ABSTRACT
President Kais Saied's de facto dissolution of parliament in July 2021, abandonment of the constitution, and targeting of the opposition are clear signs that Tunisia is no longer a democracy and has returned to the authoritarian playbook of Arab leaders past and present. I see three main reasons for this abrupt end to Tunisia's decade-old democracy: 1) the failure to accompany political reform with socioeconomic gains for citizens;2) the subsequent rise of populism;and 3) the mistakes of the Islamic party. To move forward in Tunisia and the Arab world more broadly, prodemocratic forces must link freedom, development, and social justice.
ABSTRACT
The Philippines started 2021 with a temporary relief as the arrival of limited COVID-19 vaccine supplies ushered in the government's launch of its national inoculation programme. However, the periodic surge of COVID-19 cases exposed the constant inadequacies of the Philippine pandemic response, straining once again the country's struggling healthcare system and obstructing the path to economic recovery. With the Filipinos still enduring the pandemic, the government became embroiled in various allegations of corruption and cronyism over the utilization of pandemic funds, which sparked public outcry. President Rodrigo Duterte responded by attacking constitutionally independent agencies that scrutinized the executive branch's alleged excesses, partiality, and incompetence. The national government's policies that further eroded the fragile Philippine democracy were also apparent in how the state agents were increasingly cracking down on the country's civic space, targeting left-leaning activists and the media. The year under review also captured the preparations and manoeuvring of the country's dominant political forces for the 2022 presidential election. Moreover, it saw fresh trajectories and dilemmas in Philippine foreign relations. China's maritime incursions tested Philippines-China relations despite the latter's generous pandemic aid. Conversely, China's increasing threat and the demand for COVID-19 vaccines prompted the Philippines to re-establish its ties with the United States. Finally, the International Criminal Court's decision to investigate Duterte's controversial drug war, albeit temporarily halted, might pave the way for a comprehensive international probe into the Philippines' deteriorating human rights situation. These key intertwining developments in the year under review would cement the legacy of Duterte's populist regime as he prepares to leave the presidency next year.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the study is to investigate the role that knowledge creation and knowledge transfer processes play in family firm intergenerational succession in Thailand. An exploratory qualitative case study approach is used. Interviews were conducted with successors and predecessors of small, medium and large Thai firms that have undergone leadership succession within the past five years (30 firms, for n = 60 interviews). Data were analyzed using a qualitative content analysis approach. There were 16 different knowledge approaches identified that are undertaken by the successor. These processes are commonplace to firms, including formal and informal, internal and external processes of knowledge creation and transfer. Most of these occur at different stages of preparation for succession (pre-succession, transition and succession stages). While some knowledge approaches are used across firms, others are specific to small or large firms. These knowledge approaches and stages were used to develop a knowledge process model for family firm succession. The research develops an original model of the knowledge processes associated with family firm succession. This model, which incorporates a staged succession model with the knowledge processes identified, explains how and why knowledge creation and transfer occur during the succession process.
ABSTRACT
Being poor can influence how one makes ethical decisions in various fields. Nepotism is one such area, emerging as kinship-based favoritism in the job market. People can be poor on at least three levels: one can live in a poor country (cross-cultural poverty), be poor compared to others around them (socio-economic poverty), or feel poor in their given situation (situational poverty). We assumed that these levels can simultaneously influence nepotistic hiring decisions among Hungarian (N = 191) and US participants (N = 176). Prior cross-cultural, non-experimental studies demonstrated that nepotism is more prevalent in poorer countries such as Hungary than in richer countries such as the United States. However, contrary to our expectations, in our non-representative, preliminary study, US participants showed stronger nepotistic behavioral tendencies than Hungarians (cross-cultural level). Furthermore, people with lower socioeconomic status had less nepotistic intentions than richer people (socio-economic level). When participants were asked to imagine themselves as a poor person (situational level), they tended to be more nepotistic than had they imagined themselves to be rich. Finally, nepotistic hiring intentions were in general stronger than non-nepotistic hiring intentions. These seemingly paradoxical results were interpreted in the light of the COVID-19 job market context and were explained by the mechanisms described by research on wealth and immoral behaviors, as well as the presence of risk aversion.