Government regulation capture and hindrance mechanism at public hospitals as seen from the principal-agent perspective / 中华医院管理杂志
Chinese Journal of Hospital Administration
; (12): 708-711, 2014.
Article
em Zh
| WPRIM
| ID: wpr-456446
Biblioteca responsável:
WPRO
ABSTRACT
There is a high degree of information asymmetry in medical services.Public hospitals are characteristic of the nature of multi-layer principal-agent relationships.Asymmetric information can lead to inconsistent value goals between the principal and the agent,giving birth to the government regulation capture as a result.Such capture ranks a fundamental cause for diluted public welfare nature of public hospitals.To offset such capture at public hospitals calls for reconstruction of government regulation system within the framework of public hospital corporate governance at an institution level.It is also necessary to eliminate the information asymmetry and its negative results,bringing public hospitals back on track to public welfare.
Texto completo:
1
Índice:
WPRIM
Idioma:
Zh
Revista:
Chinese Journal of Hospital Administration
Ano de publicação:
2014
Tipo de documento:
Article