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1.
BMJ Open ; 12(11): e062624, 2022 11 22.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2152991

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVES: A systematic review was conducted with the aims of identifying sectors mentioned in the public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR) literature and mapping the involvement of those sectors in the seven PHEPR cycle domains. SETTING: A detailed search strategy was conducted in Embase and Scopus, covering the period between 1 January 2005 and 1 January 2020. METHODS: Published articles focusing on preparedness for and/or response to public health emergencies of multiple origins on the European continent were included. The frequency with which predetermined sectors were mentioned when describing collaboration during the preparedness and response cycle was determined. RESULTS: The results show that description of the involvement of sectors in PHEPR in general and collaboration during PHEPR is predominantly confined to a limited number of sectors, namely 'Governmental institutions', 'Human health industry', 'Experts' and 'Civil Society'. Description is also limited to only three domains of the PHEPR cycle, namely 'Risk and crisis management', 'Pre-event preparations and governance' and 'Surveillance'. CONCLUSIONS: Optimal preparedness and response require predefined collaboration with a broader scope of partners than currently seems to be the case based on this literature review. We recommend considering these outcomes when planning multisectoral collaboration during preparedness and response, as well as the need to further operationalise the term 'multisectoral collaboration' during PHEPRs. PROSPERO REGISTRATION NUMBER: PROSPERO with registration number 176 331.


Subject(s)
Civil Defense , Humans , Civil Defense/methods , Public Health/methods
2.
Front Immunol ; 13, 2022.
Article in English | PubMed Central | ID: covidwho-2163027

ABSTRACT

Vaccination against coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has contributed greatly to providing protection against severe disease, thereby reducing hospital admissions and deaths. Several studies have reported reduction in vaccine effectiveness over time against the Omicron sub-lineages. However, the willingness to receive regular booster doses in the general population is declining. To determine the need for repeated booster vaccinations in healthy individuals and to aid policymakers in future public health interventions for COVID-19, we aim to gain insight into the immunogenicity of the additional bivalent booster vaccination in a representative sample of the healthy Dutch population. The SWITCH ON study was initiated to investigate three main topics: i) immunogenicity of bivalent vaccines after priming with adenovirus- or mRNA-based vaccines, ii) immunological recall responses and reactivity with relevant variants after booster vaccination, and iii) the necessity of booster vaccinations for the healthy population in the future.Clinical trial registration: https://clinicaltrials.gov/, identifier NCT05471440.

4.
Reproductive Sciences ; 29(SUPPL 1):168-168, 2022.
Article in English | Web of Science | ID: covidwho-1749486
8.
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde ; 165:30, 2021.
Article in Dutch | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1679259

ABSTRACT

Almost two years after the introduction of SARS-CoV-2, it has become clear that the virus is unlikely to disappear any time soon. It is also clear that the virus mutates, resulting in specific variants of SARS-CoV-2. The exact implications of these variants are being investigated but it is likely that they have a selective advantage over previously circulating variants. It is possible that SARS-CoV-2 will mutate in the coming years to such an extent that existing vaccines do not offer sufficient protection against hospitalizations in the general population. At present, the protection of current vaccines against infection is observed to be reduced by the emergence of variants but remains high against hospitalizations and severe disease. Booster vaccinations are currently advised for specific risk groups where the regular vaccination schedule leads to an insufficient immune response, and are being considered for people in old age where the vaccine effectiveness is lower.

9.
European Journal of Public Health ; 31:2, 2021.
Article in English | Web of Science | ID: covidwho-1610081
10.
European Journal of Public Health ; 31, 2021.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-1514836

ABSTRACT

Background Since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, the importance of testing suspected cases has been stressed by various governments and international organizations. Early in the pandemic, the WHO's Secretary General emphasized the need to ‘test, test, test'. Nonetheless, there were some evident differences between European Member States' testing strategies. In order to get an understanding of why and how these differences developed we conducted a mixed methods study in several EU member states. Methods We conducted semi-structured interviews with 11 professionals with expertise in public health, laboratory diagnostics and policymaking in 8 European countries, namely Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Latvia, Italy, Slovenia. Based on interview results, a questionnaire is developed to quantify to which degree a larger audience of public health, laboratory and policy-making professionals believe identified factors played a role in the national SARS-CoV-2 testing strategy. Preliminary results 3 factors seem to play an important role in the diagnostic capacity and testing strategy. Firstly, differences in the countries' available stockpile and their ability to efficiently procure diagnostic equipment influenced testing strategies. Secondly, the variation in institutions that took ownership of the issues of developing, executing and developing the policies led to differences in the testing strategies. Lastly, all countries aimed to follow international advice and guidelines, which led to the convergence of testing strategies over time. Conclusions In order to be prepared for a pandemic of COVID-19's scale and make necessary adjustments in capacity building, it is important that Member States understand the factors that play an important role in both their own and other European countries' diagnostic preparedness strategies.

11.
O'Toole, A.; Hill, V.; Pybus, O. G.; Watts, A.; Bogoch, II, Khan, K.; Messina, J. P.; consortium, Covid- Genomics UK, Network for Genomic Surveillance in South, Africa, Brazil, U. K. Cadde Genomic Network, Tegally, H.; Lessells, R. R.; Giandhari, J.; Pillay, S.; Tumedi, K. A.; Nyepetsi, G.; Kebabonye, M.; Matsheka, M.; Mine, M.; Tokajian, S.; Hassan, H.; Salloum, T.; Merhi, G.; Koweyes, J.; Geoghegan, J. L.; de Ligt, J.; Ren, X.; Storey, M.; Freed, N. E.; Pattabiraman, C.; Prasad, P.; Desai, A. S.; Vasanthapuram, R.; Schulz, T. F.; Steinbruck, L.; Stadler, T.; Swiss Viollier Sequencing, Consortium, Parisi, A.; Bianco, A.; Garcia de Viedma, D.; Buenestado-Serrano, S.; Borges, V.; Isidro, J.; Duarte, S.; Gomes, J. P.; Zuckerman, N. S.; Mandelboim, M.; Mor, O.; Seemann, T.; Arnott, A.; Draper, J.; Gall, M.; Rawlinson, W.; Deveson, I.; Schlebusch, S.; McMahon, J.; Leong, L.; Lim, C. K.; Chironna, M.; Loconsole, D.; Bal, A.; Josset, L.; Holmes, E.; St George, K.; Lasek-Nesselquist, E.; Sikkema, R. S.; Oude Munnink, B.; Koopmans, M.; Brytting, M.; Sudha Rani, V.; Pavani, S.; Smura, T.; Heim, A.; Kurkela, S.; Umair, M.; Salman, M.; Bartolini, B.; Rueca, M.; Drosten, C.; Wolff, T.; Silander, O.; Eggink, D.; Reusken, C.; Vennema, H.; Park, A.; Carrington, C.; Sahadeo, N.; Carr, M.; Gonzalez, G.; Diego, Search Alliance San, National Virus Reference, Laboratory, Seq, Covid Spain, Danish Covid-19 Genome, Consortium, Communicable Diseases Genomic, Network, Dutch National, Sars-CoV-surveillance program, Division of Emerging Infectious, Diseases, de Oliveira, T.; Faria, N.; Rambaut, A.; Kraemer, M. U. G..
Wellcome Open Research ; 6:121, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1450989

ABSTRACT

Late in 2020, two genetically-distinct clusters of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with mutations of biological concern were reported, one in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa. Using a combination of data from routine surveillance, genomic sequencing and international travel we track the international dispersal of lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 (variant 501Y-V2). We account for potential biases in genomic surveillance efforts by including passenger volumes from location of where the lineage was first reported, London and South Africa respectively. Using the software tool grinch (global report investigating novel coronavirus haplotypes), we track the international spread of lineages of concern with automated daily reports, Further, we have built a custom tracking website (cov-lineages.org/global_report.html) which hosts this daily report and will continue to include novel SARS-CoV-2 lineages of concern as they are detected.

12.
Annals of Oncology ; 32:S1337, 2021.
Article in English | EMBASE | ID: covidwho-1446386

ABSTRACT

Background: Patients with cancer have an increased risk of complications from severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections. Vaccination is recommended, but the impact of chemotherapy and immunotherapy on immunogenicity and safety is still unclear. Methods: This prospective multicenter non-inferiority trial comprises four cohorts: individuals without cancer (A) and patients with solid tumors who were treated with immunotherapy (B), chemotherapy (C) or chemo-immunotherapy (D). Participants received two mRNA-1273 vaccinations 28 days apart. The primary endpoint was SARS-CoV-2 Spike S1-specific IgG serum antibody response, defined as >10 binding antibody units (BAU)/ml 28 days after the second vaccination. We also assessed the virus neutralizing capacity of these antibodies, SARS-CoV-2 Spike-specific interferon-gamma T cell response, and adverse events. Results: Of the 791 participants enrolled, 743 were evaluable for the primary endpoint in cohort A (n=240), B (n=131), C (n=229) and D (n=143). A SARS-CoV-2-binding antibody response was found in 100%, 99.3%, 97.4%, and 100% of the participants in cohorts A, B, C, and D, respectively. To discriminate between suboptimal and adequate responders, we defined a cut-off level at 300 BAU/ml, based on neutralizing capacity. The antibody response was considered adequate after the first vaccination in 66.0%, 37.1%, 32.5%, and 33.3% of the participants in cohorts A, B, C, and D, respectively. This raised 28 days after the second vaccination to respectively 99.6%, 93.1%, 83.8%, and 88.8% in cohorts A, B, C, and D. Spike-specific T cell responses were detected in 46.7% of suboptimal and non-responders. No new safety signals were observed. Conclusions: mRNA-1273 vaccination is safe in the patient populations studied. For each cohort, the proportion of patients with a SARS-CoV-2-binding antibody response after two vaccinations is non-inferior compared to individuals without cancer. However, a significant minority lacks an adequate response. Most patients have an antibody concentration increase after the second vaccination. Therefore, an additional booster may turn inadequate into adequate responders. Clinical trial identification: NCT04715438. Legal entity responsible for the study: University Medical Center Groningen, the Netherlands. Funding: ZonMw, The Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development. Disclosure: All authors have declared no conflicts of interest.

13.
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde ; 164:7, 2020.
Article in Dutch | GIM | ID: covidwho-1308677

ABSTRACT

China is struggling with the outbreak of a new coronavirus that is not yet under control. What exactly is going on, what do we know and what not, and how should we proceed? This article lists the current state of affairs and discuss the international approach, as well as discussing past outbreaks, what they currently know about COVID-19, and public health preparation to control and prevent transmission of the virus in Netherlands.

14.
Topics in Antiviral Medicine ; 29(1):34, 2021.
Article in English | EMBASE | ID: covidwho-1250321

ABSTRACT

Background: Convalescent plasma could be an inexpensive and widely available drug for COVID-19 patients. Reports on its effectiveness are inconclusive. We collected convalescent plasma with high titers of neutralizing anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies effectively blocking SARS-CoV-2 infection and assessed their clinical and viro-immunological responses in COVID-19 patients with severe disease. Methods: In a multicentre open-label randomized clinical trial in 14 secondary and academic hospitals in the Netherlands, included patients were admitted for COVID-19 with SARS-CoV-2 detected by PCR and not on mechanical ventilation for >96hours. Convalescent plasma donors were selected based on SARS-CoV-2 plaque reduction neutralization test (PRNT50) result of ≥1:80. Primary outcome was day 60 mortality. Secondary outcomes were disease severity, inflammatory and virological markers. Results: Included patients were 72% male, median 63 years (IQR 56-74) and with median 10 days of symptoms (IQR 6-15) at inclusion when they were randomized to convalescent plasma or standard of care. We found no significant difference in mortality at day 60 by using 300mL of convalescent plasma (median PRNT50 1:640) between the arms after adjustment (OR: 0.95, 95%CI: 0.20-4.67). Improvements in WHO COVID-19 disease severity scores at day 15 (OR: 1.30, 95%CI 0.52-3.32) and time to discharge (HR: 0.88, 95%CI: 0.49-1.60) were also comparable. The vast majority of patients already had potent neutralizing anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies at hospital admission and at comparable titers as the carefully selected plasma donors. No effect of convalescent plasma on viral clearance in the respiratory tract, anti- SARS-CoV-2 antibody development or changes in serum pro-inflammatory cytokine levels were observed. After the inclusion of 86 patients and per DSMB recommendation, we decided to interrupt the study for futility. Conclusion: Convalescent plasma treatment in this patient group did not improve survival or disease course, nor did it alter relevant virological and immunological parameters. Together, these data indicate that the variable effectivity observed in trials on convalescent plasma for COVID-19 may be explained by the timing of treatment and varying levels of preexisting anti-SARS-CoV-2 immunity in patients. It also substantiates that convalescent plasma should be studied as early as possible in the disease course or at least preceding the start of an autologous humoral response. (Clinicaltrials.gov: NCT04342182).

16.
J Hosp Infect ; 110: 178-183, 2021 Apr.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1074814

ABSTRACT

AIM: To investigate the sources of infection among healthcare workers (HCWs) and patients in a teaching hospital in the Netherlands during the early stages of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic using epidemiological and whole-genome sequencing data. METHODS: From 3rd April to 11th May 2020, 88 HCWs and 215 patients were diagnosed with COVID-19. Whole-genome sequences were obtained for 30 HCWs and 20 patients. RESULTS: Seven and 11 sequence types were identified in HCWs and patients, respectively. Cluster A was the most common sequence type, detected in 23 (77%) HCWs; of these, 14 (61%) had direct patient contact and nine (39%) had indirect patient contact. In addition, seven patients who were not hospitalized in the COVID-19 cohort isolation ward who became positive during their admission were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) cluster A. Following universal masking of all HCWs and emphasis on physical distancing during meals and breaks, no further evidence was found for patient-to-HCW or HCW-to-HCW transmission or vice versa. CONCLUSION: The finding that patients and HCWs were infected with SARS-CoV-2 cluster A suggests both HCW-to-HCW and HCW-to-patient transmission.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/transmission , Health Personnel/statistics & numerical data , Hospitals, Teaching/statistics & numerical data , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/statistics & numerical data , Inpatients/statistics & numerical data , SARS-CoV-2/genetics , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , COVID-19/epidemiology , Cohort Studies , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Netherlands/epidemiology , Pandemics/statistics & numerical data
17.
Lancet Infectious Diseases ; 21(1):18-19, 2021.
Article in English | Web of Science | ID: covidwho-1059147
18.
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde ; 164(7), 2020.
Article in Dutch | Scopus | ID: covidwho-825862
19.
Oman Medical Journal ; 35 (1):7-8, 2020.
Article in English | EMBASE | ID: covidwho-824866

ABSTRACT

Objectives: The emergence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in 2012 was accompanied by uncertainty about its epidemiological and clinical characteristics. Once camelus dromedarius was found to be the natural reservoir of the virus public health systems across the Arabian Peninsula came under unprecedented pressure to control its transmission. This study describes how a One Health approach was used in Qatar to manage the MERS-CoV outbreak between 2012 and 2017. Method(s): The One Health approach adopted brought together professionals working in the health, animal welfare, and environmental sectors. To manage the MERS outbreak the Qatar National Outbreak Control Taskforce (OCT) was reactivated in November 2012 and experts from the animal health sector were invited to join. Later, technical expertise was requested from the WHO, FAO, CDC, Erasmus University (EMC), and Public Health England (PHE). A One Health roadmap was subsequently delivered addressing surveillance and investigation, epidemiological studies and increased local diagnostic capacity. Result(s): The joint OCT, once trained, was allocated resources and had access to high risk areas to gather evidence on the potential source of the virus and investigate all cases within 24-48 hours of reporting. Lack of sufficient technical guidance on veterinary surveillance and poor risk perception among vulnerable populations constituted major obstacles to maintaining systematic One Health performance. Conclusion(s): A One Health approach is essential for generating evidence and implementing control measures to restrain MERS-CoV and other zoonotic diseases.

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