Analysis on Evolutionary Game and Countermeasures for Drug Safety Regulation / 中国药房
China Pharmacy
; (12): 2593-2595, 2016.
Article
en Zh
| WPRIM
| ID: wpr-501095
Biblioteca responsable:
WPRO
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE:To put forward game strategy of drug safety regulation,and to provide reference for decision-making by drug regulation department. METHODS:Based on evolutionary game theory,evolutionary game model of drug safety regula-tion was established,and the stability of evolution during drug safety regulation was analyzed. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS:There were four possible evolutionary game results of drug safety regulation,including to provide qualified drugs,regulation;to provide unqualified drugs,regulation;to provide qualified drugs,no regulation;to provide unqualified drugs,no regulation. The evolution direction mainly depends on the parameter values involved in the payoff matrix of drug safety regulation. The stable state of drug safety regulation is related to regulation strength,regulation cost,enterprise safety input,probability of accident,acci-dent-related treatment cost,et al. Key strategies to improve drug safety regulation include increasing punishment,improving moni-toring technology,strengthening coordination mechanism,promoting social cohabitation and improving industry self-control.
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Índice:
WPRIM
Tipo de estudio:
Prognostic_studies
Idioma:
Zh
Revista:
China Pharmacy
Año:
2016
Tipo del documento:
Article