ABSTRACT
In this article, we suggest that motivation serves to anticipate the energy of the body and meet those needs before they arise, called allostasis. We describe motivation as the output of energy computations that include estimates about future energy/metabolic needs and the value of effort required for potential behaviors (i.e., whether the cost of effort is worthwhile). We bring neuroscience evidence to bear to support this hypothesis. We outline a system of brain networks that have been shown to be important for motivation, and focus in on one hub in this network, the anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC), and discuss its importance for establishing motivation in the service of allostasis. We present evidence that the aMCC, positioned at the intersection of multiple brain networks, is wired to integrate signals relating to allostasis with its sensory consequences, termed interoception, as well as with cognitive control processes, sensory and motor functions. This integration guides the nervous system towards the optimal effort required to achieve a desired goal. Across a variety of task domains, we discuss the role of aMCC in motivation, including a) processing of the value of prior and expected rewards, b) assessment of energetic costs in the brain and the body, c) selectively learning and encoding prediction errors (unexpected changes) that are relevant for allostasis, d) computations for monitoring of internal states of the body and e) modulating the internal state of the body to prepare for action. Finally, we discuss the link between individual differences in aMCC processing and variation in two extreme ends of the range of motivational states, tenacity and apathy.
ABSTRACT
Negative stimuli do not only evoke fear or disgust, but can also evoke a state of 'morbid fascination' which is an urge to approach and explore a negative stimulus. In the present neuroimaging study, we applied an innovative method to investigate the neural systems involved in typical and atypical conceptualizations of negative images. Participants received false feedback labeling their mental experience as fear, disgust or morbid fascination. This manipulation was successful; participants judged the false feedback correct for 70% of the trials on average. The neuroimaging results demonstrated differential activity within regions in the 'neural reference space for discrete emotion' depending on the type of feedback. We found robust differences in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex comparing morbid fascination to control feedback. More subtle differences in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were also found between morbid fascination feedback and the other emotion feedback conditions. This study is the first to forward evidence about the neural representation of the experimentally unexplored state of morbid fascination. In line with a constructionist framework, our findings suggest that neural resources associated with the process of conceptualization contribute to the neural representation of this state.
