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1.
Western Pac Surveill Response J ; 12(3): 82-87, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1497707

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVE: Contact tracing has been used in China and several other countries in the WHO Western Pacific Region as part of the COVID-19 response. We describe COVID-19 cases and the number of contacts traced and quarantined per case as part of COVID-19 emergency public health response activities in China. METHODS: We abstracted publicly available, online aggregated data published in daily COVID-19 situational reports by China's National Health Commission and provincial health commissions between 20 January and 29 February 2020. The number of new contacts traced by report date was computed as the difference between total contacts traced in consecutive reports. A proxy for the number of contacts traced per case was computed as the number of new contacts traced divided by the number of new cases. RESULTS: During the study period, China reported 80 968 new COVID-19 cases and 659 899 contacts. In Hubei Province, there were 67 608 cases and 264 878 contacts, representing 83% and 40% of the total, respectively. Non-Hubei provinces reported tracing 1.5 times more contacts than Hubei Province; the weekly number of contacts traced per case was also higher in non-Hubei provinces than in Hubei Province and increased from 17.2 in epidemiological week 4 to 115.7 in epidemiological week 9. DISCUSSION: More contacts per case were reported from areas and periods with lower COVID-19 case counts. With other non-pharmaceutical interventions used in China, contact tracing and quarantining large numbers of potentially infected contacts probably contributed to reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

2.
AIDS Res Ther ; 18(1): 62, 2021 09 19.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1430431

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: To accelerate progress toward the UNAIDS 90-90-90 targets, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Nigeria country office (CDC Nigeria) initiated an Antiretroviral Treatment (ART) Surge in 2019 to identify and link 340,000 people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV) to ART. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) threatened to interrupt ART Surge progress following the detection of the first case in Nigeria in February 2020. To overcome this disruption, CDC Nigeria designed and implemented adapted ART Surge strategies during February-September 2020. METHODS: Adapted ART Surge strategies focused on continuing expansion of HIV services while mitigating COVID-19 transmission. Key strategies included an intensified focus on community-based, rather than facility-based, HIV case-finding; immediate initiation of newly-diagnosed PLHIV on 3-month ART starter packs (first ART dispense of 3 months of ART); expansion of ART distribution through community refill sites; and broadened access to multi-month dispensing (MMD) (3-6 months ART) among PLHIV established in care. State-level weekly data reporting through an Excel-based dashboard and individual PLHIV-level data from the Nigeria National Data Repository facilitated program monitoring. RESULTS: During February-September 2020, the reported number of PLHIV initiating ART per month increased from 11,407 to 25,560, with the proportion found in the community increasing from 59 to 75%. The percentage of newly-identified PLHIV initiating ART with a 3-month ART starter pack increased from 60 to 98%. The percentage of on-time ART refill pick-ups increased from 89 to 100%. The percentage of PLHIV established in care receiving at least 3-month MMD increased from 77 to 93%. Among PLHIV initiating ART, 6-month retention increased from 74 to 92%. CONCLUSIONS: A rapid and flexible HIV program response, focused on reducing facility-based interactions while ensuring delivery of lifesaving ART, was critical in overcoming COVID-19-related service disruptions to expand access to HIV services in Nigeria during the first eight months of the pandemic. High retention on ART among PLHIV initiating treatment indicates immediate MMD in this population may be a sustainable practice. HIV program infrastructure can be leveraged and adapted to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , HIV Infections , HIV Infections/drug therapy , HIV Infections/epidemiology , Humans , Nigeria , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2
4.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 70(12): 421-426, 2021 Mar 26.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1151031

ABSTRACT

In 2018, an estimated 1.8 million persons living in Nigeria had HIV infection (1.3% of the total population), including 1.1 million (64%) who were receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) (1). Effective ART reduces morbidity and mortality rates among persons with HIV infection and prevents HIV transmission once viral load is suppressed to undetectable levels (2,3). In April 2019, through the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),* CDC launched an 18-month ART Surge program in nine Nigerian states to rapidly increase the number of persons with HIV infection receiving ART. CDC analyzed programmatic data gathered during March 31, 2019-September 30, 2020, to describe the ART Surge program's progress on case finding, ART initiation, patient retention, and ART Surge program growth. Overall, the weekly number of newly identified persons with HIV infection who initiated ART increased approximately eightfold, from 587 (week ending May 4, 2019) to 5,329 (week ending September 26, 2020). The ART Surge program resulted in 208,202 more HIV-infected persons receiving PEPFAR-supported ART despite the COVID-19 pandemic (97,387 more persons during March 31, 2019-March 31, 2020 and an additional 110,815 persons during April 2020-September 2020). Comprehensive, data-guided, locally adapted interventions and the use of incident command structures can help increase the number of persons with HIV infection who receive ART, reducing HIV-related morbidity and mortality as well as decreasing HIV transmission.


Subject(s)
Anti-Retroviral Agents/therapeutic use , COVID-19 , HIV Infections/drug therapy , International Cooperation , Program Development , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , HIV Infections/epidemiology , Humans , Nigeria/epidemiology , Program Evaluation , United States/epidemiology
5.
Pediatrics ; 147(4)2021 04.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1052449

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVES: In late June 2020, a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) occurred at a sleep-away youth camp in Georgia, affecting primarily persons ≤21 years. We conducted a retrospective cohort study among campers and staff (attendees) to determine the extent of the outbreak and assess factors contributing to transmission. METHODS: Attendees were interviewed to ascertain demographic characteristics, known exposures to COVID-19 and community exposures, and mitigation measures before, during, and after attending camp. COVID-19 case status was determined for all camp attendees on the basis of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) test results and reported symptoms. We calculated attack rates and instantaneous reproduction numbers and sequenced SARS-CoV-2 viral genomes from the outbreak. RESULTS: Among 627 attendees, the median age was 15 years (interquartile range: 12-16 years); 56% (351 of 627) of attendees were female. The attack rate was 56% (351 of 627) among all attendees. On the basis of date of illness onset or first positive test result on a specimen collected, 12 case patients were infected before arriving at camp and 339 case patients were camp associated. Among 288 case patients with available symptom information, 45 (16%) were asymptomatic. Despite cohorting, 50% of attendees reported direct contact with people outside their cabin cohort. On the first day of camp session, the instantaneous reproduction number was 10. Viral genomic diversity was low. CONCLUSIONS: Few introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into a youth congregate setting resulted in a large outbreak. Testing strategies should be combined with prearrival quarantine, routine symptom monitoring with appropriate isolation and quarantine, cohorting, social distancing, mask wearing, and enhanced disinfection and hand hygiene. Promotion of mitigation measures among younger populations is needed.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/transmission , Camping , Disease Outbreaks , Adolescent , Adult , Child , Cohort Studies , Female , Georgia/epidemiology , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Retrospective Studies , Young Adult
6.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(42): 1535-1541, 2020 Oct 23.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-890753

ABSTRACT

Poverty, crowded housing, and other community attributes associated with social vulnerability increase a community's risk for adverse health outcomes during and following a public health event (1). CDC uses standard criteria to identify U.S. counties with rapidly increasing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) incidence (hotspot counties) to support health departments in coordinating public health responses (2). County-level data on COVID-19 cases during June 1-July 25, 2020 and from the 2018 CDC social vulnerability index (SVI) were analyzed to examine associations between social vulnerability and hotspot detection and to describe incidence after hotspot detection. Areas with greater social vulnerabilities, particularly those related to higher representation of racial and ethnic minority residents (risk ratio [RR] = 5.3; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 4.4-6.4), density of housing units per structure (RR = 3.1; 95% CI = 2.7-3.6), and crowded housing units (i.e., more persons than rooms) (RR = 2.0; 95% CI = 1.8-2.3), were more likely to become hotspots, especially in less urban areas. Among hotspot counties, those with greater social vulnerability had higher COVID-19 incidence during the 14 days after detection (212-234 cases per 100,000 persons for highest SVI quartile versus 35-131 cases per 100,000 persons for other quartiles). Focused public health action at the federal, state, and local levels is needed not only to prevent communities with greater social vulnerability from becoming hotspots but also to decrease persistently high incidence among hotspot counties that are socially vulnerable.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Residence Characteristics/statistics & numerical data , Social Determinants of Health , COVID-19 , Crowding , Humans , Incidence , Pandemics , Poverty , Risk Assessment , United States/epidemiology
7.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(39): 1398-1403, 2020 Oct 02.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-809624

ABSTRACT

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2. During January 21-July 25, 2020, in response to official requests for assistance with COVID-19 emergency public health response activities, CDC deployed 208 teams to assist 55 state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments. CDC deployment data were analyzed to summarize activities by deployed CDC teams in assisting state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to identify and implement measures to contain SARS-CoV-2 transmission (1). Deployed teams assisted with the investigation of transmission in high-risk congregate settings, such as long-term care facilities (53 deployments; 26% of total), food processing facilities (24; 12%), correctional facilities (12; 6%), and settings that provide services to persons experiencing homelessness (10; 5%). Among the 208 deployed teams, 178 (85%) provided assistance to state health departments, 12 (6%) to tribal health departments, 10 (5%) to local health departments, and eight (4%) to territorial health departments. CDC collaborations with health departments have strengthened local capacity and provided outbreak response support. Collaborations focused attention on health equity issues among disproportionately affected populations (e.g., racial and ethnic minority populations, essential frontline workers, and persons experiencing homelessness) and through a place-based focus (e.g., persons living in rural or frontier areas). These collaborations also facilitated enhanced characterization of COVID-19 epidemiology, directly contributing to CDC data-informed guidance, including guidance for serial testing as a containment strategy in high-risk congregate settings, targeted interventions and prevention efforts among workers at food processing facilities, and social distancing.


Subject(s)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./organization & administration , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Public Health Administration , Public Health Practice , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Humans , Local Government , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , State Government , United States/epidemiology
8.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(38): 1360-1363, 2020 Sep 25.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-792612

ABSTRACT

Contact tracing is a strategy implemented to minimize the spread of communicable diseases (1,2). Prompt contact tracing, testing, and self-quarantine can reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (3,4). Community engagement is important to encourage participation in and cooperation with SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing (5). Substantial investments have been made to scale up contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States. During June 1-July 12, 2020, the incidence of COVID-19 cases in North Carolina increased 183%, from seven to 19 per 100,000 persons per day* (6). To assess local COVID-19 contact tracing implementation, data from two counties in North Carolina were analyzed during a period of high incidence. Health department staff members investigated 5,514 (77%) persons with COVID-19 in Mecklenburg County and 584 (99%) in Randolph Counties. No contacts were reported for 48% of cases in Mecklenburg and for 35% in Randolph. Among contacts provided, 25% in Mecklenburg and 48% in Randolph could not be reached by telephone and were classified as nonresponsive after at least one attempt on 3 consecutive days of failed attempts. The median interval from specimen collection from the index patient to notification of identified contacts was 6 days in both counties. Despite aggressive efforts by health department staff members to perform case investigations and contact tracing, many persons with COVID-19 did not report contacts, and many contacts were not reached. These findings indicate that improved timeliness of contact tracing, community engagement, and increased use of community-wide mitigation are needed to interrupt SARS-CoV-2 transmission.


Subject(s)
Contact Tracing/statistics & numerical data , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , COVID-19 , Humans , Incidence , North Carolina/epidemiology
9.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(34): 1170-1172, 2020 Aug 28.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-732629

ABSTRACT

On June 1, 2020, with declines in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases and hospitalizations in Rhode Island,* child care programs in the state reopened after a nearly 3-month closure implemented as part of mitigation efforts. To reopen safely, the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (RIDHS) required licensed center- and home-based child care programs to reduce enrollment, initially to a maximum of 12 persons, including staff members, in stable groups (i.e., staff members and students not switching between groups) in physically separated spaces, increasing to a maximum of 20 persons on June 29. Additional requirements included universal use of masks for adults, daily symptom screening of adults and children, and enhanced cleaning and disinfection according to CDC guidelines.† As of July 31, 666 of 891 (75%) programs were approved to reopen, with capacity for 18,945 children, representing 74% of the state's January 2020 child care program population (25,749 children).


Subject(s)
Child Care , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Adult , Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , COVID-19 , COVID-19 Testing , Child , Child Care/organization & administration , Child, Preschool , Clinical Laboratory Techniques , Contact Tracing , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Female , Guideline Adherence/statistics & numerical data , Humans , Infant , Male , Middle Aged , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Rhode Island/epidemiology , SARS-CoV-2 , Young Adult
10.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(34): 1173-1176, 2020 Aug 28.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-732628

ABSTRACT

State and local health departments in the United States are using various indicators to identify differences in rates of reported coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and severe COVID-19 outcomes, including hospitalizations and deaths. To inform mitigation efforts, on May 19, 2020, the Kentucky Department for Public Health (KDPH) implemented a reporting system to monitor five indicators of state-level COVID-19 status to assess the ability to safely reopen: 1) composite syndromic surveillance data, 2) the number of new COVID-19 cases,* 3) the number of COVID-19-associated deaths,† 4) health care capacity data, and 5) public health capacity for contact tracing (contact tracing capacity). Using standardized methods, KDPH compiles an indicator monitoring report (IMR) to provide daily analysis of these five indicators, which are combined with publicly available data into a user-friendly composite status that KDPH and local policy makers use to assess state-level COVID-19 hazard status. During May 19-July 15, 2020, Kentucky reported 12,742 COVID-19 cases, and 299 COVID-19-related deaths (1). The mean composite state-level hazard status during May 19-July 15 was 2.5 (fair to moderate). IMR review led to county-level hotspot identification (identification of counties meeting criteria for temporal increases in number of cases and incidence) and facilitated collaboration among KDPH and local authorities on decisions regarding mitigation efforts. Kentucky's IMR might easily be adopted by state and local health departments in other jurisdictions to guide decision-making for COVID-19 mitigation, response, and reopening.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Epidemiological Monitoring , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/mortality , Coronavirus Infections/therapy , Hospitalization/statistics & numerical data , Humans , Kentucky/epidemiology , Mortality/trends , Pneumonia, Viral/mortality , Pneumonia, Viral/therapy , Public Health Practice
11.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(33): 1127-1132, 2020 Aug 21.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-725246

ABSTRACT

The geographic areas in the United States most affected by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have changed over time. On May 7, 2020, CDC, with other federal agencies, began identifying counties with increasing COVID-19 incidence (hotspots) to better understand transmission dynamics and offer targeted support to health departments in affected communities. Data for January 22-July 15, 2020, were analyzed retrospectively (January 22-May 6) and prospectively (May 7-July 15) to detect hotspot counties. No counties met hotspot criteria during January 22-March 7, 2020. During March 8-July 15, 2020, 818 counties met hotspot criteria for ≥1 day; these counties included 80% of the U.S. population. The daily number of counties meeting hotspot criteria peaked in early April, decreased and stabilized during mid-April-early June, then increased again during late June-early July. The percentage of counties in the South and West Census regions* meeting hotspot criteria increased from 10% and 13%, respectively, during March-April to 28% and 22%, respectively, during June-July. Identification of community transmission as a contributing factor increased over time, whereas identification of outbreaks in long-term care facilities, food processing facilities, correctional facilities, or other workplaces as contributing factors decreased. Identification of hotspot counties and understanding how they change over time can help prioritize and target implementation of U.S. public health response activities.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Rural Population/statistics & numerical data , Urban Population/statistics & numerical data , COVID-19 , Humans , Incidence , United States/epidemiology
12.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(31): 1026-1030, 2020 Aug 07.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-694883

ABSTRACT

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is spread from person to person (1-3). Quarantine of exposed persons (contacts) for 14 days following their exposure reduces transmission (4-7). Contact tracing provides an opportunity to identify contacts, inform them of quarantine recommendations, and monitor their symptoms to promptly identify secondary COVID-19 cases (7,8). On March 12, 2020, Maine Center for Disease Control and Prevention (Maine CDC) identified the first case of COVID-19 in the state. Because of resource constraints, including staffing, Maine CDC could not consistently monitor contacts, and automated technological solutions for monitoring contacts were explored. On May 14, 2020, Maine CDC began enrolling contacts of patients with reported COVID-19 into Sara Alert (MITRE Corporation, 2020),* an automated, web-based, symptom monitoring tool. After initial communication with Maine CDC staff members, enrolled contacts automatically received daily symptom questionnaires via their choice of e-mailed weblink, text message, texted weblink, or telephone call until completion of their quarantine. Epidemiologic investigations were conducted for enrollees who reported symptoms or received a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result. During May 14-June 26, Maine CDC enrolled 1,622 contacts of 614 COVID-19 patients; 190 (11.7%) eventually developed COVID-19, highlighting the importance of identifying, quarantining, and monitoring contacts of COVID-19 patients to limit spread. In Maine, symptom monitoring was not feasible without the use of an automated symptom monitoring tool. Using a tool that permitted enrollees to specify a method of symptom monitoring was well received, because the majority of persons monitored (96.4%) agreed to report using this system.


Subject(s)
Contact Tracing , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/therapy , Epidemiological Monitoring , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/therapy , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , Automation , COVID-19 , Child , Child, Preschool , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Female , Humans , Infant , Infant, Newborn , Maine/epidemiology , Male , Middle Aged , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Program Evaluation , Symptom Assessment/methods , Young Adult
13.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(31): 1023-1025, 2020 Aug 07.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-691545

ABSTRACT

Limited data are available about transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), among youths. During June 17-20, an overnight camp in Georgia (camp A) held orientation for 138 trainees and 120 staff members; staff members remained for the first camp session, scheduled during June 21-27, and were joined by 363 campers and three senior staff members on June 21. Camp A adhered to the measures in Georgia's Executive Order* that allowed overnight camps to operate beginning on May 31, including requiring all trainees, staff members, and campers to provide documentation of a negative viral SARS-CoV-2 test ≤12 days before arriving. Camp A adopted most† components of CDC's Suggestions for Youth and Summer Camps§ to minimize the risk for SARS-CoV-2 introduction and transmission. Measures not implemented were cloth masks for campers and opening windows and doors for increased ventilation in buildings. Cloth masks were required for staff members. Camp attendees were cohorted by cabin and engaged in a variety of indoor and outdoor activities, including daily vigorous singing and cheering. On June 23, a teenage staff member left camp A after developing chills the previous evening. The staff member was tested and reported a positive test result for SARS-CoV-2 the following day (June 24). Camp A officials began sending campers home on June 24 and closed the camp on June 27. On June 25, the Georgia Department of Public Health (DPH) was notified and initiated an investigation. DPH recommended that all attendees be tested and self-quarantine, and isolate if they had a positive test result.


Subject(s)
Camping , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Disease Outbreaks , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Adolescent , Adult , COVID-19 , Child , Female , Georgia/epidemiology , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Pandemics , Young Adult
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