The history of pathology informatics: A global perspective.

Pathology informatics has evolved to varying levels around the world. The history of pathology informatics in different countries is a tale with many dimensions. At first glance, it is the familiar story of individuals solving problems that arise in their clinical practice to enhance efficiency, better manage (e.g., digitize) laboratory information, as well as exploit emerging information technologies. Under the surface, however, lie powerful resource, regulatory, and societal forces that helped shape our discipline into what it is today. In this monograph, for the first time in the history of our discipline, we collectively perform a global review of the field of pathology informatics. In doing so, we illustrate how general far-reaching trends such as the advent of computers, the Internet and digital imaging have affected pathology informatics in the world at large. Major drivers in the field included the need for pathologists to comply with national standards for health information technology and telepathology applications to meet the scarcity of pathology services and trained people in certain countries. Following trials by a multitude of investigators, not all of them successful, it is apparent that innovation alone did not assure the success of many informatics tools and solutions. Common, ongoing barriers to the widespread adoption of informatics devices include poor information technology infrastructure in undeveloped areas, the cost of technology, and regulatory issues. This review offers a deeper understanding of how pathology informatics historically developed and provides insights into what the promising future might hold.

Pathology's contributions to disease surveillance: sending our data to public health officials and encouraging our clinical colleagues to do so.

Pathology and clinical laboratories produce many types of data and information that are of relevance in protecting the health of the public. Electronic linkages between laboratory/pathology information systems and public health surveillance databases help ensure that these data reach the appropriate responder rapidly, completely, and accurately. Many efforts are underway to facilitate the flow of data from laboratory/pathology data sources to public health systems. Likewise, pathologists can encourage the contribution of clinical data from other parts of the health care enterprise. Chief complaint data from the emergency department and usage of over-the-counter medications from the retail pharmacy are useful for real-time population health surveillance. Having directly advocated transmission of data from our laboratories and facilitated other departments' participation in the public health surveillance network, we can also serve the public's health in other ways. Public health jurisdictions have a great need for staff with the skill sets of an experienced laboratorian. So, plan to contribute: data and talent.

Regional and national health care data repositories.

Efforts are underway to define a national framework for secondary analysis of health-related data. In the meantime, regional health databases have been constructed using insurance claims data, clinical data from single large health care providers, clinical data from multiple collaborating health care providers, and public health data. Large-scale survey data also are available in government databases. Clinical laboratory results are an important component of all these databases because they can provide validation for manually assigned diagnostic and procedure codes and can support inference of key information not provided by coding, such as severity of disease and prevalence of risk factors.

Implementing syndromic surveillance: a practical guide informed by the early experience.

Syndromic surveillance refers to methods relying on detection of individual and population health indicators that are discernible before confirmed diagnoses are made. In particular, prior to the laboratory confirmation of an infectious disease, ill persons may exhibit behavioral patterns, symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings that can be tracked through a variety of data sources. Syndromic surveillance systems are being developed locally, regionally, and nationally. The efforts have been largely directed at facilitating the early detection of a covert bioterrorist attack, but the technology may also be useful for general public health, clinical medicine, quality improvement, patient safety, and research. This report, authored by developers and methodologists involved in the design and deployment of the first wave of syndromic surveillance systems, is intended to serve as a guide for informaticians, public health managers, and practitioners who are currently planning deployment of such systems in their regions.

LOINC, a universal standard for identifying laboratory observations: a 5-year update.

The Logical Observation Identifier Names and Codes (LOINC) database provides a universal code system for reporting laboratory and other clinical observations. Its purpose is to identify observations in electronic messages such as Health Level Seven (HL7) observation messages, so that when hospitals, health maintenance organizations, pharmaceutical manufacturers, researchers, and public health departments receive such messages from multiple sources, they can automatically file the results in the right slots of their medical records, research, and/or public health systems. For each observation, the database includes a code (of which 25 000 are laboratory test observations), a long formal name, a "short" 30-character name, and synonyms. The database comes with a mapping program called Regenstrief LOINC Mapping Assistant (RELMA(TM)) to assist the mapping of local test codes to LOINC codes and to facilitate browsing of the LOINC results. Both LOINC and RELMA are available at no cost from http://www.regenstrief.org/loinc/. The LOINC medical database carries records for >30 000 different observations. LOINC codes are being used by large reference laboratories and federal agencies, e.g., the CDC and the Department of Veterans Affairs, and are part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) attachment proposal. Internationally, they have been adopted in Switzerland, Hong Kong, Australia, and Canada, and by the German national standards organization, the Deutsches Instituts für Normung. Laboratories should include LOINC codes in their outbound HL7 messages so that clinical and research clients can easily integrate these results into their clinical and research repositories. Laboratories should also encourage instrument vendors to deliver LOINC codes in their instrument outputs and demand LOINC codes in HL7 messages they get from reference laboratories to avoid the need to lump so many referral tests under the "send out lab" code.

Standardized emergency management system and response to a smallpox emergency.

The smallpox virus is a high-priority, Category-A agent that poses a global, terrorism security risk because it: (1) easily can be disseminated and transmitted from person to person; (2) results in high mortality rates and has the potential for a major public health impact; (3) might cause public panic and social disruption; and (4) requires special action for public health preparedness. In recognition of this risk, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (LAC-DHS) developed the Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan for LAC to prepare for the possibility of an outbreak of smallpox. A unique feature of the LAC-DHS plan is its explicit use of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) framework for detailing the functions needed to respond to a smallpox emergency. The SEMS includes the Incident Command System (ICS) structure (management, operations, planning/intelligence, logistics, and finance/administration), the mutual-aid system, and the multi/interagency coordination required during a smallpox emergency. Management for incident command includes setting objectives and priorities, information (risk communications), safety, and liaison. Operations includes control and containment of a smallpox outbreak including ring vaccination, mass vaccination, adverse events monitoring and assessment, management of confirmed and suspected smallpox cases, contact tracing, active surveillance teams and enhanced hospital-based surveillance, and decontamination. Planning/intelligence functions include developing the incident action plan, epidemiological investigation and analysis of smallpox cases, and epidemiological assessment of the vaccination coverage status of populations at risk. Logistics functions include receiving, handling, inventorying, and distributing smallpox vaccine and vaccination clinic supplies; personnel; transportation; communications; and health care of personnel. Finally, finance/administration functions include monitoring costs related to the smallpox emergency, procurement, and administrative aspects that are not handled by other functional divisions of incident command systems. The plan was developed and is under frequent review by the LAC-DHS Smallpox Planning Working Group, and is reviewed periodically by the LAC Bioterrorism Advisory Committee, and draws upon the Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan, with its SEMS framework and ICS structure, now is serving as a model for the development of LAC-DHS plans for responses to other terrorist or natural-outbreak responses.