Health and Safety Regulations for COVID-19: A Policy Analysis.

The COVID-19 pandemic spurred some regulators in the USA to require occupational health and safety programs to prevent COVID-19 transmission in workplaces. The objective of this study was to describe such state and federal regulations enacted between January 2020 and January 2022. Regulations, including emergency temporary standards (ETS) and permanent standards, were identified through a search of Nexis Uni and Bloomberg Law and review of US OSHA websites and the Federal Register. Full texts were reviewed for regulatory scope, hazard and exposure definitions, determination of exposure or risk levels, and control strategies. Four state (California, Michigan, Virginia, and Oregon) and two federal regulations were identified. All regulations described respiratory aerosols as the primary source of SARS-CoV-2 and recognized person-to-person transmission by droplet, airborne, and contact routes. Only the US OSHA ETS for healthcare explicitly stated that inhalation of respiratory particles was the most likely method of COVID-19 transmission. The Virginia, Michigan, and Oregon regulations described different categories of risk defined by exposure frequency and duration or specific workplace activities. California described exposure as places and times when employees come into contact or congregate with other people. The US OSHA ETS for healthcare described exposure as involving close contact with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients. While all of the state regulations required strategies from across the hierarchy, only the Virginia regulations specifically incorporated the hierarchy of controls. Only the California and Virginia regulations explicitly linked control strategies to the transmission route, while Virginia demarcated control strategies by risk level. Oregon linked risk level to occupancy levels and physical distancing requirements and referred to the use of a layered approach for transmission control. The US OSHA ETS for healthcare defined droplet and airborne precautions but made no mention of the hierarchy of controls or risk levels. Respirators were discussed in most of the regulations. The first Michigan regulation explicitly required respirators appropriate to exposure risk. The California regulations noted that respirators protect the wearer while face coverings protect people around the wearer. These regulations offer insights for a permanent US OSHA infectious disease regulation, such as the need to consider a range of transmission modes including near- and far-range aerosol inhalation, endemic and novel pathogens, workplaces beyond healthcare settings, factors that contribute to exposure and risk, the hierarchy of controls, the role of vaccination, and the importance of written exposure assessment and infection prevention plans.

Aerosol containment device design considerations and performance evaluation metrics.

BACKGROUND: Spurred by the Coronavirus infectious disease 2019 pandemic, aerosol containment devices (ACDs) were developed to capture infectious respiratory aerosols generated by patients at their source. Prior reviews indicated that such devices had low evidence of effectiveness, but did not address how ACDs should be evaluated, how well they should perform, nor have clearly defined performance standards. Towards developing design criteria for ACDs, two questions were posed: 1) What characteristics have guided the design of ACDs? 2) How have these characteristics been evaluated? METHODS: A scoping review was performed consistent with PRISMA guidelines. Data were extracted with respect to general study information, intended use of the device, device design characteristics and evaluation. RESULTS: Fifty-four articles were included. Evaluation was most commonly performed with respect to device aerosol containment (n = 31, 61%), with only 5 (9%), 3 (6%) and 8 (15%) formally assessing providing experience, patient experience and procedure impact, respectively. Nearly all of the studies that explored provider experience and procedure impact studied intubation. Few studies provided a priori performance criteria for any evaluation metric, or referenced any external guidelines by which to bench mark performance. CONCLUSION: With respect to aerosol containment, ACDs should reduce exposure among HCP with the device compared with the absence of the device, and provide ≥90% reduction in respirable aerosols, equivalent in performance to N95 filtering facepiece respirators, if the goal is to reduce reliance on personal protective equipment. The ACD should not increase awkward or uncomfortable postures, or adversely impact biomechanics of the procedure itself as this could have implications for procedure outcomes. A variety of standardized instruments exist to assess the experience of patients and healthcare personnel. Integration of ACDs into routine clinical practice requires rigorous studies of aerosol containment and the user experience.

Health and Safety Regulations for COVID-19: A Policy Analysis.

The COVID-19 pandemic spurred some regulators in the USA to require occupational health and safety programs to prevent COVID-19 transmission in workplaces. The objective of this study was to describe such state and federal regulations enacted between January 2020 and January 2022. Regulations, including emergency temporary standards (ETS) and permanent standards, were identified through a search of Nexis Uni and Bloomberg Law and review of US OSHA websites and the Federal Register. Full texts were reviewed for regulatory scope, hazard and exposure definitions, determination of exposure or risk levels, and control strategies. Four state (California, Michigan, Virginia, and Oregon) and two federal regulations were identified. All regulations described respiratory aerosols as the primary source of SARS-CoV-2 and recognized person-to-person transmission by droplet, airborne, and contact routes. Only the US OSHA ETS for healthcare explicitly stated that inhalation of respiratory particles was the most likely method of COVID-19 transmission. The Virginia, Michigan, and Oregon regulations described different categories of risk defined by exposure frequency and duration or specific workplace activities. California described exposure as places and times when employees come into contact or congregate with other people. The US OSHA ETS for healthcare described exposure as involving close contact with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients. While all of the state regulations required strategies from across the hierarchy, only the Virginia regulations specifically incorporated the hierarchy of controls. Only the California and Virginia regulations explicitly linked control strategies to the transmission route, while Virginia demarcated control strategies by risk level. Oregon linked risk level to occupancy levels and physical distancing requirements and referred to the use of a layered approach for transmission control. The US OSHA ETS for healthcare defined droplet and airborne precautions but made no mention of the hierarchy of controls or risk levels. Respirators were discussed in most of the regulations. The first Michigan regulation explicitly required respirators appropriate to exposure risk. The California regulations noted that respirators protect the wearer while face coverings protect people around the wearer. These regulations offer insights for a permanent US OSHA infectious disease regulation, such as the need to consider a range of transmission modes including near- and far-range aerosol inhalation, endemic and novel pathogens, workplaces beyond healthcare settings, factors that contribute to exposure and risk, the hierarchy of controls, the role of vaccination, and the importance of written exposure assessment and infection prevention plans.

A Novel Application of Risk-Risk Tradeoffs in Occupational Health: Nurses' Occupational Asthma and Infection Risk Perceptions Related to Cleaning and Disinfection during COVID-19.

BACKGROUND: Nurses face the risk of new onset occupational asthma (OA) due to exposures to cleaning and disinfection (C&D) agents used to prevent infections in healthcare facilities. The objective of this study was to measure nurses' preferences when presented with simultaneous OA and respiratory viral infection (e.g., COVID-19) risks related to increased/decreased C&D activities. METHODS: Nurses working in healthcare for ≥1 year and without physician-diagnosed asthma were recruited for an online anonymous survey, including four risk-risk tradeoff scenarios between OA and respiratory infection with subsequent recovery (Infect and Recovery) or subsequent death (Infect and Death). Nurses were presented with baseline risks at hypothetical "Hospital 1", and were asked to choose Hospital 2 (increased OA risk to maintain infection risk), Hospital 3 (increased infection risk to maintain OA risk), or indicate that they were equally happy. RESULTS: Over 70% of nurses were willing to increase infection risk to maintain baseline OA risk if they were confident they would recover from the infection. However, even when the risk of infection leading to death was much lower than OA, most nurses were not willing to accept a larger (but still small) risk of death to avoid doubling their OA risk. Age, work experience, and ever having contracted or knowing anyone who has contracted a respiratory viral infection at work influenced choices. CONCLUSIONS: We demonstrate the novel application of a risk-risk tradeoff framework to address an occupational health issue. However, more data are needed to test the generalizability of the risk preferences found in this specific risk-risk tradeoff context.

Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2? Evidence, prevention and control.

As public health teams respond to the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), containment and understanding of the modes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission is of utmost importance for policy making. During this time, governmental agencies have been instructing the community on handwashing and physical distancing measures. However, there is no agreement on the role of aerosol transmission for SARS-CoV-2. To this end, we aimed to review the evidence of aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Several studies support that aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, and the plausibility score (weight of combined evidence) is 8 out of 9. Precautionary control strategies should consider aerosol transmission for effective mitigation of SARS-CoV-2.

Relative contributions of transmission routes for COVID-19 among healthcare personnel providing patient care.

The routes of COVID-19 transmission to healthcare personnel from infected patients is the subject of debate, but is critical to the selection of personal protective equipment. The objective of this paper was to explore the contributions of three transmission routes-contact, droplet, and inhalation-to the risk of occupationally acquired COVID-19 infection among healthcare personnel (HCP). The method was quantitative microbial risk assessment, and an exposure model, where possible model parameters were based on data specific to the SARS-CoV-2 virus when available. The key finding was that droplet and inhalation transmission routes predominate over the contact route, contributing 35%, 57%, and 8.2% of the probability of infection, on average, without use of personal protective equipment. On average, 80% of inhalation exposure occurs when HCP are near patients. The relative contribution of droplet and inhalation depends upon the emission of SARS-CoV-2 in respirable particles (<10 µm) through exhaled breath, and inhalation becomes predominant, on average, when emission exceeds five gene copies per min. The predicted concentration of SARS-CoV-2 in the air of the patient room is low (< 1 gene copy per m3 on average), and likely below the limit of quantification for many air sampling methods. The findings demonstrate the value of respiratory protection for HCP, and that field sampling may not be sensitive enough to verify the contribution of SARS-CoV-2 inhalation to the risk of occupationally acquired COVID-19 infection among healthcare personnel. The emission and infectivity of SARS-CoV-2 in respiratory droplets of different sizes is a critical knowledge gap for understanding and controlling COVID-19 transmission.