Let the Chips Fall! Public Nudging Arrangements, Coercion, and the Role of Independent Shopkeepers.

Nudging, according to its inventors and defenders, is supposed to provide a non-coercive way of changing human behavior for the better-a freedom-respecting form of "libertarian paternalism." Its original point was to complement coercive modes of influence without any need of justification in liberal frameworks. This article shows, using the example of food-product placement in grocery stores, how this image is deceptive. Although nudging practices may not restrict the freedom of consumers, nudging arrangements by public health authorities do restrict the freedom of shopkeepers in standard liberal senses. Libertarianism cannot justify this coercion, and the creed is best left out of the equation as the ideological ruse that it, in this discussion, is. Other liberal theories can justify the coercion, but on grounds that can also be applied to other methods of public health promotion by subsidies and regulation. This result reaffirms that nudging should be seen to complement, not to replace, those other methods.

Social Responsibility and Healthcare in Finland.

This article examines current trends and prospects in Finnish healthcare literature and discussion. The Finnish healthcare system was long considered to manifest an equal, universal, and solidaristic welfare scheme. However, recent data reveals structural inequalities in access to healthcare that result in health differences among socioeconomic groups. The political will aims at tackling these inequalities, but the ideological trend toward responsibilization of the individual taking place across political spheres elsewhere in Europe creates potential challenges to this goal. The applications of this trend have a theoretical background in the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian-or luck egalitarian-tradition. The theory, which is unfit for real-life policy applications, has explicit appeal in considerations aiming at the responsibilization of the individual within the healthcare sector. It remains to be seen in which direction the Finnish welfare schemes will continue to develop.

Humanity and Social Responsibility, Solidarity, and Social Rights.

This article discusses the suggestion of having the notion of solidarity as the foundational value for welfare scheme reforms. Solidarity is an emerging concept in bioethical deliberations emphasizing the need for value-oriented discussion in revising healthcare structures, and the notion has been contrasted with liberal justice and rights. I suggest that this contrast is unnecessary, flawed, and potentially counterproductive. As necessary as the sense of solidarity is in a society, it is an insufficient concept to secure the goals related to social responsibility. The discussion on solidarity is also based on a questionable sense of nostalgia. Furthermore, solidarity and liberal justice share essential objectives concerning welfare schemes; therefore, the question arises whether the proper comparison should in the first place be within justice and solidarity.

The evolving idea of social responsibility in bioethics: a welcome trend.

This article discusses the notion of social responsibility for personal health and well-being in bioethics. Although social responsibility is an intrinsic aspect of bioethics, and its role is increasingly recognized in certain areas, it can still be claimed that bioethics in general is committed to an individualistic theoretical framework that disregards the social context in which decisions, health, and well-being are situated. The philosophical premises of this framework regard individuals as rational decisionmakers who can be held accountable for their health conditions and who should be the primary objects of intervention in attempts to reduce lifestyle-associated chronic diseases. There are, however, social determinants of health that challenge this conclusion. Because their impact can be controlled, to a certain extent, by social and public policy decisions, their existence shows the inadequacy of the purely individualistic approach. I suggest, accordingly, that bioethics would benefit, both academically and societally, from a more social perspective. Bioethical studies that acknowledge, from the start, the social determinants of health would be more amenable to constructive multi- and interdisciplinarity, and a more balanced account of responsibility would further the contribution of sound bioethical work to sensible public policies.