Agrotóxicos no Brasil: padrões de uso, política da regulação e prevenção da captura regulatória

Agrotóxicos são, ao mesmo tempo, insumos agrícolas e produtos perigosos, razão pela qual devem ser regulados pelo Estado. Contudo, se evidências científicas sobre impactos de agrotóxicos são universais, por que a sua regulação varia de país para país? O texto argumenta que ela depende, em parte, do poder relativo de grupos que ganham e que perdem com a regulação. Regulações sobre agrotóxicos não são criadas e implementadas por órgãos de Estado politicamente neutros: elas resultam da influência relativa de grupos organizados. Neste "jogo", grupos que concentram os custos ou benefícios de um ambiente regulado possuem mais incentivos para a mobilização do que grupos para os quais custos ou benefícios são difusos. Isto não impede, contudo, que grupos dispersos influenciem o processo regulatório, utilizando-se principalmente de normas e conhecimento técnico. O texto analisa, ainda, a evolução do uso de agrotóxicos no Brasil desde o início dos anos 1990, com foco em como este foi concentrado em algumas lavouras e regiões do país. O trabalho também sugere um conjunto de políticas, com ênfase na prevenção da captura de órgãos reguladores, quais sejam: i) manter um sistema de registro de agrotóxicos não centralizado em órgãos da área de estímulo à agricultura; ii) criar mecanismos que previnam o fenômeno que a literatura denomina de "porta giratória"; iii) aumentar a participação de organizações da sociedade civil e de especialistas; iv) treinar agentes públicos nas áreas de relações com o setor privado, política da regulação e captura regulatória; e v) manter garantias para a liberdade de expressão. Por fim, o texto explora potenciais efeitos de dinâmicas Norte-Sul sobre a regulação de agrotóxicos no Brasil, especialmente decorrentes do fato de que a produção no Brasil é quase toda controlada por empresas multinacionais.

Pesticides are not only agricultural inputs but also dangerous products, reason why the state must regulate them. However, if scientific evidence about the effects of pesticides is universal, why do regulations vary across countries? This article argues that pesticide regulation depends in part on the relative power of groups that gain and that lose with a certain type of regulation. Regulations are not created and implemented by politically neutral state agencies: they result from the relative influence of organized groups. In this "game", groups that concentrate costs or benefits of a hypothetical regulation have more incentives to mobilize than groups for which costs or benefits are diffuse. Yet, this does not prevent the latter from influencing the regulatory process, mainly through norms and scientific knowledge. The text also analyses how the use of pesticides evolved in Brazil since the beginning of the 1990s, focusing on how their use is concentrated in some crops and regions. Finally, the paper suggests a set of policies, with emphasis on preventing regulatory capture: i) maintaining a system of registration of pesticides not centralized in agencies working only to promote agricultural production; ii) creating mechanisms to prevent what the literature calls the "revolving door" problem; iii) increasing the participation of civil society organizations and experts; iv) training civil servants on relations with the private sector, regulation and regulatory capture; and v) maintaining guarantees for the freedom of expression and opinion. Finally, the text explores the potential effects of north south dynamics on the pesticide regulation in Brazil, especially the fact that the production of pesticides in Brazil is controlled by multinational companies.

Analysis on the interest groups of hospital information disclosure in the United States / 中国卫生政策研究

Through the literature combing the interest groups of hospital information disclosure in the United States, the demand and practice of the main interest groups are analyzed. This paper uses policy maker4. 0 software to further analyze the interests of various interest groups, power and the degree of influence by the policy of hospital information disclosure. The results showed that interest groups involved in hospital information disclosure in the Unit-ed States can be mainly divided into five categories:consumers, employers, health insurance companies, hospitals, and decision makers ( government) . In order to balance the cost-effectiveness of various insurance schemes, health insurance companies choose high-quality service providers to restrict poor-service providers and insurers, and hospi-tals need to use public information to manage and improve health care. In order to monitor and improve the quality of medical services, employers need to weigh various insurance plans, health insurance companies have to measure the service quality of themselves and competitors, and hospitals need to manage and improve the medical quality and in-crease market share. As the largest stake in the hospital information disclosure, the results show that the consumer's position on the hospital information disclosure is low support. From the consumer as a main, although the hospital in-formation disclosure practices but the right to speak and other small powers have a limited participation. Analyzing the of the interest groups of hospital information disclosure in the United States, they all push forward the hospital infor-mation disclosure work to provide evidence to support.

Health insurance reform in the U. S and implications for China / 中国卫生政策研究

The United States has distinguishing qualities in terms of health insurance with commercial health insurance as the main body, Medicare and Medicaid for the supplement. It is also the only developed country that has failed to realize universal health care. In fact, since 1912, the federal government has promoted the universal health insurance legislation, but due to party division, interest groups, and other ideological factors, the legislative process has been slow. In 2012, the Obama administration led the final passage of the health care bill which laid the institu-tional foundation on the road toward universal health care. The Reform of American health insurance has important implications for China, especially with a focus on the rule of law and democratic participation, and its private health insurance management and cost control experiences in medicine serve as an important reference for improving the quality of health insurance with expanded coverage.

Preferências domésticas e instituições do processo decisório em política econômica externa / Domestic preferences and institutions in the foreign economic policy decision-making process / Préférences nationales et institutions du processus décisionnel en politique économique extérieure

This article discusses the dynamics of nongovernmental domestic actors in the foreign economic policy decision-making process. The article addresses four questions: (1) Do nongovernmental actors influence foreign economic policy decisions? (2) What determines their preferences for given policies? (3) What institutional characteristics in the decision-making process offer greater or lesser permeability to demands by domestic actors? (4) Which institutional variables affect the interaction between societal and governmental interests? The author discusses the answers to these questions provided by the literature. The argument is that the existing theoretical perspectives offer only partial explanations to the dynamics at hand and need to be better integrated in order to adequately understand them.

Dans cet article, on discute la dynamique de la participation d'acteurs domestiques non-gouvernementaux dans le processus décisionnel de la politique économique extérieure. On examine quatre questions: 1) les acteurs nationaux non-gouvernementaux influent-ils sur les décisions de politique économique extérieure?; 2) qu'est-ce qui fait que ces acteurs préfèrent certaines politiques?; 3) quelles caractéristiques institutionnelles du processus décisionnel offrent une plus grande perméabilité aux demandes des acteurs nationaux?; 4) quelles variables institutionnelles nuisent à l'intéraction d'acteurs de la société et du gouvernement? On discute les réponses que la littérature offre à ces questions. On avance que les perspectives théoriques existantes offrent des explications partielles pour l'objet à l'étude et doivent être intégrées pour qu'il puisse être compris de façon adéquate.