ; 30(3): 1-11, may.-jun. 2007.
Artículo en Español | LILACS | ID: biblio-986013

RESUMEN

resumen está disponible en el texto completo


Summary This work presents a critical review of the historical, theoretical, and neurobiological bases of the theory of moral emotions. Neuroimaging methods and protocols used to study the neural correlates of moral emotions and the analysis of the brain functions involved in their processing, permit the formulation of hypotheses that attempt to understand some emotional and cognitive processes related to moral emotions. One such hypothesis refers to a neuro-matrix involving sensory systems, brainstemmediated physiological reactions and frontal brain regions processing the interaction between moral and emotional stimuli. Cross-cultural research on human facial expression has identified universal patterns to express basic emotions such as fear, anger, or happiness. Nevertheless, the experience of some emotions and their facial expressions are regulated by social and cultural mechanisms. This type of regulation is observed in moral emotions since they are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole, or of persons other than the judge or agent. Two typical features that identify moral emotions are their typical elicitors and tendencies towards specific actions. The release of a moral emotion is the perception of implicit and explicit violations of social norms and stereotypes included in personal codes, attitudes, and beliefs. In turn, the actions ensuing from moral emotions are communal or prosocial, because they promote a benefit in others and/or in the social order. Although there is not a definitive taxonomy of moral emotions, four families of prosocial feelings are suggested: a) other-condemning emotions (contempt, anger, disgust); b) self-conscious emotions (shame, embarrassment, guilt); c) other-suffering emotions (compassion); d) other-praising emotions (gratitude, awe, elevation). Such emotions are relevant to the concept of morality because this is a complex representation that includes models of prohibited actions, notions of good and bad, concepts of fairness, ideals of justice, or justifications of punitive actions. Moreover, the cognitive processes and behaviors involved in moral emotions are related to the theory of mind that refers the ability to represent the mental and emotional states of others, such as their thoughts, desires, beliefs, intentions, and knowledge. The neurobiological substrate of this capacity involves cerebral regions related to the experience of basic emotions, such as the amygdala and the cingulated cortex, and regions related to complex cognition and emotional-social contexts, such as the prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus. Neurobiological approaches to moral emotions have become relevant to study psychopathologies linked to antisocial behaviors, particularly the psychopathic or Antisocial Personality Disorder. Psychopaths show decreased emotional and physiological reactions to emotional stimuli and deficiencies to identify emotional expressions. However, they do not fail to represent or to infer others mental states or theory of mind. Therefore, the psychopathic disorder is not only linked to distortions in interpreting socially-learned moral values, but also to alterations of cognitive processes required to link the affective system to moral values. This assumption is supported by brain-imaging studies demonstrating the involvement of areas associated to the processing of complex social stimulus and language, such as prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, polar frontal cortex, and anterior temporal lobe in psychopathic patients. The affected areas also include regions such as the amygdala, ventromedial hypothalamus, thalamus, and caudate nucleus involved in the experience or expression of emotions. Scientific publications directly referring to the neurobiological research of moral emotions and the evaluation of moral judgments occupy a period between 2001 and 2005. The neurobiology of moral emotions has evolved rapidly by the use neuro-imaging techniques such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET). Brain images related to moral emotions are obtained by the use of moral stimuli in three types of situations: (a) while subjects resolve cognitive tasks, for example, reading moral emotional statements, (b) during passive or instructed viewing of affective pictures, or (c) during the resolution of moral dilemmas. The brain areas that become significantly active during these tasks provide a neurobiological interpretation of the mental operations involved in moral emotions. Thus, the medial frontal gyrus is activated during the elaborate personal and impersonal moral judgments produced by viewing moral pictures, attributing intentionality of movement, processing of facial expressions, and during the attribution of mental states (theory of mind). The posterior cingulated, restrosplenial, and precuneus cortex are associated with the elaboration of moral judgments elicited by viewing moral pictures and theory of mind. The superior temporal sulcus and the parietal lobe are related with moral judgments while viewing moral and emotional pictures and films, and attributing intentional movements. The superior temporal sulcus is also associated with the processing of social contexts. Orbitofronal and ventromedial frontal cortex is associated with the processing of simple moral judgments while viewing moral pictures, the evaluation of emotionally-charged social events, during empathy and attribution. The temporal pole is also associated with theory of mind, the elaboration of simple moral judgments and with the recalling of emotional situations. The amygdala is activated during the processing of moral pictures and social events based on facial expressions. Other empirical investigations involving a moral interpretation of data such as studies of general emotions, empathy, theory of mind, neurological disorders, and antisocial behavior, are also relevant to understand the brain activation patterns associated to cognitive and emotional social functions. Working models of psychopathologies that manifest antisocial behaviors are also required to interpret neuroimaging data. Meta-analyses of human behavior and proto-moral behavior in non-human species related to the elaboration of moral judgments and emotions are also relevant for the same purpose. Finally, moral emotion research requires the elaboration of accurate protocols based on psychological approaches directed to elicit particular moral emotions which enable the definition and neural substrates of its specific qualities.

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