ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has offered China a unique opportunity for worldwide deployment of its longstanding health diplomacy, renamed the Health Silk Road (HSR), now an integral part of its Belt and Road Initiative. As a self-proclaimed South-South collaborator and developer,11Niall Duggan, ‘China's changing role in its all-weather friendship with Africa', In, Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald (Eds). China's International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order? (Role Theory and International Relations) (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 207-225..Beijing has assumed a leadership role, grounded in ‘moral realism', in the world's health governance. Beijing's health diplomacy has received acclaim in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, the pandemic has exacerbated preexisting tensions between China, the United States (US) and European Union (EU). Western countries, wary of China's rising power, reacted resentfully, confirming underlying systemic rivalry. This article argues that the currently disputed, or shifting, world order accounts for the diametrically opposed reactions between the West and the MENA toward China's Health Silk Road.
ABSTRACT
The global COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately intensified the precariousness of insecure work. This article examines the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on platform-based food-delivery drivers in China, particularly focusing on labor conditions. Drawing on 52 in-depth interviews with drivers from top Chinese food-delivery platforms, this article shows that the precarity of drivers' work and life is dramatically amplified by the pandemic, resulting in escalating work insecurity, financial instability, and subservient class identity. More specifically, drivers struggle with increased physical risks, livelihood crisis and inflamed racism. All this results from the reorganization of algorithmic labor process and management facilitated by the coalition of food-delivery platforms and Chinese states, which results in surged workload, unpaid labor, uncompensated prolonged production time and extra investment in production assets.
ABSTRACT
Taiwan remained one of the crossroads of international politics in the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic. Cross-Strait relations with China continued their downward trend, with increasing military tensions in the airspace and waters surrounding the island, leading to speculations of a military takeover. The PLA activism in the Strait was inherently tied, in an action-reaction dynamic, to the further strengthening of relations between Washington and Taipei, with the new Biden administration in the White House operating in broad continuity with the previous Trump administration, albeit with expected differences in style. The Biden administration was instrumental in fostering support among allies to call for «peace and stability» in the Taiwan Strait. In this contest, Taiwan further strengthened relations with Japan, and made inroads in Europe. Partners abroad expanded ties with the island as a result of a broader push back against China's ambitions on the international stage, and the impact of the global supply chain crisis revolving around the shortage of chips. Taiwan's essential role in the supply chain crisis, a result of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's dominance in this strategic industrial sector and of the geographic concentration of chip plants on the island, has presented the Tsai administration with new geo-economic challenges and opportunities. On the domestic front, President Tsai and the DPP obtained an important political victory after the rejection of the referendums on trade, energy, and the electoral law that were supported by the major opposition party, the KMT.
ABSTRACT
In 2020, the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan launched an economic diplomacy project titled Economic Outreach Initiative. It aims to unlock Pakistan's growth potential and showcase national trade, tourism and foreign investment capacities through a paradigm shift of foreign policy from geopolitics to geoeconomics. The Khan administration is committed to capitalising on the ongoing strategic partnership with China and to enhancing the relationship with Washington. In parallel, Pakistan intends to strengthen connectivity with South and Central Asian countries. South Asian regional stability is the linchpin to engineering such a transition. The United States' disengagement with Afghanistan and the Taliban's Kabul takeover have offered Islamabad the opportunity to become a pivotal player in the regional scenario. Islamabad's efforts to support the Afghan peace process include consolidating solid relationships with the new rulers in Kabul and adopting a leading role in moulding the future of Afghanistan. These efforts provide impetus to galvanising Pakistan's international legitimacy, enhancing its regional influence and fostering regional stability, allowing investments and flourishing economic relations with partner countries. Similarly, Pakistan eased its tense relations with India and announced, together with New Delhi, a ceasefire in February 2021. In an environment where the Government is unchallenged by a political opposition mainly engaged in planning the general elections of 2023, Pakistan managed to contain the Coronavirus pandemic despite facing a resurgence of internal militancy.
ABSTRACT
The paper aims to argue that the conflictual debate on human rights between China and United States is characterized by a dichotomous approach which still reflects a Cold War logic and can have a detrimental impact on the full understanding of social, economic, political processes which are undergoing during our age. The argument has been built through a case-study on US-China public discourses on COVID-19 and human rights, which posits that a dichotomous approach has prevented an objective reading of the pandemic processes underway and thus influenced the health crisis' management on both sides.
ABSTRACT
The years between 2018 and 2021 continued a pattern for Cambodia of a rolling back of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties, and saw the completion of the transition from a multi-party illiberal democracy to a one-party, authoritarian state. As attacks against political opposition increased, and political space was progressively closed, most commentators agreed that Cambodia had transitioned from competitive to authoritarian hegemony. The global COVID-19 pandemic saw a marked contraction of the economy, and its ability to recover remains to be seen. Foreign relations with the US and EU, already seriously deteriorated by 2018, continued to decline, and dependence on China increased, bringing unease to nations in the region and further afield. Recognising growing dissatisfaction among the population, the ruling party took measures to secure future control through varying means, including some efforts to address corruption, widening patronage networks, and co-opting youth groups to the party. A cabinet reshuffle brought younger blood into key political positions, and health diplomacy due to the pandemic offered means for Cambodia to smooth over tense international relations. However, at the end of 2021, the Cambodian Prime Minister remained defiant of international opinion and pressure, and looks set to continue his authoritarian, politically violent, rule.
ABSTRACT
According to a Lancet report (2020), life expectancy has increased to 70.8 years, but Indians are living more years with illness and disability. The authors move from the assumption that «hunger is democracy's opposite» and cannot be tolerated in a democratic country (p. 62). Since independence, India has registered several episodes of extreme hunger and famines: in Bihar (1966–67) 13.4 million people were trapped in destitution and thousands of citizens starved to death;in Maharashtra (1973) 130,000 deaths were reported;in the 1990s serious starvation was denounced in Orissa. [...]recently, the country has been facing a form of hunger that kills in silence getting less media attention than famines. According to the 2020 Global Hunger Index, India is 94th (out of 107 nations).
ABSTRACT
The political evolution in Sri Lanka in 2021 confirmed the negative predictions that had been made in the previous year, both for domestic and foreign policy. Internally, president Rajapaksa's tendency to centralize power in his own hands, and in those of his family and close supporters continued. The authoritarian trend already visible in 2020 worsened due to the pandemic crisis. The government put forward a project to amend the Constitution and to introduce further changes in the legal system. These initiatives aroused fears for a possible limitation of the civil rights of Tamil and Muslim minorities. The President maintained Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as his main ideological thrust. In terms of foreign relations, the year was marked by the country's growing international isolation due to its refusal to pursue the accountability program on civil war crimes. Moreover, the cooling of relations with India and the US continued, while Chinese influence clearly grew in both political and economic spheres. The economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic caused a sharp slowdown in the national economy.
ABSTRACT
The election of Ebrahim Raisi as the new president of Iran in June has been the most significant development in Iran during 2021. It represented the end of an era -the reformist-pragmatist one- and the beginning of a new one controlled by the conservative establishment. This article analyses the domestic and international implications of such transition, including assessing Rouhani's performance and legacy. It also analyses the evolution of the Iranian economy, still marked by the sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic. Besides, it describes and assesses the evolution of the nuclear negotiations transferred from the outgoing to the new administration.
ABSTRACT
According to the Washington financial institution, this worsening was the compounded result of the fresh waves of infection, hitting the region in the first half of the year, and the slowness in vaccinating the local populations. According to the Oxfam report, the «pandemic billionaires» were only a fraction in the number of new billionaires who had come to the fore in the Asia-Pacific since the pandemic began. [...]Between 1987 and 2019, the number of billionaires in Asia skyrocketed from 40 to 768».11 In turn, the concentration of wealth had adversely affected the Asian health systems, making them unable to cope with the pandemic in an effective way. According to the Oxfam report: «Longstanding underinvestment and poor government oversight of public health systems has led to an inadequate and unequal public health response to the pandemic in many countries».
ABSTRACT
Migration has taken place throughout human history and continues to do so in the 21st century. In many recent instances, states that are destination of migration flows framed migration as a security issue, i.e. a threat to their citizens' livelihood, safety, and cultural identity. Discourses that securitize migration, thus criminalising immigrants, are not unique to the US and the EU, nor to South-North migration: they pertain to South-South migration as well. This article draws attention to a case of migration and border securitisation from the global South: the one concerning India-bound informal migration originating from Bangladesh. This, incidentally, is also the country of origin of large numbers of migrants that have made their way to Europe during the last decade. This article asks what are the consequences of a securitized approach in the framing and managing of borders and migration, and whether such consequences are worth or at all affordable to the countries involved in the securitisation. The article assesses the potential impact that securitized discourses have on Indo-Bangladeshi relations, as well as on the domestic politics of India and Bangladesh. It reviews the processes of the securitisation of the India-Bangladesh border and the criminalisation of the Bangladeshi migrants in India's contemporary domestic politics with reference to recent (2019-2021) events and current affairs.
ABSTRACT
In 2021, the pandemic continued inflicting a burdensome disruption on the Bangladeshi economy, weighting heavier on the poor and the new poor. However, in terms of macroeconomic indicators, the economy gave signs of early recovery. Also, Bangladesh was declared ready to officially graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026. At the domestic level, the year 2021 recorded a continuation of previous trends. State authorities often used violence in different forms to police dissent. In addition to this, the year saw one of the worst episodes of religion-based violence, aimed against the Hindu minority, symptomatic of the rise of Islamic extremism in the country. The Rohingya crisis continued unfolding both domestically, with the Bangladeshi government relocating refugees from the mainland camps to Bhasan Char;and internationally, with the passing of a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly. Relations with China and India remained central to foreign policy, moulded by the new needs created by the pandemic, but marked by ups and downs. Anti-India sentiment was showcased in violent protests that accompanied a high-level visit to Dhaka. Moreover, as Delhi abruptly halted its vaccines supplies, Chinese «Covid diplomacy» confidently stepped in. Dhaka appeared decided to keep balancing different partners to keep its options open and avoid turning any partnership into an exclusive one.
ABSTRACT
2019-2021 was a peculiar triennium for Thailand. In 2019, the military leaders who had seized power five years earlier with a coup d'état formed a civilian government via a carefully managed general election. Concomitantly, King Maha Vajiralongkorn, on the throne since 2016, underwent his coronation. While the rituals celebrated the formal beginning of his reign, the King exercised his influence over politics in ways deemed unusual for a country that calls itself a constitutional monarchy. In 2020, as COVID-19 spread worldwide, Thailand experienced more an economic than a health crisis. The number of infections remained remarkably low, but the economy recorded its worst performance since the financial crash of 1997. Only in 2021 did the pandemic become more important, the Government responding with Chinese-developed vaccines that many in Thailand deemed little efficacious. Enraged by political instability, economic stagnation, public health emergencies, and deepening relations with China, throughout 2020-2021, young people protested nationwide. Their mobilization marked the biggest instance of generational resistance since the student protests of the 1970s.
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic continued to impact the Japanese economy as well as the political fortunes of Japan's leader in 2021. For the second year in a row, Japan's Prime Minister was forced to stand down, portending a return to the revolving door of one-year prime ministerships that characterized the politically tumultuous period between 2006 and 2012. Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide's announcement that he would not seek reappointment as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), therefore effectively resigning as prime minister, precipitated the most competitive race for the LDP leadership in a decade in September. Suga's anointed replacement was former record-setting Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Fumio. Kishida was not the most popular choice for Japan's next prime minister among the public or even the LDP party cadres. His initial cabinet ratings reflected this and the fact that Kishida had triumphed over then «vaccine minister» Kōno Tarō in the party contest primarily due to factional manoeuvrings facilitated by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. To the traditionally dovish Kishida's credit, he demonstrated great pragmatism in 2021. He managed to win the backing of Abe and other conservatives by adapting his own political positions and adopting others from the conservative wing of the LDP, particularly on Taiwan policy, national security, and economic security policy. Kishida survived Japan's October House of Representatives election in better-than-expected shape and went on to improve his cabinet ratings in the last two months of 2021. Kishida entered 2022 in a strong position with both the COVID-19 and economic situation heading in the right direction ahead of the mid-2022 House of Councillors election—the last national election Kishida will have to face for three years if he prevails.
ABSTRACT
Giulio Pugliese & Andrea Fischetti
ABSTRACT
With the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, the PRC experienced one of its worst internal and international crises, in economic terms but above all in terms of image and prestige. The COVID-19 pandemic, in fact, came at a critical juncture in both China's internal and international relations, given that in recent years the communist Government has become a target of criticism on various internal and international issues. At the same time, it represented a crucial challenge for the CCP, while preparing the celebrations for its 100th anniversary and the achievement of its first «centenary goal». Beyond the undeniable effects on the country's economy, undoubtedly the most relevant effects were recorded in terms of image and reputation, as has emerged in different global opinion polls. Despite the Chinese authorities' highly effective management of the health emergency crisis after a first period of inaction, Beijing's authoritarian rule has again been an object of consistent criticism from liberal Western democracies, both on the intrusive methods adopted to cope with the crisis and its aggressiveness in imposing its official narrative regarding events. After analysing the effects of COVID-19 on China's global image, the paper focuses on the importance of «image» for China and its quest for prestige and image-building throughout history, with special reference to the communist experience. In the last part, it reflects on the opportunity that vaccine diplomacy may represent for China to recover its reputation.
ABSTRACT
After the initial shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, during 2021 the two Koreas focused their efforts in managing the crisis and adapting to the changed situation. If, on the one hand, North Korea maintained its strategy of total isolation to protect the country from the spread of the new virus, South Korea, on the other, implemented a series of measures aimed at preserving an almost normal social and economic life, which culminated with the launch of the so-called «living with COVID» strategy towards the end of the year. The implementation of the plan, however, was immediately threatened by the arrival of the new and extremely contagious «Omicron» variant.
ABSTRACT
The Philippines started 2021 with a temporary relief as the arrival of limited COVID-19 vaccine supplies ushered in the government's launch of its national inoculation programme. However, the periodic surge of COVID-19 cases exposed the constant inadequacies of the Philippine pandemic response, straining once again the country's struggling healthcare system and obstructing the path to economic recovery. With the Filipinos still enduring the pandemic, the government became embroiled in various allegations of corruption and cronyism over the utilization of pandemic funds, which sparked public outcry. President Rodrigo Duterte responded by attacking constitutionally independent agencies that scrutinized the executive branch's alleged excesses, partiality, and incompetence. The national government's policies that further eroded the fragile Philippine democracy were also apparent in how the state agents were increasingly cracking down on the country's civic space, targeting left-leaning activists and the media. The year under review also captured the preparations and manoeuvring of the country's dominant political forces for the 2022 presidential election. Moreover, it saw fresh trajectories and dilemmas in Philippine foreign relations. China's maritime incursions tested Philippines-China relations despite the latter's generous pandemic aid. Conversely, China's increasing threat and the demand for COVID-19 vaccines prompted the Philippines to re-establish its ties with the United States. Finally, the International Criminal Court's decision to investigate Duterte's controversial drug war, albeit temporarily halted, might pave the way for a comprehensive international probe into the Philippines' deteriorating human rights situation. These key intertwining developments in the year under review would cement the legacy of Duterte's populist regime as he prepares to leave the presidency next year.
ABSTRACT
In 2021 Chinese internal politics were dominated by the domestic economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. The celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worked well to project the numerous successes of Chinese politics through history. Yet, Beijing's insistence on the need to rethink the developmental path of China's economic model also demonstrates the extent to which the important engines that have driven China's growth in the past four decades must now be diverted to an internal dimension. This is the case of the dual circulation strategy and the common prosperity policy, whose guidelines are envisioned by Chinese leaders and political elites to transform the country's existing growth model through a fully fledged internal rebalancing, and which spared not even the once unscrutinized, cross-border flow of data coming out of China.
ABSTRACT
In 2021, Malaysia saw the deepening of a political legitimacy deficit as demands for reforms and political change remained largely unattended. The first half of the year was marked by a state of emergency, declared by the government in the face of a new wave of COVID-19 infections. Amid the persisting health crisis and its adverse socio-economic effects, mounting public frustration found expression in online and offline collective mobilizations. Meanwhile, power struggles within the ruling coalition led to a fresh change of government. Then, in December, unprecedented floods ravaged the country's most industrialized region. In that context, a new wave of public outrage rose against the government's sluggish response to the disaster. As the country's economic downturn continued to disproportionally affect the most vulnerable social groups, and the political elites appeared incapable of addressing pressing policy issues, Malaysia witnessed the growth of youth-led activism with an appetite for political change.