Ready to help, no matter what you did: Responsibility attribution does not influence compassion in expert Buddhist practitioners.

Within western social psychology and neuroscience, compassion is described as being conditioned by cost-benefit appraisals, such as the attribution of responsibility for the causes of suffering. Buddhist traditions maintain the possibility of cultivating and embodying unconditioned and universal forms of compassion. Whereas a growing body of empirical literature suggests that Buddhist-inspired compassion-based programs foster prosociality and well-being in healthy and clinical populations, there is no evidence that such compassionate disposition toward others can become unconditioned from moral judgment. To address this question, we collected and integrated self-report and behavioral data from expert Buddhist practitioners and trained novices using a previously validated within-subject experiment that manipulates contextual information to influence moral judgment toward suffering others and a newly designed approach-avoidance task. We found that context manipulation impacted responsibility and blame attribution in both groups and that experts' reported willingness to help was higher and less influenced by context, compared to novices. Partial correlation networks highlighted a negative relationship between blame attribution and willingness to help in novices, but not in expert practitioners. Self-reported willingness to help was correlated to reaction times when approaching suffering stimuli. Approach behavior was modulated by context in novice, but not in experts. This study provides initial evidence of a dissociation between moral attributions and prosocial attitude in expert Buddhist practitioners and challenges established evolutionary accounts of compassion in western psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The Impact of Baseline Mindfulness Scores on Mindfulness-Based Intervention Outcomes: Toward Personalized Mental Health Interventions.

A growing body of evidence has portrayed mindfulness as a useful tool for dealing with a broad range of psychological problems and disorders. This has created the impression that mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) can be used to treat nearly all psychological difficulties, in all cases. Nonetheless, little research has been done on how individual differences may contribute to intervention outcomes. The goal of this study was to evaluate the role of baseline mindfulness on participants' outcomes by examining three prior Randomized Controlled Trials that addressed the impact of MBIs on mental health and mindfulness measures. The participants were 164 people, aged between 12 and 45, from both clinical and non-clinical samples. Our findings indicate that at least two thirds of the change produced by these interventions in terms of mindfulness scores can be predicted by the baseline scores of the same variables. We also found that many trajectories are not only strongly influenced by the initial status of the participants, but also by the intervention performed, as attested to by the significant interactions found. These results stress the need to continue doing research in a way that considers the diversity of participants' trajectories, increasing the room for intervention improvements aligned with a more personalized health care model.

"I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain.

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others' emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method. Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person's painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson's bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant's own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.

Electrophysiological evidence of the differential modulation of approach-related processes toward attractive foods by immersive or mindful viewing conditions.

Awareness of mental events as mere representations rather than as accurate depictions of reality, also known as dereification, is one of the key features of mindfulness meditation. Dereification is juxtaposed to subjective realism, the process of being lost or totally immersed in the contents of one's mind. Excessive subjective realism is a hallmark of several psychiatric disorders. Here, we investigated whether a "mindful" (dereified) compared with an "immersed" (highly subjectively real) attitude, induced by instructions, differentially modulates approach-avoidance tendencies when processing visual stimuli. We presented novices and experienced meditators with neutral and attractive food images under both mindful and immersed states. Then, participants performed an approach-avoidance Task (AAT) during which we obtained behavioral data, salivary volume, EEG recordings, and self-report measures. The approach bias toward attractive food was correlated with N2 amplitude, a marker of response inhibition, and the regulation of this bias by the mindful instruction compared to the immersed instruction was associated with a modulation of the visual N1 amplitude, a marker of early selective attention. Individuals with more expertise in mindfulness meditation engaged in less late affective reappraisal during mindfulness than during immersion, as measured by lower amplitude in the late positive potential (LPP). Additionally, the ERPs sensitive to the AAT manipulation was also associated to self-report measures of subjective realism, food bias, and mindfulness meditation expertise but not to salivation measures. These findings provide novel insights into the mechanisms by which mindfulness-based interventions could be effective in a range of psychiatric conditions.

Compared to self-immersion, mindful attention reduces salivation and automatic food bias.

Immersing ourselves in food images can sometimes make it feel subjectively real, as if the actual food were right in front of us. Excessive self-immersion into mental content, however, is a hallmark of psychological distress, and of several psychiatric conditions. Being aware that imagined events are not necessarily an accurate depiction of reality is a key feature of psychotherapeutic approaches akin to mindfulness-based interventions. Yet, it is still largely unknown to what extent one's engagement with mental content, considering it as real, biases one's automatic tendencies toward the world. In this study, we measured the change in subjective realism induced by a self-immersion and a mindful attention instruction, using self-reports and saliva volumes. Then, we measured behaviorally the impact of subjective realism changes on automatic approach bias toward attractive food (FAB) using an approach-avoidance task. We found a reduction in saliva volume, followed by a reduction in FAB in the mindful condition compared to the immersed condition. During the immersed condition only, saliva volumes, state and trait measures of subjective realism, and food craving traits were positively correlated with FAB values, whereas meditation experience was negatively correlated to it. We conclude that mindful attention instructions can de-automatize food bias.