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1.
Emerg Infect Dis ; 29(4): 761-770, 2023 04.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2286800

ABSTRACT

SARS-CoV-2 infections among vaccinated nursing home residents increased after the Omicron variant emerged. Data on booster dose effectiveness in this population are limited. During July 2021-March 2022, nursing home outbreaks in 11 US jurisdictions involving >3 infections within 14 days among residents who had received at least the primary COVID-19 vaccine(s) were monitored. Among 2,188 nursing homes, 1,247 outbreaks were reported in the periods of Delta (n = 356, 29%), mixed Delta/Omicron (n = 354, 28%), and Omicron (n = 536, 43%) predominance. During the Omicron-predominant period, the risk for infection within 14 days of an outbreak start was lower among boosted residents than among residents who had received the primary vaccine series alone (risk ratio [RR] 0.25, 95% CI 0.19-0.33). Once infected, boosted residents were at lower risk for all-cause hospitalization (RR 0.48, 95% CI 0.40-0.49) and death (RR 0.45, 95% CI 0.34-0.59) than primary vaccine-only residents.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , United States/epidemiology , Humans , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19 Vaccines , SARS-CoV-2 , Nursing Homes , Disease Outbreaks
2.
Antimicrobial Stewardship and Healthcare Epidemiology ; 2(S1):s36, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2184948

ABSTRACT

Background: Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, CDC Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion (DHQP) has provided technical assistance in support of state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments for COVID-19 healthcare outbreak management and infection prevention and control (IPC). We characterized the volume and trends of technical assistance provided during the pandemic to inform the future needs of health departments for COVID-19 healthcare IPC and DHQP resources required to meet these needs. Methods: In January 2020, DHQP began receiving COVID-19 IPC TA requests directly from health departments for remote assistance or from CDC staff on field deployments providing onsite support. DHQP subject-matter experts provided responses via e-mail or, for more complex inquiries, outbreaks, or field deployments, via phone consultations. Records of e-mail communications and phone consultations were entered into an inquiry database for tracking. We calculated the number, mean, and range of technical-assistance responses by jurisdiction and by month from January 2020 through December 2021. We designated months as high-volume periods for technical assistance if inquiries surpassed the 75th percentile. Results: In total, 1,869 IPC technical-assistance responses were provided. Of all technical-assistance responses, 1,725 (92%) were to state or local health departments, 115 (6%) were tribal nations, and 28 (2%) were US territories. IPC technical assistance was provided to all 50 states and the District of Columbia, 16 tribal nations, and 5 US territories. The average total number of technical assistance responses per site during the 24-month period was 34 to state and local HDs (range, 2–111), 6 to tribal nations (when tribal nation was specified;range, 1–17), and 6 to US territories (range, 1–15). E-mail communications comprised 1,164 responses (62%);phone consultations made up the remaining 705 responses (38%). Of phone consultations, 350 (50%) were with CDC field deployers providing onsite support to health departments. The average number of technical-assistance responses provided each month across all jurisdictions was 78 (range, 0–334);months with high volumes included April–August 2020 and January 2021. Conclusions: These findings highlight the high-level collaboration between federal and state, tribal, local, and territorial health department partners in remote and onsite support of COVID-19 prevention and response efforts in healthcare settings. Variations in monthly volumes of health-department COVID-19 healthcare IPC technical assistance requests may reflect factors such as fluctuations in community infection rates and changes in CDC IPC guidance. The ability to provide effective technical assistance during pandemic response depends on the CDC maintaining sufficient healthcare IPC staffing and expertise.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

3.
Antimicrobial Stewardship and Healthcare Epidemiology ; 2(S1):s15, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2184936

ABSTRACT

Background: Rapid response is critical to control healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance threats within healthcare facilities to prevent illness among patients, residents, and healthcare personnel. Through this analysis, we aimed to quantify public health response activities, by healthcare setting type, for (1) novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms or mechanisms (MDROs), (2) SARS-CoV-2, and (3) other possible outbreaks. Method: We reviewed response activity data submitted by US state, territorial, and local health department HAI/AR programs to the CDC as part of funding requirements. We performed descriptive analyses of response activities conducted during the funding reporting period (August 2019–July 2020). SARS-CoV-2 response activities were reported from January through July 2020. Data were analyzed by response category (novel or targeted MDRO, SARS-CoV-2, other HAI/AR responses), and healthcare setting type. Results: During August 2019–July 2020, 57 HAI/AR Programs (50 state, 1 territorial, 5 local health departments, and District of Columbia) reported 18,306 public health responses involving healthcare facilities. These data included 3,860 responses to 1 or more cases of novel or targeted MDROs, 13,992 responses to SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks (beginning in January 2020), and 454 responses to other possible outbreaks. Novel and targeted MDRO responses most frequently occurred in acute-care hospitals (ACHs, 64.5%), skilled nursing facilities (SNFs, 24.5%), and long-term acute-care hospitals (LTACHs, 5.8%). SARS-CoV-2 responses most frequently occurred in SNFs (55%), and assisted living facilities (24%). Other HAI/AR responses most frequently occurred in ACH (50%), SNF (28.4%), and outpatient settings (19.6%). Of the "other” HAI/AR responses, 76% were responses to cases, clusters, or outbreaks, and 23.8% were responses to serious infection control breaches including device and instrument reprocessing, injection safety, and other deficient practices. Conclusions: During the study period, public health programs performed a high volume of HAI/AR response activities largely focused on SARS-CoV-2 in nursing homes and assisted living facilities. Other important response activities occurred across a range of other healthcare settings, including responses to novel and targeted MDROs, HAI outbreaks, and serious infection control breaches. Whereas SARS-CoV-2 response activities largely centered in long-term care settings, MDRO and other HAI/AR responses occurred mostly in acute-care settings. These data demonstrate the importance of building and sustaining public health response capacity for a broad array of healthcare settings, pathogens, and patient populations to meet the range of current and emerging HAI/AR threats.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

4.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol ; 44(6): 1005-1009, 2023 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2185246

ABSTRACT

Among nursing home outbreaks of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) with ≥3 breakthrough infections when the predominant severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant circulating was the SARS-CoV-2 δ (delta) variant, fully vaccinated residents were 28% less likely to be infected than were unvaccinated residents. Once infected, they had approximately half the risk for all-cause hospitalization and all-cause death compared with unvaccinated infected residents.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Virus Diseases , Humans , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19 Vaccines , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , Nursing Homes , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control
5.
J Public Health Manag Pract ; 28(6): 682-692, 2022.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2107680

ABSTRACT

CONTEXT: Between April 2020 and May 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) awarded more than $40 billion to health departments nationwide for COVID-19 prevention and response activities. One of the identified priorities for this investment was improving infection prevention and control (IPC) in nursing homes. PROGRAM: CDC developed a virtual course to train new and less experienced public health staff in core healthcare IPC principles and in the application of CDC COVID-19 healthcare IPC guidance for nursing homes. IMPLEMENTATION: From October 2020 to August 2021, the CDC led training sessions for 12 cohorts of public health staff using pretraining reading materials, case-based scenarios, didactic presentations, peer-learning opportunities, and subject matter expert-led discussions. Multiple electronic assessments were distributed to learners over time to measure changes in self-reported knowledge and confidence and to collect feedback on the course. Participating public health programs were also assessed to measure overall course impact. EVALUATION: Among 182 enrolled learners, 94% completed the training. Most learners were infection preventionists (42%) or epidemiologists (38%), had less than 1 year of experience in their health department role (75%), and had less than 1 year of subject matter experience (54%). After training, learners reported increased knowledge and confidence in applying the CDC COVID-19 healthcare IPC guidance for nursing homes (≥81%) with the greatest increase in performing COVID-19 IPC consultations and assessments (87%). The majority of participating programs agreed that the course provided an overall benefit (88%) and reduced training burden (72%). DISCUSSION: The CDC's virtual course was effective in increasing public health capacity for COVID-19 healthcare IPC in nursing homes and provides a possible model to increase IPC capacity for other infectious diseases and other healthcare settings. Future virtual healthcare IPC courses could be enhanced by tailoring materials to health department needs, reinforcing training through applied learning experiences, and supporting mechanisms to retain trained staff.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , Health Personnel/education , Humans , Infection Control , Nursing Homes , Public Health
6.
Clin Infect Dis ; 73(Suppl 1): S77-S80, 2021 07 15.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1315690

ABSTRACT

A suspected outbreak of influenza A and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) at a long-term care facility in Los Angeles County was, months later, determined to not involve influenza. To prevent inadvertent transmission of infections, facilities should use highly specific influenza diagnostics and follow Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines that specifically address infection control challenges.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Influenza, Human , Disease Outbreaks , Humans , Influenza, Human/diagnosis , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Long-Term Care , SARS-CoV-2
7.
Public Health Rep ; 136(1): 88-96, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-894953

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVES: Widespread global transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus causing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), continues. Many questions remain about asymptomatic or atypical infections and transmission dynamics. We used comprehensive contact tracing of the first 2 confirmed patients in Illinois with COVID-19 and serologic SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing to determine whether contacts had evidence of undetected COVID-19. METHODS: Contacts were eligible for serologic follow-up if previously tested for COVID-19 during an initial investigation or had greater-risk exposures. Contacts completed a standardized questionnaire during the initial investigation. We classified exposure risk as high, medium, or low based on interactions with 2 index patients and use of personal protective equipment (PPE). Serologic testing used a SARS-CoV-2 spike enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay on serum specimens collected from participants approximately 6 weeks after initial exposure to either index patient. The 2 index patients provided serum specimens throughout their illness. We collected data on demographic, exposure, and epidemiologic characteristics. RESULTS: Of 347 contacts, 110 were eligible for serologic follow-up; 59 (17% of all contacts) enrolled. Of these, 53 (90%) were health care personnel and 6 (10%) were community contacts. Seventeen (29%) reported high-risk exposures, 15 (25%) medium-risk, and 27 (46%) low-risk. No participant had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. The 2 index patients had antibodies detected at dilutions >1:6400 within 4 weeks after symptom onset. CONCLUSIONS: In serologic follow-up of the first 2 known patients in Illinois with COVID-19, we found no secondary transmission among tested contacts. Lack of seroconversion among these contacts adds to our understanding of conditions (ie, use of PPE) under which SARS-CoV-2 infections might not result in transmission and demonstrates that SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing is a useful tool to verify epidemiologic findings.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/transmission , Contact Tracing/statistics & numerical data , Health Personnel/statistics & numerical data , Occupational Exposure/statistics & numerical data , COVID-19/immunology , Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay , Female , Humans , Illinois/epidemiology , Male , Pandemics , Personal Protective Equipment , Risk Assessment , SARS-CoV-2
8.
Lancet ; 395(10230): 1137-1144, 2020 04 04.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-8381

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), first detected in China in December, 2019. In January, 2020, state, local, and federal public health agencies investigated the first case of COVID-19 in Illinois, USA. METHODS: Patients with confirmed COVID-19 were defined as those with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test. Contacts were people with exposure to a patient with COVID-19 on or after the patient's symptom onset date. Contacts underwent active symptom monitoring for 14 days following their last exposure. Contacts who developed fever, cough, or shortness of breath became persons under investigation and were tested for SARS-CoV-2. A convenience sample of 32 asymptomatic health-care personnel contacts were also tested. FINDINGS: Patient 1-a woman in her 60s-returned from China in mid-January, 2020. One week later, she was hospitalised with pneumonia and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Her husband (Patient 2) did not travel but had frequent close contact with his wife. He was admitted 8 days later and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Overall, 372 contacts of both cases were identified; 347 underwent active symptom monitoring, including 152 community contacts and 195 health-care personnel. Of monitored contacts, 43 became persons under investigation, in addition to Patient 2. These 43 persons under investigation and all 32 asymptomatic health-care personnel tested negative for SARS-CoV-2. INTERPRETATION: Person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV-2 occurred between two people with prolonged, unprotected exposure while Patient 1 was symptomatic. Despite active symptom monitoring and testing of symptomatic and some asymptomatic contacts, no further transmission was detected. FUNDING: None.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , COVID-19 , China , Contact Tracing , Female , Humans , Illinois , Middle Aged , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2 , Travel
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