ABSTRACT
The 18th century is often treated by scholars as a period of juristic consensus. This article argues, in contrast, that the late 18th century saw the emergence of rival 'Patriot' and 'Tory' legal traditions. Through a detailed study of the jurisprudence of Lords Camden and Mansfield-who were both pillars of the law, as well as political and juristic rivals-we show that they differed systematically in their understanding of the common law, and that those differences had a partisan cast: although they were not crude attempts to instrumentalise law to political ends, their political and jurisprudential commitments influenced each other and emerged from the same intellectual roots. We place these differences in the context of the fragmentation of 18th-century Whig politics, and argue that they have important implications for how we understand and make use of the common law tradition in present-day scholarship.
ABSTRACT
Over time, medical law has moved away from paternalism in favour of an approach grounded in patients' rights. Using Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) as a case study, we offer a deeper analysis of this emerging approach. We argue that patients' rights should be evaluated in terms of their contribution to making medical law more socially responsive, by developing it to give effect to social needs and aspirations pertaining to health care. Although rights can play an important role in achieving social responsiveness, they also carry the risk of entrenching approaches unrepresentative of patients' actual needs and empirical realities. This is evident in Montgomery, where the law, despite being derived from General Medical Council (GMC) guidance, has effects that differ significantly from the GMC's goals. Drawing on socio-legal literature, we outline a new approach for guiding the use of rights in medical law focused on the functional consequences of rights in facilitating patients' aspirations, and the capacity of rights to respond to social and institutional contexts in which medical interaction occurs. We conclude by showing how this approach, applied to informed consent, would produce a different and arguably a superior duty, providing a sounder basis for responding to patient needs.
