RESUMO
Resumen En su proceso de definición y consolidación, las ciencias de la vida se enfrentaron con la dicotomía sobre si la mejor manera de aproximarse a su objeto de estudio era seguir el modelo de la física -considerado el modelo científico por excelencia- o desligarse de este. La manera en la que este debate se decantó en cada disciplina tuvo consecuencias en el desarrollo posterior y en los alcances epistemológicos de las nuevas ciencias en consolidación. La comparación de la manera en la que se dio este debate en la biología y la psicología resulta relevante para entender la trayectoria de estas ciencias y sus posibilidades de integración disciplinar: la biología consiguió la unificación disciplinar integrándose alrededor de la teoría evolutiva, mientras que la psicología no consiguió exitosamente esa integración. Esto fue en parte por el intento de conectarse con las ciencias naturales a través de la fisiología, lo que, además, supuso un obstáculo para la comprensión e integración del principio unificador de la biología.
Abstract During the XIX century, different sciences were structured or consolidated in their modern form. Until then, biology, earth sciences, social sciences, and even physics, chemistry, and mathematics did not exist as autonomous disciplines as we know them today. In that century, the notion of "science" was utterly separated from natural philosophy, theology, and other forms of traditional knowledge. The consolidation of scientific disciplines was characterized by deep debates on the possibilities and methods of knowing the natural and human worlds. In their process of consolidation, all life sciences faced a dichotomy related to the best way to approach their object of study: should they follow the model of physics -considered the scientific model par excellence- or not take that model into account? This dichotomy provoked intense debates in all disciplines. The way this debate was resolved had lasting consequences in the subsequent development and the epistemological scope of the new sciences in consolidation. Comparing how this debate took place in biology and psychology is relevant to understanding the disciplinary trajectory followed by each science and the possibilities of integration in each field of knowledge. There is a generalized assumption in the history of psychology that the experimental paradigm adopted extensively in psychology at the end of the XIX century would have placed the discipline under the scientific status of natural sciences. However, in biology and psychology, there was a tension between a physiological-experimental paradigm and a historical-evolutionary paradigm. Understanding those debates within biology, and the comprehension of how biology achieved its disciplinary integration, shows why the experimental connection of psychology with physiology did not mean an explicit connection with the whole of the natural sciences. Disciplinary integration in biology was possible because of adopting the evolutionary principle under a historic paradigm instead of a physical-chemical one. That is why the experimental connection of psychology with physiology eventually became an obstacle for psychology in adopting the unifying principle of biology, the Theory of Evolution, as their basis for disciplinary integration. The first part of this article describes how two branches emerged in the process of consolidation of biology: physiological-experimental and historical-evolutionary. Each one had a different approach to its object of study, but both were necessary to form what is now modern biology. The second part focuses on unifying biology as a field of scientific knowledge, bringing the two branches of this science together under the evolutionary paradigm. The third part outlines the central debates in the consolidation of psychology as a scientific discipline at the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the 20th century. It introduces implications of how these debates on knowledge in psychology developed, as opposed to how it happened in biology. Finally, the difficulties of psychology connecting with the theory of evolution are addressed, as are the impossibility of integrating the different branches of the discipline.