BACKGROUND: In recognition of the interconnected nature of complex challenges such as COVID-19, a collaborative, multisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach, referred to as One Health, has been employed to address sustainable development and strengthen global health security. Although significant investments have been made to build global health capacity, characterization of the One Health is absent from the literature. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We collected and analyzed perspectives from students, graduates, workers, and employers in One Health through a multinational online survey across health disciplines and sectors. Respondents were recruited through professional networks. A total of 828 respondents from 66 countries participated, representing governmental and academic institutions and students, among others; 57% were female, and 56% had completed professional health degrees. Interpersonal communication, communication with non-scientific audiences, and the ability to work in transdisciplinary teams were valued in the workplace and were considered essential competencies to build an interdisciplinary health workforce. Employers indicated difficulty recruiting workers, while workers indicated limited availability of positions. Employers identified limited funding and ill-defined career pathways as prominent challenges for retaining One Health workers. CONCLUSIONS: Successful One Health workers use interpersonal skills and scientific knowledge to address complex health challenges. Aligning the definition of One Health will likely improve the matching of job seekers and employers. Encouraging the employment of the One Health approach for a diverse range of positions, even if they do not explicitly include "One Health" in the job title, and clarifying the expectations, roles and responsibilities within a transdisciplinary team will lead to building a stronger workforce. As One Health has evolved to address food insecurity, emerging diseases, and antimicrobial resistance, it holds promise for supporting an interdisciplinary global health workforce that can make substantial progress on Sustainable Development Goals and improve global health security for all.
Subject(s)COVID-19 , Health Workforce , Humans , Female , Male , Global Health , COVID-19/epidemiology , Workplace , Workforce
We describe animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a zoo setting in Indiana, USA. A vaccinated African lion with physical limitations requiring hand feeding tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 after onset of respiratory signs. Zoo employees were screened, monitored prospectively for onset of symptoms, then rescreened as indicated; results were confirmed by using reverse transcription PCR and whole-genome virus sequencing when possible. Traceback investigation narrowed the source of infection to 1 of 6 persons. Three exposed employees subsequently had onset of symptoms, 2 with viral genomes identical to the lion's. Forward contact tracing investigation confirmed probable lion-to-human transmission. Close contact with large cats is a risk factor for bidirectional zoonotic SARS-CoV-2 transmission that should be considered when occupational health and biosecurity practices at zoos are designed and implemented. SARS-CoV-2 rapid testing and detection methods for big cats and other susceptible animals should be developed and validated to enable timely implementation of One Health investigations.
Subject(s)COVID-19 , Lions , Animals , Humans , SARS-CoV-2/genetics , COVID-19/veterinary , Indiana/epidemiology , Contact Tracing
OBJECTIVE: To characterize clinical and epidemiologic features of SARS-CoV-2 in companion animals detected through both passive and active surveillance in the US. ANIMALS: 204 companion animals (109 cats, 95 dogs) across 33 states with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections between March 2020 and December 2021. PROCEDURES: Public health officials, animal health officials, and academic researchers investigating zoonotic SARS-CoV-2 transmission events reported clinical, laboratory, and epidemiologic information through a standardized One Health surveillance process developed by the CDC and partners. RESULTS: Among dogs and cats identified through passive surveillance, 94% (n = 87) had reported exposure to a person with COVID-19 before infection. Clinical signs of illness were present in 74% of pets identified through passive surveillance and 27% of pets identified through active surveillance. Duration of illness in pets averaged 15 days in cats and 12 days in dogs. The average time between human and pet onset of illness was 10 days. Viral nucleic acid was first detected at 3 days after exposure in both cats and dogs. Antibodies were detected starting 5 days after exposure, and titers were highest at 9 days in cats and 14 days in dogs. CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Results of the present study supported that cats and dogs primarily become infected with SARS-CoV-2 following exposure to a person with COVID-19, most often their owners. Case investigation and surveillance that include both people and animals are necessary to understand transmission dynamics and viral evolution of zoonotic diseases like SARS-CoV-2.
Subject(s)COVID-19 , Cat Diseases , Dog Diseases , Animals , Cats , Humans , Dogs , United States/epidemiology , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/veterinary , Cat Diseases/epidemiology , Dog Diseases/epidemiology , Zoonoses/epidemiology , Pets
Zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from infected humans to other animals has been documented around the world, most notably in mink farming operations in Europe and the United States. Outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 on Utah mink farms began in late July 2020 and resulted in high mink mortality. An investigation of these outbreaks revealed active and past SARS-CoV-2 infections in free-roaming and in feral cats living on or near several mink farms. Cats were captured using live traps, were sampled, fitted with GPS collars, and released on the farms. GPS tracking of these cats show they made frequent visits to mink sheds, moved freely around the affected farms, and visited surrounding residential properties and neighborhoods on multiple occasions, making them potential low risk vectors of additional SARS-CoV-2 spread in local communities.
Subject(s)COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Cats , Animals , Humans , Mink , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/veterinary , Farms , Utah/epidemiology
Zoonotic diseases represent a heavy global burden, causing important economic losses, impacting animal health and production, and costing millions of human lives. The vaccination of animals and humans to prevent inter-species zoonotic disease transmission is an important intervention. However, efforts to develop and implement vaccine interventions to reduce zoonotic disease impacts are often limited to the veterinary and agricultural sectors and do not reflect the shared burden of disease. Multisectoral collaboration, including co-development opportunities for human and animal vaccines, expanding vaccine use to include animal reservoirs such as wildlife, and strategically using vaccines to interrupt complex transmission cycles is needed. Addressing zoonoses requires a multi-faceted One Health approach, wherein vaccinating people and animals plays a critical role.
Subject(s)One Health , Forecasting
Subject(s)Poultry Diseases , Rodent Diseases , Amphibians , Animals , Pets , Poultry , Reptiles , Rodentia , Zoonoses/prevention & control
BACKGROUND: China is vulnerable to zoonotic disease transmission due to a large agricultural work force, sizable domestic livestock population, and a highly biodiverse ecology. To better address this threat, representatives from the human, animal, and environmental health sectors in China held a One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization (OHZDP) workshop in May 2019 to develop a list of priority zoonotic diseases for multisectoral, One Health collaboration. METHODS: Representatives used the OHZDP Process, developed by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC), to prioritize zoonotic diseases for China. Representatives defined the criteria used for prioritization and determined questions and weights for each individual criterion. A review of English and Chinese literature was conducted prior to the workshop to collect disease specific information on prevalence, morbidity, mortality, and Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) from China and the Western Pacific Region for zoonotic diseases considered for prioritization. RESULTS: Thirty zoonotic diseases were evaluated for prioritization. Criteria selected included: 1) disease hazard/severity (case fatality rate) in humans, 2) epidemic scale and intensity (in humans and animals) in China, 3) economic impact, 4) prevention and control, and 5) social impact. Disease specific information was obtained from 792 articles (637 in English and 155 in Chinese) and subject matter experts for the prioritization process. Following discussion of the OHZDP Tool output among disease experts, five priority zoonotic diseases were identified for China: avian influenza, echinococcosis, rabies, plague, and brucellosis. CONCLUSION: Representatives agreed on a list of five priority zoonotic diseases that can serve as a foundation to strengthen One Health collaboration for disease prevention and control in China; this list was developed prior to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic. Next steps focused on establishing a multisectoral, One Health coordination mechanism, improving multisectoral linkages in laboratory testing and surveillance platforms, creating multisectoral preparedness and response plans, and increasing workforce capacity.
Subject(s)Consensus Development Conferences as Topic , Zoonoses/prevention & control , Animals , China , Humans , Zoonoses/epidemiology , Zoonoses/transmission
OBJECTIVE: To establish a pathoepidemiological model to evaluate the role of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the first 10 companion animals that died while infected with SARS-CoV-2 in the US. ANIMALS: 10 cats and dogs that tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and died or were euthanized in the US between March 2020 and January 2021. PROCEDURES: A standardized algorithm was developed to direct case investigations, determine the necessity of certain diagnostic procedures, and evaluate the role, if any, that SARS-CoV-2 infection played in the animals' course of disease and death. Using clinical and diagnostic information collected by state animal health officials, state public health veterinarians, and other state and local partners, this algorithm was applied to each animal case. RESULTS: SARS-CoV-2 was an incidental finding in 8 animals, was suspected to have contributed to the severity of clinical signs leading to euthanasia in 1 dog, and was the primary reason for death for 1 cat. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: This report provides the global community with a standardized process for directing case investigations, determining the necessity of certain diagnostic procedures, and determining the clinical significance of SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals with fatal outcomes and provides evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can, in rare circumstances, cause or contribute to death in pets.
Subject(s)COVID-19 , Cat Diseases , Dog Diseases , Animals , COVID-19/veterinary , Cat Diseases/diagnosis , Cat Diseases/epidemiology , Cats , Dog Diseases/diagnosis , Dog Diseases/epidemiology , Dogs , Pets , SARS-CoV-2
The ongoing global pandemic caused by coronavirus disease has once again demonstrated the role of the family Coronaviridae in causing human disease outbreaks. Because severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 was first detected in December 2019, information on its tropism, host range, and clinical manifestations in animals is limited. Given the limited information, data from other coronaviruses might be useful for informing scientific inquiry, risk assessment, and decision-making. We reviewed endemic and emerging infections of alphacoronaviruses and betacoronaviruses in wildlife, livestock, and companion animals and provide information on the receptor use, known hosts, and clinical signs associated with each host for 15 coronaviruses detected in humans and animals. This information can be used to guide implementation of a One Health approach that involves human health, animal health, environmental, and other relevant partners in developing strategies for preparedness, response, and control to current and future coronavirus disease threats.
Subject(s)Coronaviridae/isolation & purification , Coronavirus Infections/veterinary , Disease Reservoirs/veterinary , Zoonoses/virology , Alphacoronavirus/isolation & purification , Animals , Animals, Wild , Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , COVID-19/virology , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/virology , Disease Outbreaks , Disease Reservoirs/virology , Host Specificity , Humans , Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus/isolation & purification , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2 , Zoonoses/epidemiology
To determine prevalence of, seroprevalence of, and potential exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among a cohort of evacuees returning to the United States from Wuhan, China, in January 2020, we conducted a cross-sectional study of quarantined evacuees from 1 repatriation flight. Overall, 193 of 195 evacuees completed exposure surveys and submitted upper respiratory or serum specimens or both at arrival in the United States. Nearly all evacuees had taken preventive measures to limit potential exposure while in Wuhan, and none had detectable SARS-CoV-2 in upper respiratory tract specimens, suggesting the absence of asymptomatic respiratory shedding among this group at the time of testing. Evidence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 was detected in 1 evacuee, who reported experiencing no symptoms or high-risk exposures in the previous 2 months. These findings demonstrated that this group of evacuees posed a low risk of introducing SARS-CoV-2 to the United States.