Study on the reimbursement rules of catastrophic disease health insurance in China / 中国卫生政策研究
Chinese Journal of Health Policy
;
(12): 1-5, 2016.
Article
in Chinese
| WPRIM
| ID: wpr-486203
ABSTRACT
Moral hazard in the catastrophic disease health insurance has challenged the sustainability of med-ical budget funds. This paper studies the health care reimbursement rule to counteract moral hazard. Theoretical a-nalysis shows that in the target to maximize social welfare, the optimal rule is to provide consumers who choose low-cost treatment with subsidies and charge a co-payment to those who choose high-cost one. Adopting simulation ap-proach shows that this difference with respect to single reimbursement rules, healthcare expenses and medical insur-ance premiums will be significantly reduced compared to a unified co-payment ratio. This paper also selects the sensitivity test simulation parameters and the results show that different values will not change the herein disclosed mechanism results.
Full text:
Available
Index:
WPRIM (Western Pacific)
Language:
Chinese
Journal:
Chinese Journal of Health Policy
Year:
2016
Type:
Article
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