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1.
J Med Internet Res ; 23(2): e25120, 2021 02 25.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1575528

ABSTRACT

Multisite medical data sharing is critical in modern clinical practice and medical research. The challenge is to conduct data sharing that preserves individual privacy and data utility. The shortcomings of traditional privacy-enhancing technologies mean that institutions rely upon bespoke data sharing contracts. The lengthy process and administration induced by these contracts increases the inefficiency of data sharing and may disincentivize important clinical treatment and medical research. This paper provides a synthesis between 2 novel advanced privacy-enhancing technologies-homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation (defined together as multiparty homomorphic encryption). These privacy-enhancing technologies provide a mathematical guarantee of privacy, with multiparty homomorphic encryption providing a performance advantage over separately using homomorphic encryption or secure multiparty computation. We argue multiparty homomorphic encryption fulfills legal requirements for medical data sharing under the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation which has set a global benchmark for data protection. Specifically, the data processed and shared using multiparty homomorphic encryption can be considered anonymized data. We explain how multiparty homomorphic encryption can reduce the reliance upon customized contractual measures between institutions. The proposed approach can accelerate the pace of medical research while offering additional incentives for health care and research institutes to employ common data interoperability standards.


Subject(s)
Computer Security/ethics , Information Dissemination/ethics , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , Technology/methods , Humans
2.
Can J Public Health ; 111(4): 454-457, 2020 08.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1389875

ABSTRACT

Sharing data expediently for pandemic response purposes exposes healthcare providers in Canada to significant regulatory uncertainty. Duplicative and contradictory ethical and legal duties flowing from overlapping sources can stifle flows of medical data among clinicians, researchers, and institutions. Authorities should support caregivers and accelerate research by providing clear guidance to the health sector. Institutions should foster robust data stewardship and standardize their practices to those recognized among the international health informatics community. Reform is critical to ensuring Canadian healthcare providers can deliver efficient health responses that are integrated with dispersed and disparate national and international approaches.


Subject(s)
Biomedical Research , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , Public Health , COVID-19 , Canada/epidemiology , Humans
6.
Eur J Hum Genet ; 29(10): 1502-1509, 2021 10.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1217699

ABSTRACT

On 16 July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued their decision in the Schrems II case concerning Facebook's transfers of personal data from the EU to the US. The decision may have significant effects on the legitimate transfer of personal data for health research purposes from the EU. This article aims: (i) to outline the consequences of the Schrems II decision for the sharing of personal data for health research between the EU and third countries, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic; and, (ii) to consider certain options available to address the consequences of the decision and to facilitate international data exchange for health research moving forward.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , Information Dissemination/legislation & jurisprudence , Pandemics , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , SARS-CoV-2/physiology , Social Media/legislation & jurisprudence , COVID-19/virology , European Union , Humans , Research/legislation & jurisprudence , United States
7.
Clin Obstet Gynecol ; 64(2): 392-397, 2021 06 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1203758

ABSTRACT

While telemedicine had been utilized in varying ways over the last several years, it has dramatically accelerated in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article we describe the privacy issues, in relation to the barriers to care for health care providers and barriers to the obstetric patient, licensing and payments for telehealth services, technological issues and language barriers. While there may be barriers to the use of telehealth services this type of care is feasible and the barriers are surmountable.


Subject(s)
Communication Barriers , Health Services Accessibility , Obstetrics , Privacy , Telemedicine , Female , Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act , Health Services Accessibility/ethics , Health Services Accessibility/legislation & jurisprudence , Health Services Accessibility/organization & administration , Humans , Internet , Licensure , Obstetrics/ethics , Obstetrics/legislation & jurisprudence , Obstetrics/methods , Obstetrics/organization & administration , Pregnancy , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , Technology , Telemedicine/ethics , Telemedicine/legislation & jurisprudence , Telemedicine/methods , Telemedicine/organization & administration , United States
9.
J World Fed Orthod ; 10(1): 9-13, 2021 03.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1101206

ABSTRACT

Recent advances in technology, growing patient demand, and the need for social distancing due to Coronavirus Disease 2019 has expedited adoption of teledentistry in orthodontics as a means of consulting and monitoring a patient without an in-office visit. However, a lack of computer literacy and knowledge of software choices, and concerns regarding patient safety and potential infringement of regulations can make venturing into this new technology intimidating. In this article, various types of teledentistry systems for orthodontic practices, implementation guidelines, and important regulatory considerations on the use of teledentistry for orthodontic purposes are discussed. A thorough evaluation of the intended use of the software should precede commitment to a service. Selected service should be Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act compliant at minimum and a Business Associate Agreement should be in place for protection of privacy. Ensuring the compatibility of the designated clinic computer with the system's requirements and installation of all safeguards must follow. Appointments should be documented in the same manner as in-office visits and teledentistry patients must be located within the clinician's statutory license boundary. Informed consent forms should include teledentistry or a supplemental teledentistry consent form should be used. Malpractice insurance covers everything usual and customary under the provider's license but the need for cyber liability insurance increases with teledentistry.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , Orthodontics , Telemedicine/methods , Artificial Intelligence , Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act , Humans , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , SARS-CoV-2 , United States
11.
PLoS One ; 16(1): e0245740, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1042900

ABSTRACT

The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic may require governments to use privacy-encroaching technologies to help contain its spread. One technology involves co-location tracking through mobile Wi-Fi, GPS, and Bluetooth to permit health agencies to monitor people's contact with each other, thereby triggering targeted social-distancing when a person turns out to be infected. The effectiveness of tracking relies on the willingness of the population to support such privacy encroaching measures. We report the results of two large surveys in the United Kingdom, conducted during the peak of the pandemic, that probe people's attitudes towards various tracking technologies. The results show that by and large there is widespread acceptance for co-location tracking. Acceptance increases when the measures are explicitly time-limited and come with opt-out clauses or other assurances of privacy. Another possible future technology to control the pandemic involves "immunity passports", which could be issued to people who carry antibodies for the COVID-19 virus, potentially implying that they are immune and therefore unable to spread the virus to other people. Immunity passports have been considered as a potential future step to manage the pandemic. We probe people's attitudes towards immunity passports and find considerable support overall, although around 20% of the public strongly oppose passports.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , Contact Tracing , Privacy , Adult , Aged , COVID-19/prevention & control , Contact Tracing/legislation & jurisprudence , Contact Tracing/methods , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Mobile Applications , Physical Distancing , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , Surveys and Questionnaires , United Kingdom/epidemiology
14.
J Med Internet Res ; 22(9): e23692, 2020 09 17.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-749057

ABSTRACT

Cybersecurity threats are estimated to cost the world US $6 trillion a year by 2021, and the number of attacks has increased five-fold after COVID-19. Although there is substantial literature on the threats technological vulnerabilities have on the health care industry, less research exists on how pandemics like COVID-19 are opportunistic for cybercriminals. This paper outlines why cyberattacks have been particularly problematic during COVID-19 and ways that health care industries can better protect patient data. The Office for Civil Rights has loosened enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which, although useful in using new platforms like Zoom, has also loosened physical and technical safeguards to cyberattacks. This is especially problematic given that 90% of health care providers had already encountered data breaches. Companies must implement well-defined software upgrade procedures, should use secure networks like virtual local area networks, and conduct regular penetration tests of their systems. By understanding factors that make individuals, health care organizations, and employers more susceptible to cyberattacks, we can better prepare for the next pandemic.


Subject(s)
Computer Security/statistics & numerical data , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Delivery of Health Care , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , COVID-19 , Electronic Health Records , Humans
20.
NASN Sch Nurse ; 35(4): 198-202, 2020 Jul.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-273610

ABSTRACT

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 is the federal law that protects the privacy of personally identifiable information from student education records and applies to all education entities that receive funding under any program administered by the U.S. Department of Education. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is the federal law that establishes privacy requirements for patients' protected health information. Together these privacy laws establish rules that guide school nurses in the sharing of student information, even in times of public health emergencies. The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services have issued special updates to privacy laws in response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease providing certain waivers of typical privacy requirements and direction to allow the sharing of information during this public health emergency. The purpose of this article is to briefly review the privacy laws as they relate to schools, as well as to provide an overview of the recent waivers to assist school nurses, school administrators, healthcare professionals, and public health agencies in protecting the health and safety of students during this current public health emergency.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus , Confidentiality/legislation & jurisprudence , Coronavirus Infections , Information Dissemination/legislation & jurisprudence , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , School Nursing/legislation & jurisprudence , School Nursing/standards , COVID-19 , Emergencies , Guidelines as Topic , Humans , Public Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Public Health/standards , SARS-CoV-2 , United States
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