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Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing.
Mackelprang, Rebecca; Adamala, Katarzyna P; Aurand, Emily R; Diggans, James C; Ellington, Andrew D; Evans, Samuel Weiss; Fortman, J L Clem; Hillson, Nathan J; Hinman, Albert W; Isaacs, Farren J; Medford, June I; Mamaghani, Shadi; Moon, Tae Seok; Palmer, Megan J; Peccoud, Jean; Vitalis, Elizabeth A; Hook-Barnard, India; Friedman, Douglas C.
  • Mackelprang R; Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States.
  • Adamala KP; Department of Genetics, Cell Biology and Development, University of Minnesota, 420 Washington Avenue SE, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, United States.
  • Aurand ER; Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States.
  • Diggans JC; Twist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, California 94080, United States.
  • Ellington AD; Center for Systems and Synthetic Biology, University of Texas at Austin, 100 E 24th Street, Austin, Texas 78712, United States.
  • Evans SW; Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Science, Technology & Society, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, United States.
  • Fortman JLC; Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States.
  • Hillson NJ; Biological Systems & Engineering Division, Berkeley National Lab, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States.
  • Hinman AW; DOE Agile BioFoundry, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States.
  • Isaacs FJ; DOE Joint Genome Institute,1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States.
  • Medford JI; DOE Joint BioEnergy Institute, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States.
  • Mamaghani S; Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States.
  • Moon TS; Department of Molecular, Cellular & Developmental Biology, Department of Biomedical Engineering, Systems Biology Institute, Yale University, 266 Whitney Avenue, KBT 802, P.O. Box 208103, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, United States.
  • Palmer MJ; Department of Biology, Colorado State University, 1878 Campus Delivery, Fort Collins, Colorado 90523-1878, United States.
  • Peccoud J; AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellowship, 1200 NW New York Avenue, Washington, D.C., 20005, United States.
  • Vitalis EA; Department of Energy, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive Box 1180, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, United States.
  • Hook-Barnard I; Division of Biology and Biomedical Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive Box 1180, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, United States.
  • Friedman DC; Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, 443 Via Ortega, Stanford, California 94305, United States.
ACS Synth Biol ; 11(2): 522-527, 2022 02 18.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1704005
ABSTRACT
The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.
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Full text: Available Collection: International databases Database: MEDLINE Main subject: Publishing / Security Measures / Bioengineering Type of study: Prognostic study Topics: Vaccines / Variants Language: English Journal: ACS Synth Biol Year: 2022 Document Type: Article Affiliation country: Acssynbio.1c00324

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Full text: Available Collection: International databases Database: MEDLINE Main subject: Publishing / Security Measures / Bioengineering Type of study: Prognostic study Topics: Vaccines / Variants Language: English Journal: ACS Synth Biol Year: 2022 Document Type: Article Affiliation country: Acssynbio.1c00324