RESUMEN
Background: India recently launched Ayushman Bharat – National Health Protection Mission – an upgraded version of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY), which is projected as world's largest public insurance scheme by numbers. The new scheme can certainly draw learning from the former (RSBY) to ensure better reach and success. RSBY has been extensively analyzed for supply-side barriers but sparsely for demand and supply-side barriers simultaneously. Objectives: Through this study, authors intend to determine causality as well as configurations (pathways) of demand and supply barriers that make beneficiary vulnerable even under the scheme. The study explores the interaction of barriers that lead to patient dis/satisfaction, overcharging for a medical procedure and high disease severity among beneficiaries. Methods: The study uses RSBY insurance claim records from 2013 to 2015 backed up by posthospitalization survey of the state of Chhattisgarh, India. It employs a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to determine causality and configuration (path-way) of parameters leading to the outcome. Results: Provision of medicine emerges as a necessary condition for patient satisfaction. Waiting time did not appear as a necessary parameter of satisfaction. Overcharging the cashless card in case of minor surgical procedures is observed irrespective of beneficiaries' education and occupation status. Urban male and rural female appear to bear high disease severity. Conclusions: Results have implication for policymakers and implementors to recognize the segment that remains vulnerable under the scheme and gain insights on the parameters of patient satisfaction.
RESUMEN
Background & objective: Given that Ayushman Bharat Yojna was launched in 2018 in India, analysis of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY) become relevant. The objective of this study was to examine the scheme design and the incentive structure under RSBY. Methods: The study was conducted in the districts of Patiala and Yamunanagar in the States of Punjab and Haryana, respectively (2011-2013). The mixed method study involved review of key documents; 20 in-depth interviews of key stakeholders; 399 exit interviews of RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries in Patiala and 353 in Yamunanagar from 12 selected RSBY empanelled hospitals; and analysis of secondary databases from State nodal agencies and district medical officers. Results: Insurance companies had considerable implementation responsibilities which led to conflict of interest in enrolment and empanelment. Enrolment was 15 per cent in Patiala and 42 per cent in Yamunanagar. Empanelment of health facilities was 17 (15%) in Patiala and 37 (30%) in Yamunanagar. Private-empanelled facilities were geographically clustered in the urban parts of the sub-districts. Monitoring was weak and led to breach of contracts. RSBY beneficiaries incurred out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures (?5748); however, it was lower than that for non-RSBY (?10667). The scheme had in-built incentives for Centre, State, insurance companies and health providers (both public and private). There were no incentives for health staff for additional RSBY activities. Interpretation & conclusions: RSBY has in-built incentives for all stakeholders. Some of the gaps identified in the scheme design pertained to poor enrolment practices, distribution of roles and responsibilities, fixed package rates, weak monitoring and supervision, and incurring OOP expenditure.