Your browser doesn't support javascript.
Show: 20 | 50 | 100
Results 1 - 20 de 23
Filter
2.
Int J Mol Sci ; 21(12)2020 Jun 22.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-705276

ABSTRACT

Our work concerns the actual problem of spread of SARS- CoV-2 outbreak which requires fast and correct as possible answer. In current scenario, the need of rapid answer put away the imperative of proper methodology. We focus on the serogical immunoassay for diagnosis of Covid-19 as an important weapon not only for diagnostic purpose, but also for epidemiologic one. The right equilibrium between high speed, low cost and accuracy is obtained with easy-to-use decentralized point-of-care test as the colloidal gold-based immunochromatographic strip assay which detects IgM and IgG antibodies directed against SARS-CoV-2. As our aim is to evaluate the efficacy of Covid-19 rapid tests and of serological assays in real-life settings, we designed a research protocol aimed to establish how to use correctly these diagnostics, taking into account the different possible clinical and epidemiological scenarios.


Subject(s)
Clinical Laboratory Techniques/methods , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Clinical Laboratory Techniques/standards , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Humans , Mass Screening/methods , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Mass Screening/standards , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Practice Guidelines as Topic , Primary Prevention/methods , Primary Prevention/organization & administration , Primary Prevention/standards
4.
Gastroenterol Hepatol ; 43(6): 332-347, 2020.
Article in English, Spanish | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-658769

ABSTRACT

The set of measures proposed by SEPD, AEEH, GETECCU and AEG are aimed to help departments in their resumption of usual activity. We have prepared a number of practical recommendations regarding patient management and the stepwise resumption of healthcare activity. These recommendations are based on the sparse, changing evidence available, and will be updated in the future according to daily needs and the availability of expendable materials to suit them; in each department they will be implemented depending upon the cumulative incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in each region, and the burden the pandemic has represented for each hospital. The general objectives of these recommendations include: (a)To protect our patients against the risks of infection with SARS-CoV-2 and to provide them with high-quality care. (b)To protect all healthcare professionals against the risks of infection with SARS-CoV-2. (c)To resume normal functioning of our departments in a setting of ongoing risk for infection with SARS-CoV-2.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Gastroenterology/organization & administration , Hospital Departments/organization & administration , Infection Control/organization & administration , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Appointments and Schedules , Clinical Laboratory Techniques , Clinical Trials as Topic , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/drug therapy , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Cross Infection/prevention & control , Diagnostic Techniques, Digestive System/instrumentation , Digestive System Diseases/complications , Digestive System Diseases/diagnosis , Digestive System Diseases/therapy , Disinfection , Drug Interactions , Equipment Contamination/prevention & control , Home Care Services/organization & administration , Humans , Immunocompromised Host , Immunosuppressive Agents/adverse effects , Immunosuppressive Agents/therapeutic use , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/prevention & control , Infectious Disease Transmission, Professional-to-Patient/prevention & control , Liver Transplantation , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Occupational Diseases/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/drug therapy , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Protective Devices , Symptom Assessment , Telemedicine/organization & administration , Universal Precautions
7.
Elife ; 92020 06 19.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-607959

ABSTRACT

Previously, we showed that 3% (31/1032)of asymptomatic healthcare workers (HCWs) from a large teaching hospital in Cambridge, UK, tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 in April 2020. About 15% (26/169) HCWs with symptoms of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) also tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (Rivett et al., 2020). Here, we show that the proportion of both asymptomatic and symptomatic HCWs testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 rapidly declined to near-zero between 25th April and 24th May 2020, corresponding to a decline in patient admissions with COVID-19 during the ongoing UK 'lockdown'. These data demonstrate how infection prevention and control measures including staff testing may help prevent hospitals from becoming independent 'hubs' of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and illustrate how, with appropriate precautions, organizations in other sectors may be able to resume on-site work safely.


Subject(s)
Clinical Laboratory Techniques/statistics & numerical data , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Health Personnel , Mass Screening/statistics & numerical data , Occupational Diseases/prevention & control , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Adult , Asymptomatic Diseases , Betacoronavirus/genetics , Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , Community-Acquired Infections/transmission , Contact Tracing , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Disease Transmission, Infectious/prevention & control , England/epidemiology , Family Characteristics , Female , Hospital Units , Hospitals, Teaching/organization & administration , Hospitals, Teaching/statistics & numerical data , Hospitals, University/organization & administration , Hospitals, University/statistics & numerical data , Humans , Infection Control , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/statistics & numerical data , Male , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Middle Aged , Nasopharynx/virology , Occupational Diseases/epidemiology , Pandemics/prevention & control , Patient Admission/statistics & numerical data , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Prevalence , Program Evaluation , Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction , Symptom Assessment
9.
MEDICC Rev ; 22(2): 58-63, 2020 04.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-479794

ABSTRACT

Meningitis, neuropathy, HIV, dengue-since the 1960s, Cuba has faced its share of epidemics. More recently, Cuban health pro-fessionals tackled domestic outbreaks of H1N1 (2009) and Zika (2016), and worked alongside colleagues from around the world to stem Ebola in West Africa; all three were categorized by WHO as public health emergencies of international concern. In December 2019, China reported its fi rst cluster of pneumo-nia cases, later identifi ed as the novel coronavirus disease COVID-19. In January 2020, Cuban authorities convened a multi-sector working group coordinated by the Ministry of Pub-lic Health (MINSAP) and Civil Defense to tailor its national epi-demic control plan to confront the rapidly-spreading disease. The plan features a national reporting system and database, with standard protocols including early case detection, contact tracing and regularly-scheduled public health messaging. In late January, no fewer than six ministries, plus the National Sports and Recreation Institute, Customs, Immigration and national media outlets, came together to adapt domestic proto-cols and design multi-phase control and response mechanisms to combat the SARS-CoV-2 virus.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Cuba , Humans , Information Storage and Retrieval , Pandemics , Public Health
11.
J Aging Soc Policy ; 32(4-5): 387-395, 2020.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-436493

ABSTRACT

Older adults with COVID-19 who survive hospitalizations and return to their homes confront substantial health challenges and an unpredictable future. While understanding of the unique needs of COVID-19 survivors is developing, components of the evidence-based Transitional Care Model provide a framework for taking a more immediate, holistic response to caring for these individuals as they moved back into the community. These components include: increasing screening, building trusting relationships, improving patient engagement, promoting collaboration across care teams, undertaking symptom management, increasing family caregiver care/education, coordinating health and social services, and improving care continuity. Evidence generated from rigorous testing of these components reveal the need for federal and state policy solutions to support the following: employment/redeployment of nurses, social workers, and community health workers; training and reimbursement of family caregivers; widespread access to research-based transitional care tools; and coordinated local efforts to address structural barriers to effective transitions. Immediate action on these policy options is necessary to more effectively address the complex issues facing these older adults and their family caregivers who are counting on our care system for essential support.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Transitional Care/organization & administration , Aged , Betacoronavirus , Cooperative Behavior , Family , Humans , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Pandemics , Patient Care Team/organization & administration , Patient Participation , Social Support , Social Work/organization & administration
12.
Emerg Med J ; 37(7): 402-406, 2020 Jul.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-429888

ABSTRACT

By 11 February 2020 when the WHO named the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and the disease it causes (COVID-19), it was evident that the virus was spreading rapidly outside of China. Although San Francisco did not confirm its first locally transmitted cases until the first week of March, our ED and health system began preparing for a potential COVID-19 surge in late February 2020.In this manuscript, we detail how the above responses were instrumental in the rapid deployment of two military-grade negative-pressure medical tents, named accelerated care units (ACU). We describe engagement of our workforce, logistics of creating new care areas, ensuring safety through personal protective equipment access and conservation, and the adaptive leadership challenges that this process posed.We know of no other comprehensive examples of how EDs have prepared for COVID-19 in the peer-reviewed literature. Many other EDs both in and outside of California have requested access to the details of how we operationalised our ACUs to facilitate their own planning. This demonstrates the urgent need to disseminate this information to our colleagues. Below we describe the process of developing and launching our ACUs as a potential model for other EDs around the country.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/therapy , Emergency Service, Hospital/organization & administration , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/therapy , Aerosols , Betacoronavirus , Communication , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Disaster Planning/organization & administration , Humans , Leadership , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Pandemics/prevention & control , Patient Care Team/organization & administration , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Time Factors , Triage/organization & administration , Work Engagement , Workflow
16.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(18): 540-544, 2020 May 08.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-209644

ABSTRACT

Respiratory pathogens, such as novel influenza A viruses, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and now, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), are of particular concern because of their high transmissibility and history of global spread (1). Clusters of severe respiratory disease are challenging to investigate, especially in resource-limited settings, and disease etiology often is not well understood. In 2014, endorsed by the Group of Seven (G7),* the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) was established to help build country capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats.† GHSA is a multinational, multisectoral collaboration to support countries towards full implementation of the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations (IHR).§ Initially, 11 technical areas for collaborator participation were identified to meet GHSA goals. CDC developed the Detection and Response to Respiratory Events (DaRRE) strategy in 2014 to enhance country capacity to identify and control respiratory disease outbreaks. DaRRE initiatives support the four of 11 GHSA technical areas that CDC focuses on: surveillance, laboratory capacity, emergency operations, and workforce development.¶ In 2016, Kenya was selected to pilot DaRRE because of its existing respiratory disease surveillance and laboratory platforms and well-developed Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP) (2). During 2016-2020, Kenya's DaRRE partners (CDC, the Kenya Ministry of Health [MoH], and Kenya's county public health officials) conceptualized, planned, and implemented key components of DaRRE. Activities were selected based on existing capacity and determined by the Kenya MoH and included 1) expansion of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) surveillance sites; 2) piloting of community event-based surveillance; 3) expansion of laboratory diagnostic capacity; 4) training of public health practitioners in detection, investigation, and response to respiratory threats; and 5) improvement of response capacity by the national emergency operations center (EOC). Progress on DaRRE activity implementation was assessed throughout the process. This pilot in Kenya demonstrated that DaRRE can support IHR requirements and can capitalize on a country's existing resources by tailoring tools to improve public health preparedness based on countries' needs.


Subject(s)
Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Public Health Surveillance , Respiratory Tract Diseases/diagnosis , Respiratory Tract Diseases/prevention & control , Capacity Building , Humans , Kenya/epidemiology , Pilot Projects , Respiratory Tract Diseases/epidemiology
18.
Gastroenterol Hepatol ; 43(6): 332-347, 2020.
Article in English, Spanish | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-116776

ABSTRACT

The set of measures proposed by SEPD, AEEH, GETECCU and AEG are aimed to help departments in their resumption of usual activity. We have prepared a number of practical recommendations regarding patient management and the stepwise resumption of healthcare activity. These recommendations are based on the sparse, changing evidence available, and will be updated in the future according to daily needs and the availability of expendable materials to suit them; in each department they will be implemented depending upon the cumulative incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in each region, and the burden the pandemic has represented for each hospital. The general objectives of these recommendations include: (a)To protect our patients against the risks of infection with SARS-CoV-2 and to provide them with high-quality care. (b)To protect all healthcare professionals against the risks of infection with SARS-CoV-2. (c)To resume normal functioning of our departments in a setting of ongoing risk for infection with SARS-CoV-2.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Gastroenterology/organization & administration , Hospital Departments/organization & administration , Infection Control/organization & administration , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Appointments and Schedules , Clinical Laboratory Techniques , Clinical Trials as Topic , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/drug therapy , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Cross Infection/prevention & control , Diagnostic Techniques, Digestive System/instrumentation , Digestive System Diseases/complications , Digestive System Diseases/diagnosis , Digestive System Diseases/therapy , Disinfection , Drug Interactions , Equipment Contamination/prevention & control , Home Care Services/organization & administration , Humans , Immunocompromised Host , Immunosuppressive Agents/adverse effects , Immunosuppressive Agents/therapeutic use , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/prevention & control , Infectious Disease Transmission, Professional-to-Patient/prevention & control , Liver Transplantation , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Occupational Diseases/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/drug therapy , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Protective Devices , Symptom Assessment , Telemedicine/organization & administration , Universal Precautions
19.
Oncologist ; 25(6): 463-467, 2020 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-66231

ABSTRACT

Italy and the rest of the world are experiencing an outbreak of a novel beta-coronavirus known as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In this context, in Italy, we reorganized the National Health System and prioritized the clinical cancer care scenario, balancing risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission versus the magnitude of clinical benefit deriving from a specific therapeutic approach. As initial actions, we recommended that routine screening be suspended and that patients with early and advanced cancer be treated as outpatients as much as possible and at the nearest medical center. Patients who need to be hospitalized for cancer treatment were protected from potential SARS-CoV-2 infection by creating a dedicated diagnostic and therapeutic internal pathway for cancer treatment. We implemented reorganization of the hospital networks, based on a hub-and-spoke design. Stronger personal protection was made available for patients with cancer. Because of the extreme burden created by COVID-19, antitumor treatment was initiated only after considering patient performance status, comorbidities, biology of disease, and the likely impact of treatment on outcome. Treatment strategies were discussed in the context of a multidisciplinary tumor board. Treatment decision making balanced risk and benefits of treatment in the context of the specific pandemic level, on a case-by-case basis.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Medical Oncology/organization & administration , Neoplasms/therapy , Patient Care , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Clinical Decision-Making , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Coronavirus Infections/virology , Hospitalization , Humans , Infection Control/organization & administration , Infection Control/standards , Infection Control/trends , Italy/epidemiology , Mass Screening/organization & administration , Mass Screening/standards , Mass Screening/trends , Medical Oncology/standards , Medical Oncology/trends , Pandemics , Patient Care Team/organization & administration , Patient Care Team/standards , Patient Care Team/trends , Patient Selection , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Pneumonia, Viral/virology
SELECTION OF CITATIONS
SEARCH DETAIL