Performance and Operational Evaluation of the Access Bio CareStart Rapid Antigen Test in a High-Throughput Drive-Through Community Testing Site in Massachusetts.

BACKGROUND: To facilitate deployment of point-of-care testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, we evaluated the Access Bio CareStart COVID-19 Antigen test in a high-throughput, drive-through, free community testing site using anterior nasal (AN) swab reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for clinical testing. METHODS: Consenting symptomatic and asymptomatic children (≤18 years) and adults received dual AN swabs. CareStart testing was performed with temperature/humidity monitoring. All tests had 2 independent reads to assess interoperator agreement. Patients with positive CareStart results were called and instructed to isolate pending RT-PCR results. The paired RT-PCR result was the reference for sensitivity and specificity calculations. RESULTS: Of 1603 participants, 1245 adults and 253 children had paired RT-PCR/CareStart results and complete symptom data. Eighty-three percent of adults and 87% of children were asymptomatic. CareStart sensitivity/specificity were 84.8% (95% confidence interval [CI], 71.1-93.7)/97.2% (95% CI, 92.0-99.4) and 85.7% (95% CI, 42.1-99.6)/89.5% (95% CI, 66.9-98.7) in adults and children, respectively, within 5 days of symptoms. Sensitivity/specificity were 50.0% (95% CI, 41.0-59.0)/99.1% (95% CI, 98.3-99.6) in asymptomatic adults and 51.4% (95% CI, 34.4-68.1)/97.8% (95% CI, 94.5-99.4) in asymptomatic children. Sensitivity in all 234 RT-PCR-positive people was 96.3% with cycle threshold (Ct) ≤25, 79.6% with Ct ≤30, and 61.4% with Ct ≤35. All 21 false-positive CareStart tests had faint but normal bands. Interoperator agreement was 99.5%. Operational challenges included identification of faint test bands and inconsistent swab elution volumes. CONCLUSIONS: CareStart had high sensitivity in people with Ct ≤25 and moderate sensitivity in symptomatic people overall. Specificity was unexpectedly lower in symptomatic versus asymptomatic people. Excellent interoperator agreement was observed, but operational challenges indicate that operator training is warranted.

Performance and Implementation Evaluation of the Abbott BinaxNOW Rapid Antigen Test in a High-Throughput Drive-Through Community Testing Site in Massachusetts.

Rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for SARS-CoV-2 antigens (Ag) that can be performed at point of care (POC) can supplement molecular testing and help mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic. Deployment of an Ag RDT requires an understanding of its operational and performance characteristics under real-world conditions and in relevant subpopulations. We evaluated the Abbott BinaxNOW COVID-19 Ag card in a high-throughput, drive-through, free community testing site in Massachusetts using anterior nasal (AN) swab reverse transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR) for clinical testing. Individuals presenting for molecular testing in two of seven lanes were offered the opportunity to also receive BinaxNOW testing. Dual AN swabs were collected from symptomatic and asymptomatic children (≤18 years of age) and adults. BinaxNOW testing was performed in a testing pod with temperature/humidity monitoring. One individual performed testing and official result reporting for each test, but most tests had a second independent reading to assess interoperator agreement. Positive BinaxNOW results were scored as faint, medium, or strong. Positive BinaxNOW results were reported to patients by phone, and they were instructed to isolate pending RT-PCR results. The paired RT-PCR result was the reference for sensitivity and specificity calculations. Of 2,482 participants, 1,380 adults and 928 children had paired RT-PCR/BinaxNOW results and complete symptom data. In this study, 974/1,380 (71%) adults and 829/928 (89%) children were asymptomatic. BinaxNOW had 96.5% (95% confidence interval [CI], 90.0 to 99.3) sensitivity and 100% (95% CI, 98.6 to 100.0) specificity in adults within 7 days of symptoms and 84.6% (95% CI, 65.1 to 95.6) sensitivity and 100% (95% CI, 94.5 to 100.0) specificity in children within 7 days of symptoms. Sensitivity and specificity in asymptomatic adults were 70.2% (95% CI, 56.6 to 81.6) and 99.6% (95% CI, 98.9 to 99.9), respectively, and in asymptomatic children, they were 65.4% (95% CI, 55.6 to 74.4) and 99.0% (95% CI, 98.0 to 99.6), respectively. By cycle threshold (CT ) value cutoff, sensitivity in all subgroups combined (n = 292 RT-PCR-positive individuals) was 99.3% with CT values of ≤25, 95.8% with CT values of ≤30, and 81.2% with CT values of ≤35. Twelve false-positive BinaxNOW results (out of 2,308 tests) were observed; in all 12, the test bands were faint but otherwise normal and were noted by both readers. One invalid BinaxNOW result was identified. Interoperator agreement (positive versus negative BinaxNOW result) was 100% (n = 2,230/2,230 double reads). Each operator was able to process 20 RDTs per hour. In a separate set of 30 specimens (from individuals with symptoms ≤7 days) run at temperatures below the manufacturer's recommended range (46 to 58.5°F), sensitivity was 66.7% and specificity 95.2%. BinaxNOW had very high specificity in both adults and children and very high sensitivity in newly symptomatic adults. Overall, 95.8% sensitivity was observed with CT values of ≤30. These data support public health recommendations for use of the BinaxNOW test in adults with symptoms for ≤7 days without RT-PCR confirmation. Excellent interoperator agreement indicates that an individual can perform and read the BinaxNOW test alone. A skilled laboratorian can perform and read 20 tests per hour. Careful attention to temperature is critical.

Mass SARS-CoV-2 Testing in a Dormitory-Style Correctional Facility in Arkansas.

Objectives. To assess SARS-CoV-2 transmission within a correctional facility and recommend mitigation strategies.Methods. From April 29 to May 15, 2020, we established the point prevalence of COVID-19 among incarcerated persons and staff within a correctional facility in Arkansas. Participants provided respiratory specimens for SARS-CoV-2 testing and completed questionnaires on symptoms and factors associated with transmission.Results. Of 1647 incarcerated persons and 128 staff tested, 30.5% of incarcerated persons (range by housing unit = 0.0%-58.2%) and 2.3% of staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Among those who tested positive and responded to symptom questions (431 incarcerated persons, 3 staff), 81.2% and 33.3% were asymptomatic, respectively. Most incarcerated persons (58.0%) reported wearing cloth face coverings 8 hours or less per day, and 63.3% reported close contact with someone other than their bunkmate.Conclusions. If testing remained limited to symptomatic individuals, fewer cases would have been detected or detection would have been delayed, allowing transmission to continue. Rapid implementation of mass testing and strict enforcement of infection prevention and control measures may be needed to mitigate spread of SARS-CoV-2 in this setting.

COVID-19 Response Efforts of Washington State Public Health Laboratory: Lessons Learned.

Laboratory diagnostics play an essential role in pandemic preparedness. In January 2020, the first US case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Washington State. At the same time, the Washington State Public Health Laboratory (WA PHL) was in the process of building upon and initiating innovative preparedness activities to strengthen laboratory testing capabilities, operations, and logistics. The response efforts of WA PHL, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to the COVID-19 outbreak in Washington are described herein-from the initial detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 through the subsequent 2 months.Factors that contributed to an effective laboratory response are described, including preparing early to establish testing capacity, instituting dynamic workforce solutions, advancing information management systems, refining laboratory operations, and leveraging laboratory partnerships. We also report on the challenges faced, successful steps taken, and lessons learned by WA PHL to respond to COVID-19.The actions taken by WA PHL to mount an effective public health response may be useful for US laboratories as they continue to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and may help inform current and future laboratory pandemic preparedness activities.

COVID-19 Outbreak Among Employees at a Meat Processing Facility - South Dakota, March-April 2020.

On March 24, 2020, the South Dakota Department of Health (SDDOH) was notified of a case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in an employee at a meat processing facility (facility A) and initiated an investigation to isolate the employee and identify and quarantine contacts. On April 2, when 19 cases had been confirmed among facility A employees, enhanced testing for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, was implemented, so that any employee with a COVID-19-compatible sign or symptom (e.g., fever, cough, or shortness of breath) could receive a test from a local health care facility. By April 11, 369 COVID-19 cases had been confirmed among facility A employees; on April 12, facility A began a phased closure* and did not reopen during the period of investigation (March 16-April 25, 2020). At the request of SDDOH, a CDC team arrived on April 15 to assist with the investigation. During March 16-April 25, a total of 929 (25.6%) laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases were diagnosed among 3,635 facility A employees. At the outbreak's peak, an average of 67 cases per day occurred. An additional 210 (8.7%) cases were identified among 2,403 contacts of employees with diagnosed COVID-19. Overall, 48 COVID-19 patients were hospitalized, including 39 employees and nine contacts. Two employees died; no contacts died. Attack rates were highest among department-groups where employees tended to work in proximity (i.e., <6 feet [2 meters]) to one another on the production line. Cases among employees and their contacts declined to approximately 10 per day within 7 days of facility closure. SARS-CoV-2 can spread rapidly in meat processing facilities because of the close proximity of workstations and prolonged contact between employees (1,2). Facilities can reduce this risk by implementing a robust mitigation program, including engineering and administrative controls, consistent with published guidelines (1).

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Prevalence, Seroprevalence, and Exposure among Evacuees from Wuhan, China, 2020.

To determine prevalence of, seroprevalence of, and potential exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among a cohort of evacuees returning to the United States from Wuhan, China, in January 2020, we conducted a cross-sectional study of quarantined evacuees from 1 repatriation flight. Overall, 193 of 195 evacuees completed exposure surveys and submitted upper respiratory or serum specimens or both at arrival in the United States. Nearly all evacuees had taken preventive measures to limit potential exposure while in Wuhan, and none had detectable SARS-CoV-2 in upper respiratory tract specimens, suggesting the absence of asymptomatic respiratory shedding among this group at the time of testing. Evidence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 was detected in 1 evacuee, who reported experiencing no symptoms or high-risk exposures in the previous 2 months. These findings demonstrated that this group of evacuees posed a low risk of introducing SARS-CoV-2 to the United States.

COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities - 19 States, April 2020.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections and Transmission in a Skilled Nursing Facility.

BACKGROUND: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection can spread rapidly within skilled nursing facilities. After identification of a case of Covid-19 in a skilled nursing facility, we assessed transmission and evaluated the adequacy of symptom-based screening to identify infections in residents. METHODS: We conducted two serial point-prevalence surveys, 1 week apart, in which assenting residents of the facility underwent nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal testing for SARS-CoV-2, including real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR), viral culture, and sequencing. Symptoms that had been present during the preceding 14 days were recorded. Asymptomatic residents who tested positive were reassessed 7 days later. Residents with SARS-CoV-2 infection were categorized as symptomatic with typical symptoms (fever, cough, or shortness of breath), symptomatic with only atypical symptoms, presymptomatic, or asymptomatic. RESULTS: Twenty-three days after the first positive test result in a resident at this skilled nursing facility, 57 of 89 residents (64%) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Among 76 residents who participated in point-prevalence surveys, 48 (63%) tested positive. Of these 48 residents, 27 (56%) were asymptomatic at the time of testing; 24 subsequently developed symptoms (median time to onset, 4 days). Samples from these 24 presymptomatic residents had a median rRT-PCR cycle threshold value of 23.1, and viable virus was recovered from 17 residents. As of April 3, of the 57 residents with SARS-CoV-2 infection, 11 had been hospitalized (3 in the intensive care unit) and 15 had died (mortality, 26%). Of the 34 residents whose specimens were sequenced, 27 (79%) had sequences that fit into two clusters with a difference of one nucleotide. CONCLUSIONS: Rapid and widespread transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was demonstrated in this skilled nursing facility. More than half of residents with positive test results were asymptomatic at the time of testing and most likely contributed to transmission. Infection-control strategies focused solely on symptomatic residents were not sufficient to prevent transmission after SARS-CoV-2 introduction into this facility.

Asymptomatic and Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Residents of a Long-Term Care Skilled Nursing Facility - King County, Washington, March 2020.

Older adults are susceptible to severe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outcomes as a consequence of their age and, in some cases, underlying health conditions (1). A COVID-19 outbreak in a long-term care skilled nursing facility (SNF) in King County, Washington that was first identified on February 28, 2020, highlighted the potential for rapid spread among residents of these types of facilities (2). On March 1, a health care provider at a second long-term care skilled nursing facility (facility A) in King County, Washington, had a positive test result for SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, after working while symptomatic on February 26 and 28. By March 6, seven residents of this second facility were symptomatic and had positive test results for SARS-CoV-2. On March 13, CDC performed symptom assessments and SARS-CoV-2 testing for 76 (93%) of the 82 facility A residents to evaluate the utility of symptom screening for identification of COVID-19 in SNF residents. Residents were categorized as asymptomatic or symptomatic at the time of testing, based on the absence or presence of fever, cough, shortness of breath, or other symptoms on the day of testing or during the preceding 14 days. Among 23 (30%) residents with positive test results, 10 (43%) had symptoms on the date of testing, and 13 (57%) were asymptomatic. Seven days after testing, 10 of these 13 previously asymptomatic residents had developed symptoms and were recategorized as presymptomatic at the time of testing. The reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing cycle threshold (Ct) values indicated large quantities of viral RNA in asymptomatic, presymptomatic, and symptomatic residents, suggesting the potential for transmission regardless of symptoms. Symptom-based screening in SNFs could fail to identify approximately half of residents with COVID-19. Long-term care facilities should take proactive steps to prevent introduction of SARS-CoV-2 (3). Once a confirmed case is identified in an SNF, all residents should be placed on isolation precautions if possible (3), with considerations for extended use or reuse of personal protective equipment (PPE) as needed (4).

COVID-19 in a Long-Term Care Facility - King County, Washington, February 27-March 9, 2020.

On February 28, 2020, a case of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was identified in a woman resident of a long-term care skilled nursing facility (facility A) in King County, Washington.* Epidemiologic investigation of facility A identified 129 cases of COVID-19 associated with facility A, including 81 of the residents, 34 staff members, and 14 visitors; 23 persons died. Limitations in effective infection control and prevention and staff members working in multiple facilities contributed to intra- and interfacility spread. COVID-19 can spread rapidly in long-term residential care facilities, and persons with chronic underlying medical conditions are at greater risk for COVID-19-associated severe disease and death. Long-term care facilities should take proactive steps to protect the health of residents and preserve the health care workforce by identifying and excluding potentially infected staff members and visitors, ensuring early recognition of potentially infected patients, and implementing appropriate infection control measures.

Epidemiology of Covid-19 in a Long-Term Care Facility in King County, Washington.

BACKGROUND: Long-term care facilities are high-risk settings for severe outcomes from outbreaks of Covid-19, owing to both the advanced age and frequent chronic underlying health conditions of the residents and the movement of health care personnel among facilities in a region. METHODS: After identification on February 28, 2020, of a confirmed case of Covid-19 in a skilled nursing facility in King County, Washington, Public Health-Seattle and King County, aided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, launched a case investigation, contact tracing, quarantine of exposed persons, isolation of confirmed and suspected cases, and on-site enhancement of infection prevention and control. RESULTS: As of March 18, a total of 167 confirmed cases of Covid-19 affecting 101 residents, 50 health care personnel, and 16 visitors were found to be epidemiologically linked to the facility. Most cases among residents included respiratory illness consistent with Covid-19; however, in 7 residents no symptoms were documented. Hospitalization rates for facility residents, visitors, and staff were 54.5%, 50.0%, and 6.0%, respectively. The case fatality rate for residents was 33.7% (34 of 101). As of March 18, a total of 30 long-term care facilities with at least one confirmed case of Covid-19 had been identified in King County. CONCLUSIONS: In the context of rapidly escalating Covid-19 outbreaks, proactive steps by long-term care facilities to identify and exclude potentially infected staff and visitors, actively monitor for potentially infected patients, and implement appropriate infection prevention and control measures are needed to prevent the introduction of Covid-19.