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1.
Frontiers in public health ; 10, 2022.
Article in English | EuropePMC | ID: covidwho-2092603

ABSTRACT

Background COVID-19 underscored the importance of building resilient health systems and hospitals. Nevertheless, evidence on hospital resilience is limited without consensus on the concept, its application, or measurement, with practical guidance needed for action at the facility-level. Aim This study establishes a baseline for understanding hospital resilience, exploring its 1) conceptualization, 2) operationalization, and 3) evaluation in the empirical literature. Methods Following Arksey and O'Malley's model, a scoping review was conducted, and a total of 38 articles were included for final extraction. Findings and discussion In this review, hospital resilience is conceptualized by its components, capacities, and outcomes. The interdependence of six components (1) space, 2) stuff, 3) staff, 4) systems, 5) strategies, and 6) services) influences hospital resilience. Resilient hospitals must absorb, adapt, transform, and learn, utilizing all these capacities, sometimes simultaneously, through prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, within a risk-informed and all-hazard approach. These capacities are not static but rather are dynamic and should improve continuously occur over time. Strengthening hospital resilience requires both hard and soft resilience. Hard resilience encompasses the structural (or constructive) and non-structural (infrastructural) aspects, along with agility to rearrange the space while hospital's soft resilience requires resilient staff, finance, logistics, and supply chains (stuff), strategies and systems (leadership and coordination, community engagement, along with communication, information, and learning systems). This ultimately results in hospitals maintaining their function and providing quality and continuous critical, life-saving, and essential services, amidst crises, while leaving no one behind. Strengthening hospital resilience is interlinked with improving health systems and community resilience, and ultimately contributes to advancing universal health coverage, health equity, and global health security. The nuances and divergences in conceptualization impact how hospital resilience is applied and measured. Operationalization and evaluation strategies and frameworks must factor hospitals' evolving capacities and varying risks during both routine and emergency times, especially in resource-restrained and emergency-prone settings. Conclusion Strengthening hospital resilience requires consensus regarding its conceptualization to inform a roadmap for operationalization and evaluation and guide meaningful and effective action at facility and country level. Further qualitative and quantitative research is needed for the operationalization and evaluation of hospital resilience comprehensively and pragmatically, especially in fragile and resource-restrained contexts.

2.
Int J Environ Res Public Health ; 19(19)2022 Sep 25.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2043749

ABSTRACT

Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) booster doses decrease infection transmission and disease severity. This study aimed to assess the acceptance of COVID-19 vaccine booster doses in low, middle, and high-income countries of the East Mediterranean Region (EMR) and its determinants using the health belief model (HBM). In addition, we aimed to identify the causes of booster dose rejection and the main source of information about vaccination. Using the snowball and convince sampling technique, a bilingual, self-administered, anonymous questionnaire was used to collect the data from 14 EMR countries through different social media platforms. Logistic regression analysis was used to estimate the key determinants that predict vaccination acceptance among respondents. Overall, 2327 participants responded to the questionnaire. In total, 1468 received compulsory doses of vaccination. Of them, 739 (50.3%) received booster doses and 387 (26.4%) were willing to get the COVID-19 vaccine booster doses. Vaccine booster dose acceptance rates in low, middle, and high-income countries were 73.4%, 67.9%, and 83.0%, respectively (p < 0.001). Participants who reported reliance on information about the COVID-19 vaccination from the Ministry of Health websites were more willing to accept booster doses (79.3% vs. 66.6%, p < 0.001). The leading causes behind booster dose rejection were the beliefs that booster doses have no benefit (48.35%) and have severe side effects (25.6%). Determinants of booster dose acceptance were age (odds ratio (OR) = 1.02, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.01-1.03, p = 0.002), information provided by the Ministry of Health (OR = 3.40, 95% CI: 1.79-6.49, p = 0.015), perceived susceptibility to COVID-19 infection (OR = 1.88, 95% CI: 1.21-2.93, p = 0.005), perceived severity of COVID-19 (OR = 2.08, 95% CI: 137-3.16, p = 0.001), and perceived risk of side effects (OR = 0.25, 95% CI: 0.19-0.34, p < 0.001). Booster dose acceptance in EMR is relatively high. Interventions based on HBM may provide useful directions for policymakers to enhance the population's acceptance of booster vaccination.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19 Vaccines , Cross-Sectional Studies , Developed Countries , Health Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice , Humans , Immunization, Secondary , Vaccination
3.
BMJ Glob Health ; 7(Suppl 4)2022 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1909730

ABSTRACT

The functionality of Public Health Emergency Operations Centres (PHEOCs) in countries is vital to their response capacity. The article assesses the status of National PHEOCs in the 22 countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Region. We designed and administered an online survey between May and June 2021. Meetings and Key Informant Interviews were also conducted with the emergency focal points in the WHO country offices and with other select partners. We also collected data on PHEOCs from the Joint External Evaluations conducted in the Region between 2016 and 2018 in 18 countries, and intra-action review mission reports conducted in 11 countries to review the response to COVID-19 during May 2020-June 2021 - and other relevant mission reports. Only 12 countries reported having PHEOC with varying levels of functionality and 10 of them reported using PHEOC for their response operations. This review formed the baseline of capacity requirements of National PHEOC in each country and will facilitate identifying benchmarks of areas of improvement for future national, WHO and partners support.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Public Health , Humans , Mediterranean Region , Surveys and Questionnaires
4.
BMJ Glob Health ; 6(7)2021 07.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1295212

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic is a devastating reminder that mitigating the threat of emerging zoonotic outbreaks relies on our collective capacity to work across human health, animal health and environment sectors. Despite the critical need for shared approaches, collaborative benchmarks in the International Health Regulations (IHR) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and more specifically the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) often reveal low levels of performance in collaborative technical areas (TAs), thus identifying a real need to work on the human-animal-environment interface to improve health security. The National Bridging Workshops (NBWs) proposed jointly by the World Organisation of Animal Health and World Health Organization (WHO) provide opportunity for national human health, animal health, environment and other relevant sectors in countries to explore the efficiency and gaps in their coordination for the management of zoonotic diseases. The results, gathered in a prioritised roadmap, support the operationalisation of the recommendations made during JEE for TAs where a multisectoral One Health approach is beneficial. For those collaborative TAs (12 out of 19 in the JEE), more than two-thirds of the recommendations can be implemented through one or multiple activities jointly agreed during NBW. Interestingly, when associated with the WHO Benchmark Tool for IHR, it appears that NBW activities are often associated with lower level of performance than anticipated during the JEE missions, revealing that countries often overestimate their capacities at the human-animal-environment interface. Deeper, more focused and more widely shared discussions between professionals highlight the need for concrete foundations of multisectoral coordination to meet goals for One Health and improved global health security through IHR.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , One Health , Animals , Humans , International Cooperation , International Health Regulations , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2
5.
PLoS One ; 16(6): e0245312, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1256013

ABSTRACT

Collaborative, One Health approaches support governments to effectively prevent, detect and respond to emerging health challenges, such as zoonotic diseases, that arise at the human-animal-environmental interfaces. To overcome these challenges, operational and outcome-oriented tools that enable animal health and human health services to work specifically on their collaboration are required. While international capacity and assessment frameworks such as the IHR-MEF (International Health Regulations-Monitoring and Evaluation Framework) and the OIE PVS (Performance of Veterinary Services) Pathway exist, a tool and process that could assess and strengthen the interactions between human and animal health sectors was needed. Through a series of six phased pilots, the IHR-PVS National Bridging Workshop (NBW) method was developed and refined. The NBW process gathers human and animal health stakeholders and follows seven sessions, scheduled across three days. The outputs from each session build towards the next one, following a structured process that goes from gap identification to joint planning of corrective measures. The NBW process allows human and animal health sector representatives to jointly identify actions that support collaboration while advancing evaluation goals identified through the IHR-MEF and the OIE PVS Pathway. By integrating sector-specific and collaborative goals, the NBWs help countries in creating a realistic, concrete and practical joint road map for enhanced compliance to international standards as well as strengthened preparedness and response for health security at the human-animal interface.


Subject(s)
Global Health , Goals , International Cooperation , International Health Regulations , Public Health , Animals , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Humans , Zoonoses
7.
Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal ; 26(6):626-629, 2020.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-1220407

ABSTRACT

[...]work has been done to support implementation of a package of emergency care tools including: the Integrated Interagency Triage Tool (prehospital, routine and mass casualty);Emergency Medical and Trauma Care Checklists;the Basic Emergency Care - an open-access training course for frontline health-care providers who manage acute illness and injury with limited resources;and the International Registry of Trauma and Emergency care to help gather essential data about the performance of emergency care systems (6,7). Despite countries' efforts to control patient flow by directing suspected COVID-19 patients to dedicated facilities, many "self-present" to facilities of their choosing. [...]patients presenting for unrelated emergencies (e.g., trauma) may also be co-infected with COVID-19 - whether or not they are symptomatic. Additionally, many EMR countries lack legislation guaranteeing access to emergency care for all (a key WHO Health System Building Block under governance), which limits access to marginal communities (10). Since the Region is host to the largest number of displaced persons in the world, region-specific guidance has been developed to guide health system response to COVID-19 in the context of displacement (22). [...]there is a paucity of high-quality published data on emergency care systems in the Region and an urgent need for operational research to understand the emergency care needs and emergency care systems performance in EMR countries.

9.
East Mediterr Health J ; 26(6): 626-629, 2020 Jun 24.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-634614

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic began as a cluster of reported cases of acute respiratory illness in China on 31 December 2019 and went on to spread with exponential growth across the globe. By the time it was characterized as a global pandemic on 11 March 2020, 17 of 22 countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) had reports of infected persons. EMR countries are particularly susceptible to such outbreaks due to the presence of globally interconnected markets; complex emergencies in more than half of the countries; religious mass gatherings that draw tens of millions of pilgrims annually; and variation in emergency care systems capacity and health systems performance within and between countries.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/therapy , Emergency Medical Services/organization & administration , Emergency Service, Hospital/organization & administration , Epidemiology/education , International Cooperation , Pneumonia, Viral/therapy , Public Health/education , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Health Policy , Health Services Accessibility , Humans , Mediterranean Region/epidemiology , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Public Health Practice , SARS-CoV-2 , World Health Organization
10.
East Mediterr Health J ; 26(2): 136-137, 2020 Feb 24.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-5026

ABSTRACT

On 31 December 2019, a cluster of acute respiratory illness was reported from China and later confirmed as novel coronavirus on 7 January 2020. This virus is the same member of the coronavirus family that caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) reported in China 2003, and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012. The initial cases have been linked to a live seafood market in Wuhan, China, and the specific animal source is yet to be determined. The detection of this new virus in humans without knowing the source of the infection has raised greatly heightened concerns not only in China, but also internationally. To date, the outbreak has spread to most provinces in China and 25 other countries within a relatively short period. Consequent to its spread, Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus, Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO), declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Infection Control/methods , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Public Health Practice , Animals , COVID-19 , Disease Outbreaks , Humans , Mediterranean Region/epidemiology , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2 , World Health Organization
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