Origins of the classical gene concept, 1900-1950: genetics, mechanistic, philosophy, and the capitalization of agriculture.

In the period of "classical genetics" (roughly 1915-950), the common view of the gene was mechanistic--hat is, genes were seen as individual, atomistic units, as material components of the chromosomes. Although it was recognized early on that genes could interact and influence each other's expression, they were still regarded as individually functioning units, much like the chemists' atoms or molecules. Although geneticists in particular knew the story was more complex, the atomistic gene remained the central view for a variety of reasons. It fit the growing philosophy of mechanistic materialism in the life sciences, as biologists tried to make their field more quantitative,rigorous, and predictive, like physics and chemistry. Conceptually and pedagogically, it provided a simple way to depict genes (as beads on a string) that fit with the exciting new work on chromosomal mapping. The atomistic gene also fit well with the increasing drive to move capital into agriculture, both for potential patenting purposes and for ease of experimental manipulation and prediction. It is the latter point that the present essay explores most thoroughly. The rise of agriculture as an industrialized process provided a context and material support that fueled much of the rapid growth of genetics in the first half of the 20th century.

"Culling the herd": eugenics and the conservation movement in the United States, 1900-1940.

While from a late twentieth- and early twenty-first century perspective, the ideologies of eugenics (controlled reproduction to eliminate the genetically unfit and promote the reproduction of the genetically fit) and environmental conservation and preservation, may seem incompatible, they were promoted simultaneously by a number of figures in the progressive era in the decades between 1900 and 1950. Common to the two movements were the desire to preserve the "best" in both the germ plasm of the human population and natural environments (including not only natural resources, but also undisturbed nature preserves such as state and national parks and forests). In both cases advocates sought to use the latest advances in science to bolster and promote their plans, which in good progressive style, involved governmental planning and social control. This article explores the interaction of eugenic and conservationist ideologies in the careers of Sacramento banker and developer Charles M. Goethe and his friend and mentor, wealthy New York lawyer Madison Grant. In particular, the article suggests how metaphors of nature supported active work in both arenas.

Eugenics and modern biology: critiques of eugenics, 1910-1945.

Eugenics in most western countries in the first four decades of the 20th century was based on the idea that genes control most human phenotypic traits, everything from physical features such as polydactyly and eye colour to physiological conditions such as the A-B-O blood groups to mental and personality traits such as "feeblemindedness," alcoholism and pauperism. In assessing the development of the eugenics movement-its rise and decline between 1900 and 1950-it is important to recognise that its naïve assumptions and often flawed methodologies were openly criticised at the time by scientists and nonscientists alike. This paper will present a brief overview of the critiques launched against eugenicists' claims, particularly criticisms of the American school led by Charles B. Davenport. Davenport's approach to eugenics will be contrasted to his British counterpart, Karl Pearson, founder and first editor of the Annals of Eugenics. It was not the case that nearly everyone in the early 20th century accepted eugenic conclusions as the latest, cutting-edge science. There are lessons from this historical approach for dealing with similar naïve claims about genetics today.

Mechanism, vitalism and organicism in late nineteenth and twentieth-century biology: the importance of historical context.

The term 'mechanism' has been used in two quite different ways in the history of biology. Operative, or explanatory mechanism refers to the step-by-step description or explanation of how components in a system interact to yield a particular outcome (as in the 'mechanism of enzyme action' or the 'mechanism of synaptic transmission'). Philosophical Mechanism, on the other hand, refers to a broad view of organisms as material entities, functioning in ways similar to machines--that is, carrying out a variety of activities based on known chemical and physical processes. In the early twentieth century philosophical Mechanism became the foundation of a 'new biology' that sought to establish the life sciences on the same solid and rigorous foundation as the physical sciences, including a strong emphasis on experimentation. In the context of the times this campaign was particularly aimed at combating the reintroduction of more holistic, non-mechanical approaches into the life sciences (organicism, vitalism). In so doing, Mechanists failed to see some of the strong points of non-vitalistic holistic thinking. The two approaches are illustrated in the work of Jacques Loeb and Hans Spemann.

Human heredity and politics: A comparative institutional study of the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor (United States), the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics (Germany), and the Maxim Gorky Medical Genetics Institute (USSR).

Despite the fact that much has been written in recent years about the science of heredity under the Third Reich, there is as yet no satisfying analysis of two central questions: What, if anything, was peculiarly "Nazi" about human genetics under National Socialism? How, under whatever set of causes, did at least some of Germany's most well-known and leading biomedical practioners become engaged in entgrenzte Wissenschaft (science without moral boundaries)? This paper attempts to provide some answers to these two questions comparing three institutes that studied eugenics and human heredity in the 1920s and 1930s: the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, New York, directed by Charles B. Davenport; the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics, in Berlin, directed by Eugen Fischer; and the Maxim Gorky Medical Genetics Institute in Moscow, directed by Solomon G. Levit. The institutes are compared on the basis of the kind and quality of their research in eugenics and medical genetics, organizational structure, leadership, patronage (private or state), and the economic-social-political context in which they functioned.

A pact with the embryo: Viktor Hamburger, holistic and mechanistic philosophy in the development of neuroembryology, 1927-1955.

Viktor Hamburger was a developmental biologist interested in the ontogenesis of hte vertebrate nervous system. A student of Hans Spemann at Freiburg in the 1920s, Hamburger picked up a holistic view of the embryo that precluded him from treating it in a reductionist way; at the same time, he was committed to a materialist and analytical approach that eschewed any form of vitalism or metaphysics. This paper explores how Hamburger walked this thin line between mechanistic reductionism and metaphysical vitalism in light of his work on the factors influencing growth of neurons into limb buds, and the discovery of nerve growth factor, work carried out with Rita Levi-Montalcini and Stanley Cohen.

Mendel and modern genetics: the legacy for today.

The legacy of Mendel's pioneering studies of hybridization in the pea continues to influence the way we understand modern genetics. But what sort of picture did Mendel himself have of his work and its ultimate uses, and how does that picture compare with the collection of ideas and methodologies that was put forward in his name and later became known as 'Mendelism'? With genetics standing at the center of our present biomedical and biotechnological research, an examination of the history of our concepts in the field can help us better understand what we should and should not expect from current genetic claims. For that enterprise there is no better starting place than Mendel himself.