Discussing End-of-Life Decisions in a Clinical Ethics Committee: An Interview Study of Norwegian Doctors' Experience.

With disagreement, doubts, or ambiguous grounds in end-of-life decisions, doctors are advised to involve a clinical ethics committee (CEC). However, little has been published on doctors' experiences with discussing an end-of-life decision in a CEC. As part of the quality assurance of this work, we wanted to find out if clinicians have benefited from discussing end-of-life decisions in CECs and why. We will disseminate some Norwegian doctors' experiences when discussing end-of-life decisions in CECs, based on semi-structured interviews with fifteen Norwegian physicians who had brought an end-of-life decision case to a CEC. Almost half of the cases involved conflicts with the patients' relatives. In a majority of the cases, there was uncertainty about what would be the ethically preferable solution. Reasons for referring the case to the CEC were to get broader illumination of the case, to get perspective from people outside the team, to get advice, or to get moral backing on a decision already made. A great majority of the clinicians reported an overall positive experience with the CECs' discussions. In cases where there was conflict, the clinicians reported less satisfaction with the CECs' discussions. The study shows that most doctors who have used a CEC in an end-of-life decision find it useful to have ethical and/or legal aspects illuminated, and to have the dilemma scrutinized from a new perspective. A systematic discussion seems to be significant to the clinicians.

Law, ethics and clinical judgment in end-of-life decisions--how do Norwegian doctors think?

AIM: According to Norwegian law, an autonomous patient has the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment. If the patient is not defined as dying, however, health personnel are obliged to instigate life-saving treatment in an emergency situation even against the patient's wishes. The purpose of this study was to investigate how doctors' attitudes and knowledge agree with these legal provisions, and how the statutory provision on emergency situations influences the principle of patient autonomy for severely ill, but not dying, patients. METHOD: A strategic sample of 1175 Norwegian doctors who are specialists in internal medicine, paediatrics, surgery, neurology and neurosurgery received a mail questionnaire about decisions on end-of-life care in hypothetical scenarios. The case presented concerns a 45-year-old autonomous patient diagnosed with end-stage ALS who declines ventilatory treatment. Recipients were randomly selected from the membership roster of the Norwegian Medical Association. 640 (54.5%) responded; of these, 406 had experience with end-of-life decisions. RESULTS: 56.1% (221/394) stated that ALS patients in such situations can always refuse life-prolonging treatment, and 42.4% (167/394) were of the opinion that the patient can normally refuse life-prolonging treatment. 1.5% (6/394) stated that the patient cannot refuse life-prolonging treatment. CONCLUSIONS: The answers indicate that the respondents include patients' refusal in an overall clinical judgement, and interpret patients' right to decline life-saving treatment in different ways. This may reflect the complex legal situation in Norway regarding patient autonomy with respect to the right of severely ill, but not dying, patients' right to decline acute life-saving treatment.

Parents as decision-makers--do the attitudes of Norwegian doctors conform to law?

This article studies whether the attitudes of Norwegian doctors regarding surrogate decision power in end-of-life care conform to legal rules, particularly as they apply to the protection of children. The article is based on a hypothetical scenario concerning a critically ill child, believed to be dying, presented to 406 doctors. The study indicates that doctors may permit parental/surrogate decision-making to a greater extent than justified by law, sometimes in contravention of the child's best interests, which should be a fundamental guideline in all decisions that concern children. This article suggests a need to improve knowledge of doctors concerning parents'/surrogates' right to participate in life-or-death decisions. We conclude that Norway needs a precedent decision from the Supreme Court that confirms the right of judicial review of end-of-life decisions, and which applies the principle of the child's best interests as a fundamental guideline in the final decision.