Zoonotic potential of guinea pigs: Outbreak of cryptosporidiosis combined with chlamydiosis in a breeding guinea pig herd.

INTRODUCTION: In a guinea pig herd with 26 breeding animals, several individuals of all age categories died (16/26) after three animals had been newly introduced from another herd. Furthermore, the population suffered of apathy, anorexia, severe weight loss and conjunctivitis, as well as abortions and stillbirths. At the same time, the owner experienced a SARS-CoV-2 infection with pneumonia, which was confirmed by taking a PCR test. Chlamydia caviae was detected from the conjunctiva and vagina/uterus in one juvenile animal together with an intestinal Cryptosporidium wrairi infection. Oocysts were found histologically in the small intestine, which was confirmed by PCR. C. wairi is a parasite adapted to guinea pigs with zoonotic potential, which causes diarrhoea with frequent deaths in larger guinea pig herds. C. caviae is also a zoonotic pathogen and often the cause of conjunctivitis, pneumonia and abortions in guinea pigs and can lead to upper respiratory tract disease, conjunctivitis but also severe pneumonia in humans. The increased death cases and the clinical signs could be traced back to an infection with Cryptosporidium wrairi, complicated by a co-infection of C. caviae. We suspect that the abortions were caused by C. caviae, but since the population was treated with various antibiotics effective against chlamydial infections, it was no longer possible to verify this by PCR testing. Unfortunately, more animals succumbed and finally only two animals of the originally 26 were left. With this case report, we would like to point out to veterinarians that guinea pigs can be an important source of zoonotic infections for various pathogens, especially since they are popular pets and often come into close contact with children where hygiene might not always be strictly followed.

INTRODUCTION: Dans un groupe de cobayes de 26 animaux reproducteurs, plusieurs individus de toutes les catégories d'âge sont morts (16/26) après l'introduction de trois animaux provenant d'un autre groupe. En outre, la population a souffert d'apathie, d'anorexie, de perte de poids sévère et de conjonctivite ainsi que d'avortements et de mortinatalité. La présence de Chlamydia caviae a pu être détectée dans la conjonctive et le vagin/utérus d'un animal juvénile, ainsi qu'une infection intestinale à Cryptosporidium wrairi. Des oocystes ont été trouvés histologiquement dans l'intestin grêle, ce qui a été confirmé par PCR. C. wairi est un parasite adapté aux cobayes avec un potentiel zoonotique, qui provoque des diarrhées avec des morts fréquentes dans les grands groupes de cobayes. C. caviae est également un agent pathogène zoonotique et est souvent à l'origine de conjonctivites, de pneumonies et d'avortements chez les cobayes ; il peut entraîner des maladies des voies respiratoires supérieures, des conjonctivites mais aussi des pneumonies graves chez l'homme. L'augmentation des cas de décès et les signes cliniques pourraient être attribués à une infection par Cryptosporidium wrairi, compliquée par une co-infection par C. caviae. Nous soupçonnons que les avortements ont été causés par C. caviae, mais comme la population a été traitée avec divers antibiotiques efficaces contre les infections à chlamydia, il n'était plus possible de le vérifier par des tests PCR. Malheureusement, d'autres animaux ont succombé et il ne restait finalement que deux animaux sur les 26 d'origine. Avec ce rapport de cas, nous aimerions attirer l'attention des vétérinaires sur le fait que les cochons d'Inde peuvent être une source importante d'infections zoonotiques pour divers pathogènes, d'autant plus qu'il s'agit d'animaux de compagnie populaires qui sont souvent en contact étroit avec des enfants avec lesquels l'hygiène n'est pas toujours strictement respectée.

Characterization of an outbreak of equine coronavirus infection in adult horses in Switzerland.

INTRODUCTION: Outbreaks of equine coronavirus (ECoV) infections have been described in different parts of the world including Europe. The aim of this report was to describe clinical signs, diagnostic work-up and outcome of the first documented outbreak of ECoV in Switzerland in order to raise the awareness for the disease and its various clinical presentations. The outbreak occurred on a farm with 26 horses. Of these, seven horses developed clinical disease ranging from mild signs such as fever and anorexia to severe signs of acute colitis. One horse died due to severe endotoxemia and circulatory shock secondary to severe acute necrotizing enteritis and colitis. Out of the 26 horses, five horses tested positive for ECoV, including two ponies without any clinical signs of infection. The low number of positive cases should nevertheless be interpreted with caution as testing was only performed on one occasion, over a month after the onset of clinical signs in the first suspected case. This report highlights the importance of diagnostic testing and early implementation of biosecurity measures on a farm with an ECoV outbreak. It should furthermore raise the awareness for unspecific and mild clinical signs such as fever and anorexia in affected animals that are potentially able to spread the disease.

INTRODUCTION: Des foyers d'infection à coronavirus équin (ECoV) ont été décrits dans différentes parties du monde, y compris en Europe. L'objectif de ce rapport est de décrire les signes cliniques, le diagnostic et les conséquences du premier foyer d'ECoV documenté en Suisse, afin de sensibiliser le public à cette maladie et à ses différents aspects cliniques. L'épidémie s'est produite dans une écurie comptant 26 chevaux. Parmi ceux-ci, sept chevaux ont développé une forme clinique allant de signes légers tels que la fièvre et l'anorexie à des signes sévères de colite aiguë. Un cheval est mort en raison d'une endotoxémie sévère et d>un choc circulatoire secondaire à une entérite nécrosante aiguë sévère et à une colite. Sur les 26 chevaux, cinq ont été testés positifs à l>ECoV, dont deux poneys sans aucun signe clinique d'infection. Le faible nombre de cas positifs doit néanmoins être interprété avec prudence car les tests n'ont été effectués qu'à une seule occasion, plus d'un mois après l'apparition des signes cliniques chez le premier cas suspect. Ce rapport souligne l'importance des tests de diagnostic et de la mise en œuvre rapide de mesures de biosécurité dans une exploitation où un foyer d'ECoV est détecté. Il devrait en outre sensibiliser à la présence de signes cliniques peu spécifiques et bénins tels que la fièvre et l'anorexie chez les animaux atteints qui sont potentiellement capables de propager la maladie.

Foot-and-mouth disease status in India during the second decade of the twenty-first century (2011-2020).

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a major disease of livestock in India and causes huge economic losses. The formal FMD control program started in 2003-04 in selected districts and was gradually expanded. The present study provides a descriptive review of the FMD outbreaks, prevalent serotypes, and genetic and antigenic features of the FMD virus (FMDV) that circulated in the country between 2011 and 2020. FMD outbreaks were regularly reported in cloven-hoofed domestic livestock and wildlife, with three serotypes including O, A, and Asia1. During the study period, a total of 2226 FMD outbreaks were documented and serotypes confirmed. FMDV serotype O dominated the outbreak scenario, accounting for about 92% of all outbreaks, followed by Asia1 (5% of all outbreaks) and A (3% of all outbreaks). Two major epidemics of FMD on an unprecedented scale during the years 2013 and 2018 by serotype O were recorded. The spatial distribution of FMD was characterized by a larger number of outbreaks in the southern region of the country. In an annual-scale analysis, 2020 was the year with the lowest outbreaks, and 2013 was the year with the highest. The month-scale analysis showed that outbreaks were reported throughout the year, with the highest numbers between October and March. The emergence of three major lineages (O/ME-SA/Ind2001d, O/ME-SA/Ind2001e, and O/ME-SA/Ind2018) of serotype O was observed during the period. In the cases of serotype A and Asia1, the appearance of at least one novel lineage/genetic group, including A/G-18/non-deletion/2019 and Asia1/Group-IX, was documented. While serotype A showed the advent of antigenic variants, serotypes O and Asia1 did not show any antigenic diversity. It was noticed during the course of an outbreak that animal movement contributes significantly to disease transmission. Except for 2018, when numerous FMD outbreaks were recorded, the number of annual outbreaks reported after 2016 has been lower than in the first half of the decade, probably due to mass vaccination and COVID-19 pandemic-linked movement restrictions. Even during outbreaks, disease symptoms in ruminant populations, including cattle, were found to be less severe. Regular six-monthly immunization certainly has a positive impact on the reduction of disease burden and should be followed without fail and delay, along with intensive disease surveillance.

Best practices for after-action review: turning lessons observed into lessons learned for preparedness policy.

All-hazards preparedness and response planning requires ongoing individual, organisational and multi-jurisdictional learning. Disaster after-action reviews are an established emergency management practice to acquire knowledge through a process of analysing what happened and why, to improve the emergency response before the next crisis. After-action reviews help individuals and organisations learn, and are an essential step in the preparedness cycle. Human and animal health authorities have begun to employ after-action reviews for disaster preparedness and response among public health and Veterinary Services. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) encourages Members to establish after-action reviews and share best practice. The adoption of afteraction review is an essential step for all provincial, national and multinational emergency management authorities to mitigate the impact of disasters on human and animal health. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases with pandemic potential pose unique preparedness challenges, requiring high-level policy attention to close long-standing gaps. A review of after-action reports from the 2001 anthrax bioterror attacks and of naturally occurring infectious disease crises, from the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) to the 2014 Ebola epidemic, reveal a similar pattern of repeated weakness and failures. These phenomena are described as 'lessons observed but not lessons learned'. Most infectious disease outbreaks with pandemic potential are zoonotic and require a One Health approach to prevent, prepare for and respond to global health security crises. After-action reviews in a One Health security context are essential to improve the pandemic preparedness of public health and Veterinary Services. After-action reviews can also provide the evidence-based 'feedback loop' needed to galvanise public policy and political will to translate lessons observed into sustained and applied lessons learned.

La planification de la préparation et de la réponse à tous les risques est un processus qui exige un apprentissage permanent tant à l'échelle des individus que des organisations et des différentes autorités compétentes. Les retours d'expérience (ou « revues après action¼) suite à une catastrophe constituent un exercice éprouvé de gestion des urgences visant à acquérir de nouvelles connaissances en procédant à l'analyse de ce qui est arrivé et des raisons pour lesquelles c'est arrivé, dans le but d'améliorer les capacités d'intervention d'urgence avant que ne survienne la prochaine crise. Les individus et les organisations trouvent dans ces retours un cadre pour tirer des enseignements de leur expérience, ce qui constitue une étape essentielle du cycle de préparation. Les autorités en charge de la santé humaine et de la santé animale ont commencé à utiliser les retours d'expérience pour planifier la préparation et la réponse au sein des Services de santé publique et des Services vétérinaires. L'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale (OIE) encourage ses Membres à mettre en place des retours d'expérience et à partager les meilleures pratiques en la matière. L'analyse des retours d'expérience est une étape cruciale pour que les autorités en charge de la gestion des urgences à l'échelle provinciale, nationale et internationale puissent atténuer l'impact des catastrophes sur la santé humaine et animale. Les maladies émergentes et ré-émergentes ayant un potentiel pandémique posent des défis exceptionnels en termes de préparation et exigent des prises de décision de haut niveau afin de pallier des lacunes souvent anciennes. L'examen des retours d'expérience datant des attentats terroristes à l'anthrax de 2001 et des crises sanitaires dues à des maladies infectieuses d'origine naturelle (depuis l'épidémie du syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère [SRAS] en 2003 jusqu'à l'épidémie d'Ebola en 2014) révèle des caractéristiques toujours similaires, avec à chaque fois les mêmes faiblesses et les mêmes écueils. Ce phénomène correspond à ce que l'on peut appeler des « leçons observées mais non apprises ¼. Compte tenu de la nature zoonotique de la plupart des foyers de maladies infectieuses ayant un potentiel pandémique, c'est l'approche Une seule santé qui doit prévaloir en matière de prévention, de préparation et de réponse aux crises de sécurité sanitaire d'envergure mondiale. Les retours d'expérience dans un contexte de sécurité Une seule santé sont essentiels pour améliorer la préparation des Services de santé publique et des Services vétérinaires aux pandémies. En outre, les « boucles de réaction¼ fondées sur des éléments factuels résultant des retours d'expérience apportent un éclairage indispensable pour inciter les pouvoirs publics à élaborer des mesures appropriées et pour créer la volonté politique de traduire les leçons observées en leçons durablement apprises et appliquées.

La planificación de las labores de preparación y respuesta ante toda clase de peligros exige un permanente aprendizaje tanto personal como institucional y desde múltiples competencias. El examen de las intervenciones tras un desastre constituye un arraigado proceder de gestión de emergencias que sirve para aprender de la experiencia analizando el cómo y el porqué de lo sucedido y, a partir de ahí, mejorar los procesos de respuesta de emergencia antes de que advenga la siguiente crisis. Estos exámenes posteriores a las intervenciones, que ayudan a las personas y organizaciones a aprender, son una etapa fundamental del ciclo de preparación. Las autoridades sanitarias y zoosanitarias han empezado a utilizarlos en los servicios de salud pública y los Servicios Veterinarios con fines de preparación y respuesta para casos de desastre. La Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE) alienta a sus Miembros a que establezcan este tipo de exámenes y pongan en común prácticas óptimas al respecto. La implantación del examen posterior a las intervenciones es un paso esencial para que todas las autoridades provinciales, nacionales e internacionales de gestión de emergencias estén en condiciones de mitigar los efectos sanitarios y zoosanitarios de un desastre. Las enfermedades infecciosas emergentes y reemergentes con potencial pandémico plantean singulares problemas de preparación, que requieren una atención y una labor normativa de alto nivel para solventar carencias históricas. El examen de los informes posteriores a las actuaciones de respuesta a los ataques bioterroristas perpetrados en 2001 con bacterias de carbunco (ántrax) y a crisis infecciosas de origen natural, desde el brote registrado en 2003 de síndrome respiratorio agudo severo (SRAS) hasta la epidemia causada por el virus del Ébola en 2014, revela un parecido patrón de fallos y carencias que se van repitiendo, fenómeno que se describe como «hechos observados sin enseñanzas extraídas¼. La mayoría de los brotes de enfermedades infecciosas con potencial pandémico son zoonóticos y exigen la aplicación de la lógica de Una sola salud para prevenir crisis sanitarias de dimensión mundial, prepararse para ellas y darles respuesta. Los exámenes posteriores a una intervención inscritos en el contexto de seguridad sanitaria de Una sola salud son esenciales para mejorar la preparación de los servicios de salud pública y los Servicios Veterinarios para episodios de pandemia. Estos procesos de examen también pueden alimentar con datos científicos el «ciclo de retroalimentación¼ que se requiere para galvanizar las políticas públicas y la voluntad política de traducir los hechos observados en enseñanzas extraídas que sean duraderas y se apliquen en la práctica.

Possible ramifications of climate variability on HPAI-H5N1 outbreak occurrence: Case study from the Menoufia, Egypt.

Long endemicity of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 subtype in Egypt poses a lot of threats to public health. Contrary to what is previously known, outbreaks have been circulated continuously in the poultry sectors all year round without seasonality. These changes call the need for epidemiological studies to prove or deny the influence of climate variability on outbreak occurrence, which is the aim of this study. This work proposes a modern approach to examine the degree to which the HPAI-H5N1disease event is being influenced by climate variability as a potential risk factor using generalized estimating equations (GEEs). GEE model revealed that the effect of climate variability differs according to the timing of the outbreak occurrence. Temperature and relative humidity could have both positive and negative effects on disease events. During the cold seasons especially in the first quarter, higher minimum temperatures, consistently show higher risks of disease occurrence, because this condition stimulates viral activity, while lower minimum temperatures support virus survival in the other quarters of the year with the highest negative effect in the third quarter. On the other hand, relative humidity negatively affects the outbreak in the first quarter of the year as the humid weather does not support viral circulation, while the highest positive effect was found in the second quarter during which low humidity favors the disease event.

Preliminary report of an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in mink and mink farmers associated with community spread, Denmark, June to November 2020.

In June-November 2020, SARS-CoV-2-infected mink were detected in 290 of 1,147 Danish mink farms. In North Denmark Region, 30% (324/1,092) of people found connected to mink farms tested SARS-CoV-2-PCR-positive and approximately 27% (95% confidence interval (CI): 25-30) of SARS-CoV-2-strains from humans in the community were mink-associated. Measures proved insufficient to mitigate spread. On 4 November, the government ordered culling of all Danish mink. Farmed mink constitute a potential virus reservoir challenging pandemic control.

Pathogen-specific risk factors in acute outbreaks of respiratory disease in calves.

Respiratory tract infections (bovine respiratory disease) are a major concern in calf rearing. The objective of this study was to identify pathogen-specific risk factors associated with epidemic respiratory disease in calves. A cross-sectional study was conducted, involving 128 outbreaks (29 dairy, 58 dairy-mixed, and 41 beef) in Belgium (2016-2018). A semiquantitative PCR for 7 respiratory pathogens was done on a pooled nonendoscopic bronchoalveolar lavage sample for each herd. Potential risk factors were collected by questionnaire and derived from the national cattle registration databank. Most outbreaks occurred between October and March, and single and multiple viral infections were detected in 58.6% (75/128) and 13.3% (17/128), respectively. Bovine coronavirus (BCV) was the most frequently isolated virus (38.4%), followed by bovine respiratory syncytial virus (bRSV; 29.4%) and parainfluenzavirus type 3 (PI-3; 8.1%). Mycoplasma bovis, Mannheimia haemolytica, Pasteurella multocida, and Histophilus somni were detected in 33.3, 41.2, 89.1, and 36.4% of the herds, respectively. Specific risk factors for BCV detection were detection of M. haemolytica [odds ratio (OR) = 2.8 (95% confidence interval = 1.1-7.5)], increasing herd size [OR = 1.3 (1.0-1.8) for each increase with 100 animals] and detection of BCV by antigen ELISA on feces in calves in the last year [OR = 3.6 (1.2-11.1)]. A seasonal effect was shown for bRSV only {more in winter compared with autumn [OR = 10.3 (2.8-37.5)]}. Other factors associated with bRSV were PI-3 detection [OR = 13.4 (2.1-86.0)], prevalence of calves with respiratory disease [OR = 1.02 (1.00-1.04) per 1% increase], and number of days with respiratory signs before sampling [OR = 0.99 (0.98-0.99) per day increase]. Next to its association with BCV, M. haemolytica was more frequently detected in herds with 5 to 10 animals per pen [OR = 8.0 (1.4-46.9)] compared with <5 animals, and in herds with sawdust as bedding [OR = 18.3 (1.8-191.6)]. Also, for H. somni, housing on sawdust was a risk factor [OR = 5.2 (1.2-23.0)]. Purchase of cattle [OR = 2.9 (1.0-8.0)] and housing of recently purchased animals in the same airspace [OR = 5.0 (1.5-16.5)] were risk factors for M. bovis. This study identified pathogen-specific risk factors that might be useful for the development of customized control and prevention and for the design of decision support tools to justify antimicrobial use by predicting the most likely pathogen before sampling results are available.

Assessment of abortion risk of sows on Japanese commercial farms infected with porcine epidemic diarrhea virus.

The objectives of this study were to assess abortion risk (AR) and the number of piglets that died during suckling periods per litter (DP) in farms infected with porcine epidemic diarrhea (PED) in relation to herd immunization procedures. Data were obtained from 91 farms in Japan that had PED infection during 2013 to 2014. The 91 PED-positive farms were asked the number of abortions that occurred and DP for 3 months (1 month before PED outbreak (previous month), 1 month after PED outbreak (the month of PED), and from 1 month after PED outbreak to 2 months after PED outbreak (following month)). AR in each month was calculated as the number of abortions divided by sow inventory. Both AR and DP in the month of PED were higher than those in the previous and following months (p < .05). Farms that performed a herd immunization procedure had higher AR and DP in the month of PED than those that did not perform the procedure (p < .05). In summary, PED occurrence increased AR and DP.

Clinical and Pathological Findings in SARS-CoV-2 Disease Outbreaks in Farmed Mink (Neovison vison).

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, caused respiratory disease outbreaks with increased mortality in 4 mink farms in the Netherlands. The most striking postmortem finding was an acute interstitial pneumonia, which was found in nearly all examined mink that died at the peak of the outbreaks. Acute alveolar damage was a consistent histopathological finding in mink that died with pneumonia. SARS-CoV-2 infections were confirmed by detection of viral RNA in throat swabs and by immunohistochemical detection of viral antigen in nasal conchae, trachea, and lung. Clinically, the outbreaks lasted for about 4 weeks but some animals were still polymerase chain reaction-positive for SARS-CoV-2 in throat swabs after clinical signs had disappeared. This is the first report of the clinical and pathological characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms.