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1.
Clin Infect Dis ; 2022 Jun 23.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1901144

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: Concurrent detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and another respiratory virus in individuals can document contemporaneous circulation. We used an ongoing, community-based study of school-aged children and their households to evaluate SARS-CoV-2 co-detections with other respiratory viruses in a non-medically attended population over a two-year period. METHODS: Household enrollment was predicated on an acute respiratory illness in a child residing in that household who was also a kindergarten through 12th grade student in the participating school district. Demographic, symptom and household composition data, and self-collected nasal specimens were obtained on the recruitment day, and 7 and 14 days later, from the index child and all other household members. All specimens were tested for SARS-CoV-2/influenza A/B by RT-PCR. Day 0 specimens from the index children were simultaneously tested for 17 viruses using a commercial respiratory pathogen panel (RPP). To assess viral co-detections involving SARS-CoV-2, all household specimens were tested via RPP if the index child's Day 0 specimen tested positive to any of the 17 viral targets in RPP and any household member tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. RESULTS: Of 2,109 participants (497 index children in 497 households with 1,612 additional household members), two (0.1%) were positive for both SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A; an additional 11 (0.5%) were positive for SARS-CoV-2 and another RPP-covered respiratory virus. Co-detections predominantly affected school-aged children (12 out of 13 total) and were noted in 11 of 497 households. CONCLUSIONS: SARS-CoV-2 co-detections with other respiratory viruses were uncommon and predominated in school-aged children.

2.
EuropePMC; 2022.
Preprint in English | EuropePMC | ID: ppcovidwho-332884

ABSTRACT

Prolonged infections in immunocompromised individuals may be a source for novel SARS-CoV-2 variants, particularly when both the immune system and antiviral therapy fail to clear the infection, thereby promoting adaptation. Here we describe an approximately 16-month case of SARS-CoV-2 infection in an immunocompromised individual. Following monotherapy with the monoclonal antibody Bamlanivimab, the individual's virus was resistant to this antibody via a globally unique Spike amino acid variant (E484T) that evolved from E484A earlier in infection. With the emergence and spread of the Omicron Variant of Concern, which also contains Spike E484A, E484T may arise again as an antibody-resistant derivative of E484A.

4.
Cell Rep ; 39(3): 110688, 2022 04 19.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1763614

ABSTRACT

The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron (B.1.1.529) variant with a surprising number of spike mutations raises concerns about reduced sensitivity of this virus to antibody neutralization and subsequent vaccine breakthrough infections. Here, we infect Moderna mRNA-vaccinated or previously infected hamsters with the Omicron BA.1 variant. While the Moderna mRNA vaccine reduces viral loads in the respiratory tissues upon challenge with an early S-614G isolate, the vaccine efficacy is not as pronounced after infection with the Omicron variant. Previous infection with the early SARS-CoV-2 isolate prevents replication after rechallenge with either virus in the lungs of previously infected hamsters, but the Omicron variant replicates efficiently in nasal turbinate tissue. These results experimentally demonstrate in an animal model that the antigenic changes in the Omicron variant are responsible for vaccine breakthrough and re-infection.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Animals , Antibodies, Neutralizing , COVID-19/prevention & control , Cricetinae , Disease Models, Animal , Mesocricetus , Vaccination , Vaccines, Synthetic , mRNA Vaccines
5.
Nature ; 603(7902): 687-692, 2022 03.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1641974

ABSTRACT

The recent emergence of B.1.1.529, the Omicron variant1,2, has raised concerns of escape from protection by vaccines and therapeutic antibodies. A key test for potential countermeasures against B.1.1.529 is their activity in preclinical rodent models of respiratory tract disease. Here, using the collaborative network of the SARS-CoV-2 Assessment of Viral Evolution (SAVE) programme of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), we evaluated the ability of several B.1.1.529 isolates to cause infection and disease in immunocompetent and human ACE2 (hACE2)-expressing mice and hamsters. Despite modelling data indicating that B.1.1.529 spike can bind more avidly to mouse ACE2 (refs. 3,4), we observed less infection by B.1.1.529 in 129, C57BL/6, BALB/c and K18-hACE2 transgenic mice than by previous SARS-CoV-2 variants, with limited weight loss and lower viral burden in the upper and lower respiratory tracts. In wild-type and hACE2 transgenic hamsters, lung infection, clinical disease and pathology with B.1.1.529 were also milder than with historical isolates or other SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. Overall, experiments from the SAVE/NIAID network with several B.1.1.529 isolates demonstrate attenuated lung disease in rodents, which parallels preliminary human clinical data.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/pathology , COVID-19/virology , Disease Models, Animal , SARS-CoV-2/pathogenicity , Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2/genetics , Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2/metabolism , Animals , Cricetinae , Female , Humans , Lung/pathology , Lung/virology , Male , Mesocricetus , Mice , Mice, Inbred BALB C , Mice, Inbred C57BL , Mice, Transgenic , Viral Load
6.
2021.
Preprint in English | Other preprints | ID: ppcovidwho-295837

ABSTRACT

The SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant is highly transmissible and contains mutations that confer partial immune escape. We compared RT-PCR cycle threshold (Ct) data from 699 test-positive anterior nasal swab specimens from fully vaccinated (n = 310) or unvaccinated (n=389) individuals. We observed low Ct values (<25) in 212 of 310 fully vaccinated (68%) and 246 of 389 (63%) unvaccinated individuals. Testing a subset of these low-Ct samples revealed infectious SARS-CoV-2 in 15 of 17 specimens (88%) from unvaccinated individuals and 37 of 39 (95%) from vaccinated people. To determine whether infectious virus titers differed in vaccinated and unvaccinated persons, we performed plaque assays on an additional set of 48 samples with Ct <25, finding no difference in infectious virus titer between groups.

7.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 70(13): 478-482, 2021 Apr 02.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1168277

ABSTRACT

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, can spread rapidly in prisons and can be introduced by staff members and newly transferred incarcerated persons (1,2). On September 28, 2020, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) contacted CDC to report a COVID-19 outbreak in a state prison (prison A). During October 6-20, a CDC team investigated the outbreak, which began with 12 cases detected from specimens collected during August 17-24 from incarcerated persons housed within the same unit, 10 of whom were transferred together on August 13 and under quarantine following prison intake procedures (intake quarantine). Potentially exposed persons within the unit began a 14-day group quarantine on August 25. However, quarantine was not restarted after quarantined persons were potentially exposed to incarcerated persons with COVID-19 who were moved to the unit. During the subsequent 8 weeks (August 14-October 22), 869 (79.4%) of 1,095 incarcerated persons and 69 (22.6%) of 305 staff members at prison A received positive test results for SARS-CoV-2. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) of specimens from 172 cases among incarcerated persons showed that all clustered in the same lineage; this finding, along with others, demonstrated that facility spread originated with the transferred cohort. To effectively implement a cohorted quarantine, which is a harm reduction strategy for correctional settings with limited space, CDC's interim guidance recommendation is to serial test cohorts, restarting the 14-day quarantine period when a new case is identified (3). Implementing more effective intake quarantine procedures and available mitigation measures, including vaccination, among incarcerated persons is important to controlling transmission in prisons. Understanding and addressing the challenges faced by correctional facilities to implement medical isolation and quarantine can help reduce and prevent outbreaks.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/transmission , Disease Outbreaks , Prisoners/statistics & numerical data , Prisons , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19 Testing , Humans , Quarantine , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , Wisconsin/epidemiology
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