Congenital tuberculosis and management of exposure in three neonatal intensive care units.

Congenital tuberculosis (TB) is uncommon, and diagnosis may be delayed. We report a case of congenital TB and the management of exposure in three different neonatal intensive care units. This case demonstrates the need for a high index of suspicion, active communication among maternal and neonatal medical providers, and timely provider reporting of maternal disease, and emphasizes the relatively greater risk of transmission to health care workers versus infants in this setting.

Factors associated with positive tuberculin skin test results among HIV-infected persons in Orel Oblast, Russia.

BACKGROUND: The treatment of persons living with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune-deficiency syndrome (PLWHAs) for latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) reduces tuberculosis (TB) morbidity. Despite a high TB burden and an expanding human immunodeficiency virus epidemic, Russia had limited data on the utility of the tuberculin skin test (TST) for LTBI diagnosis in PLWHAs. OBJECTIVE: To determine the prevalence and predictors of positive TSTs in PLWHAs in Orel Oblast. METHODS: A total of 150 consenting PLWHAs being followed up at the AIDS Center were administered a TST and a questionnaire for risk factors for LTBI. A positive TST result was defined as >or=5 mm induration. RESULTS: Of the 150 subjects, 67% were male and 74% were aged <30 years. Of the PLWHAs tested, 26% had a positive TST result, while among PLWHAs with CD4(+) >500 cells/ml, 36% were TST-positive. TST positivity varied inversely with CD4(+) cell count. Among PLWHAs with a history of injection drug use, the primary risk factor for HIV, 29 (31.9%) were positive. CONCLUSIONS: A high proportion of tested PLWHAs had a positive TST and could benefit from preventive therapy (PT) to reduce the risk of TB. A TB control programme in Russia should therefore include TST screening among PLWHAs and PT, besides active TB case finding and treatment.

Capacity building for international tuberculosis control through operations research training.

SETTING: In resource-poor countries, few tuberculosis (TB) program staff at the national, provincial, and even district levels have the basic analytical and epidemiological skills necessary for collecting and analyzing quality data pertaining to national TB control program (NTP) improvements. This includes setting program priorities, operations planning, and implementing and evaluating program activities. OBJECTIVES: To present a model course for building capacity in basic epidemiology and operations research (OR). DESIGN: A combination of didactic lectures and applied field exercises were used to achieve the main objectives of the 6-day OR course. These were to increase the understanding of quantitative and qualitative research concepts, study design, and analytic methods, and to increase awareness of how these methods apply to the epidemiology and control of TB; and to demonstrate the potential uses of OR in answering practical questions on NTP effectiveness. As a final outcome, course participants develop OR proposals that are funded and later implemented. RESULTS: Since 1997, this OR course has been conducted nine times in five countries; 149 key NTP and laboratory staff have been trained in OR methods, and 44 OR protocols have been completed or are underway. CONCLUSION: This low-cost model course can be adapted to a wide range of public health issues.

A preventable outbreak of tuberculosis investigated through an intricate social network.

In 1998, a city in Indiana reported 4-fold increase in the number of cases of tuberculosis (TB). An investigation to assess the increase in cases and to identify possible epidemiologic links among persons with TB identified 41 cases of active TB. Epidemiologic links and/or matching DNA fingerprints were identified for 31 patients (76%). The majority of these patients were members of a single social network within the community. Links for most of these patients were identified after multiple interviews with patients and their contacts. TB control activities in the county were limited prior to the identification of the outbreak. At least 24 cases may have been preventable. This outbreak may have been prevented with prompt case identification and effective contact tracing and screening during the years before the outbreak. The use of social networks should be considered in the investigation of outbreaks that involve difficult-to-reach populations. TB control measures should be maintained in areas with historically low TB incidence.

Spread of strain W, a highly drug-resistant strain of Mycobacterium tuberculosis, across the United States.

Strain W, a highly drug-resistant strain of Mycobacterium tuberculosis, was responsible for large nosocomial outbreaks in New York in the early 1990s. To describe the spread of strain W outside New York, we reviewed data from epidemiologic investigations, national tuberculosis surveillance, regional DNA fingerprint laboratories, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Mycobacteriology Laboratory to identify potential cases of tuberculosis due to strain W. From January 1992 through February 1997, 23 cases were diagnosed in nine states and Puerto Rico; 8 were exposed to strain W in New York before their diagnosis; 4 of the 23 transmitted disease to 10 others. Eighty-six contacts of the 23 cases are presumed to be infected with strain W; 11 completed alternative preventive therapy. Strain W tuberculosis cases will occur throughout the United States as persons infected in New York move elsewhere. To help track and contain this strain, health departments should notify the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of cases of tuberculosis resistant to isoniazid, rifampin, streptomycin, and kanamycin.

An outbreak involving extensive transmission of a virulent strain of Mycobacterium tuberculosis.

BACKGROUND AND METHODS: From 1994 to 1996, there was a large outbreak of tuberculosis in a small, rural community with a population at low risk for tuberculosis. Twenty-one patients with tuberculosis (15 with positive cultures) were identified; the DNA fingerprints of the 13 isolates available for testing were identical. To determine the extent of transmission, we investigated both the close and casual contacts of the patients. Using a mouse model, we also studied the virulence of the strain of Mycobacterium tuberculosis that caused the outbreak. RESULTS: The index patient, in whom tuberculosis was diagnosed in 1995; the source patient, in whom the disease was diagnosed in 1994; and a patient in whom the disease was diagnosed in 1996 infected the other 18 persons. In five, active disease developed after only brief, casual exposure. There was extensive transmission from the three patients to both close and casual contacts. Of the 429 contacts, 311 (72 percent) had positive skin tests, including 81 [corrected] with documented skin-test conversions. Mice infected with the virulent Erdman strain of M. tuberculosis had approximately 1000 bacilli per lung after 10 days and about 10,000 bacilli per lung after 20 days. In contrast, mice infected with the strain involved in the outbreak had about 10,000 bacilli per lung after 10 days and about 10 million bacilli per lung after 20 days. CONCLUSIONS: In this outbreak of tuberculosis, the growth characteristics of the strain involved greatly exceeded those of other clinical isolates of M. tuberculosis. The extensive transmission of tuberculosis may have been due to the increased virulence of the strain rather than to environmental factors or patient characteristics.

Transmission of a highly drug-resistant strain (strain W1) of Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Community outbreak and nosocomial transmission via a contaminated bronchoscope.

CONTEXT: Nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) has been reported primarily in New York State and has generally been presumed to occur via respiratory aerosols. OBJECTIVE: To assess nosocomial transmission of MDR TB. In 1995, 8 patients with MDR TB were identified in South Carolina; all were resistant to 7 drugs and had matching DNA fingerprints (strain W1). Community linkswere identified for 5 patients (Patients 1-5). However, no links were identified forthe other 3 patients (Patients 6-8) except being hospitalized at the same hospital as 1 community patient. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation. SETTING: Community and hospital. PATIENTS: Eight patients whose MDR TB isolates had DNA fingerprint patterns matching strain W1. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Clinical characteristics of patients with strain W1 Mycobacterium tuberculosis isolates. RESULTS: Patient 5 (community patient) and Patient 8, diagnosed April 1995 and November 1995, respectively, had clinical courses consistent with MDR TB, with smear-positive and culture-positive specimens and cavitary lesions on chest radiograph; both died of MDR TB less than 1 month after diagnosis. Patients 6 and 7 (diagnosed May 1995) each had 1 positive culture for MDR TB; specimens were collected during bronchoscopy. Patient 6 had a skin test conversion after bronchoscopy. Neither Patient 6 nor Patient 7 had a clinical course consistent with MDR TB, neither was treated for MDR TB, and both are alive and well. No evidence of laboratory contamination of specimens, transmission on inpatient wards, or contact among patients was found. All 4 received bronchoscopies in May 1995; Patients 6, 7, and 8 had bronchoscopies 1, 12, and 17 days, respectively, after Patient 5. Observations revealed that bronchoscope cleaning was inadequate, and the bronchoscope was never immersed in disinfectant. CONCLUSIONS: Inadequate cleaning and disinfection of the bronchoscope after the procedure performed on Patient 5 led to subsequent false-positive cultures in Patients 6 and 7 and transmission of infection to Patient 6 and active MDR TB to Patient 8.

Impact of the bloodborne pathogens standard on vaccination of healthcare workers with hepatitis B vaccine.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the impact of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations on the vaccination of healthcare workers (HCWs), to assess interpretation of these regulations, and to evaluate changes in hospital vaccination policies. DESIGN: Between June 1, 1992, and August 15, 1992, a telephone survey was conducted among 150 hospitals selected randomly from participants in the American Hospital Association 1991 annual survey. RESULTS: Of the 150 hospitals, 96 (64%) provided information on hepatitis B vaccination coverage of their employees. Of the 103,419 employees in these hospitals, 77,302 (75%) were eligible to receive the hepatitis B vaccine, and 38,850 (51%) of these were vaccinated completely (had received 3 doses of vaccine). Following issuance of the final regulations, 73% of hospitals reported greater employee acceptance of hepatitis B vaccine, and hospitals were more likely to offer hepatitis B vaccine to maintenance workers, security personnel, dietary staff, and clerical personnel. Seventy-five hospitals (50%) reported conducting postvaccination serologic testing on all hospital employees, 12 (8%) as a result of OSHA regulations. Twenty-three hospitals (16%) reported administering routine booster doses of hepatitis B vaccine at 3, 5, or 7 years. CONCLUSIONS: The new OSHA standard resulted in a greater awareness of risk for HBV infection among HCWs and an increase in the number of HCWs receiving hepatitis B vaccine; however, vaccination coverage remained suboptimal. Postvaccination serologic testing of employees with negligible risk and the routine administration of vaccine booster doses may be diverting resources and preventing comprehensive coverage of high-risk employees.