Prediction model to identify infectious COVID-19 patients in the emergency department.

Background: Real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) has been the gold standard for diagnosing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) but has a lag time for the results. An effective prediction algorithm for infectious COVID-19, utilized at the emergency department (ED), may reduce the risk of healthcare-associated COVID-19. Objective: To develop a prototypic prediction model for infectious COVID-19 at the time of presentation to the ED. Material and methods: Retrospective cohort study of all adult patients admitted to Singapore General Hospital (SGH) through ED between March 15, 2020, and December 31, 2022, with admission of COVID-19 RT-PCR results. Two prediction models were developed and evaluated using area under the curve (AUC) of receiver operating characteristics (ROC) to identify infectious COVID-19 patients (cycle threshold (Ct) of <25). Results: Total of 78,687 patients were admitted to SGH through ED during study period. 6,132 of them tested severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 positive on RT-PCR. Nearly 70% (4,226 of 6,132) of the patients had infectious COVID-19 (Ct<25). Model that included demographics, clinical history, symptom and laboratory variables had AUROC of 0.85 with sensitivity and specificity of 80.0% & 72.1% respectively. When antigen rapid test results at ED were available and added to the model for a subset of the study population, AUROC reached 0.97 with sensitivity and specificity of 95.0% and 92.8% respectively. Both models maintained respective sensitivity and specificity results when applied to validation data. Conclusion: Clinical predictive models based on available information at ED can be utilized for identification of infectious COVID-19 patients and may enhance infection prevention efforts.

Rapid management of Serratia marcescens outbreak in neonatology unit in Singapore: Risk factors and infection control measures.

BACKGROUND: We describe the investigations for control of two consecutive Serratia marcescens outbreaks in neonatology unit of Singapore General Hospital. METHODS: Epidemiological investigations, environmental sampling and risk-factors analysis were performed to guide infection control measures. Active surveillance sampling of nasopharyngeal aspirate and/or stool from neonates was conducted during both outbreaks. Whole-genome-sequencing was done to determine clonal links. Retrospective case-control study was conducted for second outbreak to identify risk factors for S marcescens acquisition. RESULTS: In 2022, two genetically unrelated S marcescens outbreaks were managed involving five neonates in March 2022 (outbreak 1) and eight neonates in November 2022 (outbreak 2). A link to positive isolates from sinks in intensive care units and milk preparation room was identified during outbreak 1. Neonatal jaundice (aOR, 16.46; p-value= 0.023) and non-formula milk feeding (aOR, 13.88; p-value= 0.02) were identified as risk factors during second outbreak. Multiple interventions adopted were cohorting of positive cases, carriage-screening, enhanced environmental cleaning, and emphasis on alcohol-based handrubs for hand-hygiene. CONCLUSION: The two outbreaks were likely due to infection prevention practices lapses and favourable environmental conditions. Nosocomial S marcescens outbreaks in neonatology units are difficult to control and require multidisciplinary approach with strict infection prevention measures to mitigate risk factors.

Environmental contamination and evaluation of healthcare-associated SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk in temporary isolation wards during the COVID-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: Temporary isolation wards have been introduced to meet demands for airborne-infection-isolation-rooms (AIIRs) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Environmental sampling and outbreak investigation was conducted in temporary isolation wards converted from general wards and/or prefabricated containers, in order to evaluate the ability of such temporary isolation wards to safely manage COVID-19 cases over a period of sustained use. METHODS: Environmental sampling for SARS-CoV-2 RNA was conducted in temporary isolation ward rooms constructed from pre-fabricated containers (N = 20) or converted from normal-pressure general wards (N = 47). Whole genome sequencing (WGS) was utilized to ascertain health care-associated transmission when clusters were reported amongst HCWs working in isolation areas from July 2020 to December 2021. RESULTS: A total of 355 environmental swabs were collected; 22.4% (15/67) of patients had at least one positive environmental sample. Patients housed in temporary isolation ward rooms constructed from pre-fabricated containers (adjusted-odds-ratio, aOR = 10.46, 95% CI = 3.89-58.91, P = .008) had greater odds of detectable environmental contamination, with positive environmental samples obtained from the toilet area (60.0%, 12/20) and patient equipment, including electronic devices used for patient communication (8/20, 40.0%). A single HCW cluster was reported amongst staff working in the temporary isolation ward constructed from pre-fabricated containers; however, health care-associated transmission was deemed unlikely based on WGS and/or epidemiological investigations. CONCLUSION: Environmental contamination with SARS-CoV-2 RNA was observed in temporary isolation wards, particularly from the toilet area and smartphones used for patient communication. However, despite intensive surveillance, no healthcare-associated transmission was detected in temporary isolation wards over 18 months of prolonged usage, demonstrating their capacity for sustained use during succeeding pandemic waves.

Nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission in multi-bedded hospital cubicles over successive pandemic waves: Lower mortality but wider spread with Omicron despite enhanced infection-prevention measures.

BACKGROUND: Increased transmissibility of severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-2(SARS-CoV-2) variants, such as the Omicron-variant, presents an infection-control challenge. We contrasted nosocomial transmission amongst hospitalized inpatients across successive pandemic waves attributed to the Delta- and Omicron variants, over a 9-month period in which enhanced-infection-prevention-measures were constantly maintained. METHODS: Enhanced-infection-prevention-measures in-place at a large tertiary hospital included universal N95-usage, routine-rostered-testing (RRT) for all inpatient/healthcare-workers (HCWs), rapid-antigen-testing (RAT) for visitors, and outbreak-investigation coupled with enhanced-surveillance (daily-testing) of exposed patients. The study-period lasted from 21st June 2021-21st March 2022. Chi-square test and multivariate-logistic-regression was utilized to identify factors associated with onward transmission and 28d-mortality amongst inpatient cases of hospital-onset COVID-19. RESULTS: During the Delta-wave, hospital-onset cases formed 2.7% (47/1727) of all COVID-19 cases requiring hospitalisation; in contrast, hospital onset-cases formed a greater proportion (17.7%, 265/1483; odds-ratio, OR = 7.78, 95%CI = 5.65-10.70) during the Omicron-wave, despite universal N95-usage and other enhanced infection-prevention measures that remained unchanged. The odds of 28d-mortality were higher during the Delta-wave compared to the Omicron-wave (27.7%, 13/47, vs. 10.6%, 28/265, adjusted-odds-ratio, aOR = 2.78, 95%CI = 1.02-7.69). Onward-transmission occurred in 21.2% (66/312) of hospital-onset cases; being on enhanced-surveillance (daily-testing) was independently associated with lower odds of onward-transmission (aOR = 0.18, 95%CI = 0.09-0.38). Costs amounted to $USD7141 per-hospital-onset COVID-19 case. CONCLUSION: A surge of hospital-onset COVID-19 cases was encountered during the Omicron-wave, despite continuation of enhanced infection-prevention measures; mortality amongst hospital-onset cases was reduced. The Omicron variant poses an infection-control challenge in contrast to Delta; surveillance is important especially in settings where infrastructural limitations make room-sharing unavoidable, despite the high risk of transmission.

Linking sporadic hospital clusters during a community surge of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.617.2 delta variant: The utility of whole-genome sequencing.

Sporadic clusters of healthcare-associated coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) occurred despite intense rostered routine surveillance and a highly vaccinated healthcare worker (HCW) population, during a community surge of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.617.2 δ (delta) variant. Genomic analysis facilitated timely cluster detection and uncovered additional linkages via HCWs moving between clinical areas and among HCWs sharing a common lunch area, enabling early intervention.

Dengue and COVID-19: Managing Undifferentiated Febrile Illness during a "Twindemic".

BACKGROUND: During the COVID-19 pandemic, distinguishing dengue from COVID-19 in endemic areas can be difficult, as both may present as undifferentiated febrile illness. COVID-19 cases may also present with false-positive dengue serology. Hospitalisation protocols for managing undifferentiated febrile illness are essential in mitigating the risk from both COVID-19 and dengue. METHODS: At a tertiary hospital contending with COVID-19 during a dengue epidemic, a triage strategy of routine COVID-19 testing for febrile patients with viral prodromes was used. All febrile patients with viral prodromes and no epidemiologic risk for COVID-19 were first admitted to a designated ward for COVID-19 testing, from January 2020 to December 2021. RESULTS: A total of 6103 cases of COVID-19 and 1251 cases of dengue were managed at our institution, comprising a total of 3.9% (6103/155,452) and 0.8% (1251/155,452) of admissions, respectively. A surge in dengue hospitalisations in mid-2020 corresponded closely with the imposition of a community-wide lockdown. A total of 23 cases of PCR-proven COVID-19 infection with positive dengue serology were identified, of whom only two were true co-infections; both had been appropriately isolated upon admission. Average length-of-stay for dengue cases initially admitted to isolation during the pandemic was 8.35 days (S.D. = 6.53), compared with 6.91 days (S.D. = 8.61) for cases admitted outside isolation (1.44 days, 95%CI = 0.58-2.30, p = 0.001). Pre-pandemic, only 1.6% (9/580) of dengue cases were admitted initially to isolation-areas; in contrast, during the pandemic period, 66.6% (833/1251) of dengue cases were initially admitted to isolation-areas while awaiting the results of SARS-CoV-2 testing. CONCLUSIONS: During successive COVID-19 pandemic waves in a dengue-endemic country, coinfection with dengue and COVID-19 was uncommon. Routine COVID-19 testing for febrile patients with viral prodromes mitigated the potential infection-prevention risk from COVID-19 cases, albeit with an increased length-of-stay for dengue hospitalizations admitted initially to isolation.

Sporadic outbreaks of healthcare-associated COVID-19 infection in a highly-vaccinated inpatient population during a community outbreak of the B.1.617.2 variant: The role of enhanced infection-prevention measures.

Sporadic clusters of health care-associated COVID-19 infection occurred in a highly vaccinated health care-workers and patient population, over a 3-month period during ongoing community transmission of the B.1.617.2 variant. Enhanced infection-prevention measures and robust surveillance systems, including routine-rostered-testing of all inpatients and staff and usage of N95-respirators in all clinical areas, were insufficient in achieving zero health care-associated transmission. The unvaccinated and immunocompromised remain at-risk and should be prioritized for enhanced surveillance.