Migration costs and rewarding schemes in spatial public goods games.

This study explores the influence of migration costs and rewarding schemes on cooperation through the implementation of computational behavioral models in spatial public goods games. The former involves a cost for agents to migrate to a neighboring group, while the latter rewards them for remaining in the same group for multiple rounds. By analyzing these mechanisms separately and in combination, we unveil their effects on cooperative behavior. The grid-based game dynamics begins with equal size groups, and agents can adjust their contributions each round, with the option to migrate if unsatisfied. Our findings reveal that when considered separately, the rewarding scheme is not as effective in achieving full cooperation as the migration cost scheme. Combining migration costs and rewards instead yields high cooperation levels with low public goods game enhancement factors and migration probability. Our results offer valuable insights for contexts where promoting cooperative behavior is crucial, such as community engagement development and public policies.

Assessing the effects of pandemic risk on cooperation and social norms using a before-after Covid-19 comparison in two long-term experiments.

How does threat from disease shape our cooperative actions and the social norms that guide such behaviour? To study these questions, we draw on a collective-risk social dilemma experiment that we ran before the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic (Wave 1, 2018) and compare this to its exact replication, sampling from the same population, that we conducted during the first wave of the pandemic (Wave 2, 2020). Tightness-looseness theory predicts and evidence generally supports that both cooperation and accompanying social norms should increase, yet, we mostly did not find this. Contributions, the probability of reaching the threshold (cooperation), and the contents of the social norm (how much people should contribute) remained similar across the waves, although the strength of these social norms were slightly greater in Wave 2. We also study whether the results from Wave 1 that should not be affected by the pandemic-the relationship between social norms and cooperation and specific behavioural types-replicate in Wave 2 and find that these results generally hold. Overall, our work demonstrates that social norms are important drivers of cooperation, yet, communicable diseases, at least in the short term, have little or no effects on either.

On the interplay of hierarchies, conflicts, and cooperation: An experimental approach.

Previous research suggests that it is difficult to maintain cooperation in a large society when there is a strong hierarchical structure. In this study, we implement online human experiments to study the effects of exogenous variation in a particular notion of hierarchy on cooperation and conflict within groups. We demonstrate how cooperation can be maintained when collective action is accompanied by dyadic conflicts whose outcome feeds back on the hierarchical rank of the contestants. We find that the majority of individuals take part in conflicts and that highly ranked individuals mostly cooperate and engage in conflicts as a way to punish noncooperators. As a consequence, stable hierarchical groups can arise and maintain high levels of cooperation. Our results are in agreement with the prediction of earlier theoretical models on hierarchical societies and are relevant to understanding the interplay of hierarchy, cooperation, and conflict.

Social capital as a network measure provides new insights on economic growth.

Unveiling the main drivers of economic growth is of paramount importance. Previous research recognizes the critical role played by the factors of production: capital and labor. However, the exact mechanisms that underpin Total Factor Productivity (TFP) are not fully understood. An increasing number of studies suggests that the creation and transmission of knowledge, factor supply and economic integration are indeed crucial. Yet, the need for a systematic and unifying framework still exists. Nowadays capital and labor are embedded into a complex network structure through global supply chains and international migration. Recent research has established a link between network centralities and different types of social capital. In this work we employ the OECD's Multi-Regional Input-Output and International Migration datasets to build the network representation for capital and labor of 63 economies during 10 years. We then examine the role of social capital measures as drivers of the TFP adopting an extended Cobb-Douglass production function and addressing potential issues such as multicollinearity, reverse causality and non-linear effects. Our results indicate that social capital in the factors of production networks can significantly drive economic outputs through TFP.

Non-selective distribution of infectious disease prevention may outperform risk-based targeting.

Epidemic control often requires optimal distribution of available vaccines and prophylactic tools, to protect from infection those susceptible. Well-established theory recommends prioritizing those at the highest risk of exposure. But the risk is hard to estimate, especially for diseases involving stigma and marginalization. We address this conundrum by proving that one should target those at high risk only if the infection-averting efficacy of prevention is above a critical value, which we derive analytically. We apply this to the distribution of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) among men-having-sex-with-men (MSM), a population particularly vulnerable to HIV. PrEP is effective in averting infections, but its global scale-up has been slow, showing the need to revisit distribution strategies, currently risk-based. Using data from MSM communities in 58 countries, we find that non-selective PrEP distribution often outperforms risk-based, showing that a logistically simpler strategy is also more effective. Our theory may help design more feasible and successful prevention.

Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game.

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Evidence from a long-term experiment that collective risks change social norms and promote cooperation.

Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change to reducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength of the norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change.

Large scale and information effects on cooperation in public good games.

The problem of public good provision is central in economics and touches upon many challenging societal issues, ranging from climate change mitigation to vaccination schemes. However, results which are supposed to be applied to a societal scale have only been obtained with small groups of people, with a maximum group size of 100 being reported in the literature. This work takes this research to a new level by carrying out and analysing experiments on public good games with up to 1000 simultaneous players. The experiments are carried out via an online protocol involving daily decisions for extended periods. Our results show that within those limits, participants' behaviour and collective outcomes in very large groups are qualitatively like those in smaller ones. On the other hand, large groups imply the difficulty of conveying information on others' choices to the participants. We thus consider different information conditions and show that they have a drastic effect on subjects' contributions. We also classify the individual decisions and find that they can be described by a moderate number of types. Our findings allow to extend the conclusions of smaller experiments to larger settings and are therefore a relevant step forward towards the understanding of human behaviour and the organisation of our society.

Individual perception dynamics in drunk games.

We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we introduce a framework based on evolutionary games where individuals have the capacity to perceive their interactions in different ways. Starting from the narrative of social behaviors in a pub as an illustration, we first study the combination of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Harmony Game as two alternative perceptions of the same situation. Considering a selection of game pairs, our results show that the interplay between perception dynamics and game payoffs gives rise to nonlinear phenomena unexpected in each of the games separately, such as catastrophic phase transitions in the cooperation basin of attraction, Hopf bifurcations and cycles of cooperation and defection. Combining analytical techniques with multiagent simulations, we also show how introducing individual perceptions can cause nontrivial dynamical behaviors to emerge, which cannot be obtained by analyzing the system at a macroscopic level. Specifically, initial perception heterogeneities at the microscopic level can yield a polarization effect that is unpredictable at the macroscopic level. This framework opens the door to the exploration of new ways of understanding the link between the emergence of cooperation and individual preferences and perceptions, with potential applications beyond social interactions.

Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment.

Reputation plays a key role among the mechanisms supporting cooperation in our society. This is a well-known observation and, in fact, several studies have shown that reputation may substantially increase cooperation among subjects playing Prisoner's Dilemma games in the laboratory. Unfortunately, recent experiments indicate that when reputation can be faked cooperation can still be maintained at the expense of honest subjects who are deceived by the dishonest ones. As experimental work is limited due to financial and other reasons, we present here an agent-based simulation model inspired by, and calibrated against, the results obtained in the experiment. We thus simulate much larger population sizes over longer times, and test other model parameters to see whether the observed behavior generalizes in those yet untried conditions. The results show that the collective behavior is qualitatively similar in larger systems and stable over longer times horizons. We conclude that the findings of the experimental work are meaningful, taking into account that the model is strictly tailored to our particular experimental setting and therefore it is a possible explanation of our observations whose applicability to other contexts requires further research. We argue that simulations like the ones presented here may also be useful to cheaply and quickly suggest settings and options to enhance and facilitate further experiments, which, in turn, may provide new tests of the models themselves.

Ecological multiplex interactions determine the role of species for parasite spread amplification.

Despite their potential interplay, multiple routes of many disease transmissions are often investigated separately. As a unifying framework for understanding parasite spread through interdependent transmission paths, we present the 'ecomultiplex' model, where the multiple transmission paths among a diverse community of interacting hosts are represented as a spatially explicit multiplex network. We adopt this framework for designing and testing potential control strategies for Trypanosoma cruzi spread in two empirical host communities. We show that the ecomultiplex model is an efficient and low data-demanding method to identify which species enhances parasite spread and should thus be a target for control strategies. We also find that the interplay between predator-prey and host-parasite interactions leads to a phenomenon of parasite amplification, in which top predators facilitate T. cruzi spread, offering a mechanistic interpretation of previous empirical findings. Our approach can provide novel insights in understanding and controlling parasite spreading in real-world complex systems.

Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games.

The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation.

Coevolution of Synchronization and Cooperation in Costly Networked Interactions.

Despite the large number of studies on synchronization, the hypothesis that interactions bear a cost for involved individuals has seldom been considered. The introduction of costly interactions leads, instead, to the formulation of a dichotomous scenario in which an individual may decide to cooperate and pay the cost in order to get synchronized with the rest of the population. Alternatively, the same individual can decide to free ride, without incurring any cost, waiting for others to get synchronized to his or her state. Thus, the emergence of synchronization may be seen as the byproduct of an evolutionary game in which individuals decide their behavior according to the benefit-to-cost ratio they accrued in the past. We study the onset of cooperation and synchronization in networked populations of Kuramoto oscillators and report how topology is essential in order for cooperation to thrive. We also display how different classes of topology foster synchronization differently both at microscopic and macroscopic levels.

Infection dynamics on spatial small-world network models.

The study of complex networks, and in particular of social networks, has mostly concentrated on relational networks, abstracting the distance between nodes. Spatial networks are, however, extremely relevant in our daily lives, and a large body of research exists to show that the distances between nodes greatly influence the cost and probability of establishing and maintaining a link. A random geometric graph (RGG) is the main type of synthetic network model used to mimic the statistical properties and behavior of many social networks. We propose a model, called REDS, that extends energy-constrained RGGs to account for the synergic effect of sharing the cost of a link with our neighbors, as is observed in real relational networks. We apply both the standard Watts-Strogatz rewiring procedure and another method that conserves the degree distribution of the network. The second technique was developed to eliminate unwanted forms of spatial correlation between the degree of nodes that are affected by rewiring, limiting the effect on other properties such as clustering and assortativity. We analyze both the statistical properties of these two network types and their epidemiological behavior when used as a substrate for a standard susceptible-infected-susceptible compartmental model. We consider and discuss the differences in properties and behavior between RGGs and REDS as rewiring increases and as infection parameters are changed. We report considerable differences both between the network types and, in the case of REDS, between the two rewiring schemes. We conclude that REDS represent, with the application of these rewiring mechanisms, extremely useful and interesting tools in the study of social and epidemiological phenomena in synthetic complex networks.

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation.

In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction. Cheaters end up being better off than honest individuals, who not only keep their true reputation but are also more cooperative. In practice, this results in honest subjects paying the costs of fraud as cheaters earn the same as in a truthful environment. These findings point to the importance of ensuring the truthfulness of reputation for a more equitable and fair society.

Short-range mobility and the evolution of cooperation: an experimental study.

A pressing issue in biology and social sciences is to explain how cooperation emerges in a population of self-interested individuals. Theoretical models suggest that one such explanation may involve the possibility of changing one's neighborhood by removing and creating connections to others, but this hypothesis has problems when random motion is considered and lacks experimental support. To address this, we have carried out experiments on diluted grids with human subjects playing a Prisoner's Dilemma. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we have found no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting.

Lévy flights and cooperation among mobile individuals.

Mobility is a general feature of human and animal populations living in physical space. In particular, it has been observed that often these movements are of the Lévy flight type. In this paper we study the effect of such power-law distributed displacements on the evolution of cooperation in simple games played on diluted two-dimensional grids. Using numerical simulations, our results show that unconditional Lévy flights do not favor the evolution of cooperation. However, when Lévy jumps are performed as a reaction to a growing number of defectors in an individual׳s neighborhood, all games studied here, including the harder Prisoner׳s Dilemma, remarkably benefit from this simple heuristics and cooperation can evolve in the population.

Know thy neighbor: costly information can hurt cooperation in dynamic networks.

People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. We study whether and how the ability to make or break links in social networks fosters cooperate, paying particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to potential partners. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's references, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential partners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in fluid networks.

Global information and mobility support coordination among humans.

Coordination among different options is key for a functioning and efficient society. However, often coordination failures arise, resulting in serious problems both at the individual and the societal level. An additional factor intervening in the coordination process is individual mobility, which takes place at all scales in our world, and whose effect on coordination is not well known. In this experimental work we study the behavior of people who play a pure coordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population.

Random diffusion and cooperation in continuous two-dimensional space.

This work presents a systematic study of population games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Stag Hunt types in two-dimensional Euclidean space under two-person, one-shot game-theoretic interactions, and in the presence of agent random mobility. The goal is to investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents can move randomly in continuous space. When the agents all have the same constant velocity cooperation may evolve if the agents update their strategies imitating the most successful neighbor. If a fitness difference proportional is used instead, cooperation does not improve with respect to the static random geometric graph case. When viscosity effects set-in and agent velocity becomes a quickly decreasing function of the number of neighbors they have, one observes the formation of monomorphic stable clusters of cooperators or defectors in the Prisoner's Dilemma. However, cooperation does not spread in the population as in the constant velocity case.