Public Policy in a Time of Crisis: A Framework for Evaluating Canada's COVID-19 Income Support Programs

ABSTRACT

Part of their argument is that there should not have been worker incentives in any case, given the policy goal of keeping people at home in order to reduce disease transmission.8 Another part of their argument is that disincentive concerns arise from deeply embedded neoclassical assumptions about work as a disutility,9 assumptions that the authors suggest are given too much weight in labour market policy. The authors main criticism of actual policy, however, is that the majority of . . . individual and household crisis support programs introduced during the pandemic were directly tied to labour market participation (i.e. being employed or having lost a job).10 In terms of policy specifics, one of the authors principal criticisms is that eligibility for the Canada emergency response benefit (CERB) required earnings of $5,000 in 2019 or the past 12 months.11 An interesting aspect of the article is its addition of a third consideration (namely, voice) to the traditional equity-versus-efficiency policy tradeoff. [...]workers would have been freer to engage in "meaningful participation in society" with somewhat less fear of employer retribution.12 These considerations bring the authors to their specific policy proposal.