The complete genome of equid herpesvirus-1 (EHV-1) field isolates from Argentina reveals an interspecific recombinant strain.

The Equid alphaherpesvirus type 1 (EHV-1) infection can have devastating economic consequences in the horse industry due to large-scale outbreaks of abortions, perinatal foal mortality, and myeloencephalopathy. The present study analyzed the genome of two isolates obtained from aborted fetuses in Argentina, E/745/99 and E/1297/07. The E745/99 genome shares 98.2% sequence identity with Ab4, a reference EHV-1 strain. The E/1297/07 genome shares 99.8% identity with NY03, a recombinant strain containing part of ORF64 and part of the intergenic region from Equid alphaherpesvirus-4 (EHV-4). The E/1297/07 genome has the same breakpoints as other United States and Japanese recombinants, including NY03. The recombinant regions have varying numbers of tandem repeat sequences and different minor parental sequences (EHV-4), suggesting distinct origins of the recombinant events. These are the first complete genomes of EHV-1 from Argentina and South America available in the Databases.

A healthcare approach to mental integrity.

The current human rights framework can shield people from many of the risks associated with neurotechnological applications. However, it has been argued that we need either to articulate new rights or reconceptualise existing ones in order to prevent some of these risks. In this paper, we would like to address the recent discussion about whether current reconceptualisations of the right to mental integrity identify an ethical dimension that is not covered by existing moral and/or legal rights. The main challenge of these proposals is that they make mental integrity indistinguishable from autonomy. They define mental integrity in terms of the control we can have over our mental states, which seems to be part of the authenticity condition for autonomous action. Based on a fairly comprehensive notion of mental health (ie, a notion that is not limited to the mere absence of illness), we propose an alternative view according to which mental integrity can be characterised both as a positive right to (medical and non-medical) interventions that restore and sustain mental and neural function, and promote its development and a negative right protecting people from interventions that threaten or undermine these functions or their development. We will argue that this notion is dissociated from cognitive control and therefore can be adequately distinguished from autonomy.