Individuals with current suicidal ideation demonstrate implicit "fearlessness of death".

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Suicidal behaviour has proved to be difficult to predict, due in part to the particular limitations of introspection within suicidality. In an effort to overcome this, recent research has demonstrated the utility of indirect measures of "implicit" attitudes within the study of suicidality. However, research to date has focused predominantly on implicit self-evaluations and self-death associations. No work has examined implicit evaluations of death, despite the theoretical importance of such evaluations; "fearlessness of death" is central to both the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide and the Integrated Motivational-Volitional model of suicide.. METHODS: Twenty-three psychiatric patients with current suicidal ideation and twenty-five normative university students completed two versions of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) that targeted evaluations of death. One task specified personal death (i.e., was self-focused) and the other targeted death in the abstract. RESULTS: Self-focused evaluations of death reliably distinguished between the two groups, correctly classifying 74% of cases, but evaluations of death in the abstract did not. The suicidal group produced specific biases indicating a rejection of the negativity of death. Results are consistent with the definition of suicidality as involving a self-focused wish to die.. LIMITATIONS: For ethical reason, suicidal behaviours were not assessed in the normative group. Groups were therefore not mutually exclusive. This may have decreased the specificity of the IRAP. CONCLUSIONS: Suicidal ideation is associated with an implicit "fearlessness of death". The utility of implicit death-evaluations should therefore be considered alongside self-evaluations and self-death associations in the future..

Derived stimulus--response and stimulus--stimulus relations in children and adults: assessing training order effects.

Preschool children and adults received training on three sets of successive discriminations: (1) A1-R1,A2-R2, (2) B1-R1,B2-R2, and (3) A1-R3,A2-R4. Then they received tests assessing derived stimulus-response relations (B1-R3, B2-R4) and stimulus-stimulus relations (e.g., A1-B1, A2-B2). Four training protocols were used. The protocols differed with regard to the order in which the sets were trained: Many-To-One (1-2-3), One-To-Many-1 (1-3-2), One-To-Many-2 (3-1-2), and One-To-One (3-2-1 or 2-3-1). The adults displayed class-consistent B-R and A-B performances over all conditions. The children displayed class consistent B-R performances more often in Many-To-One and One-To-Many than in One-To-One. Their A-B performances were highly consistent with the trained A-R and tested B-R performances. Present findings are consistent with the stimulus equivalence account rather than with the mediated response account.

Understanding metaphor: A relational frame perspective.

The current article presents a basic functional-analytic interpretation of metaphor. This work involves an extension of Skinner's (1957) interpretation of metaphor using relational frame theory (RFT). A basic RFT interpretation of a particular metaphor is outlined, according to which the metaphor acquires its psychological effects when formal stimulus dimensions are contacted via the derivation of arbitrary stimulus relations. This interpretation sees the metaphor as involving four elements: (a) establishing two separate equivalence relations, (b) deriving an equivalence relation between these relations, (c) discriminating a formal relation via this equivalence-equivalence relation, and (d) a transformation of functions on the basis of the formal relation discriminated in the third element. In the second half of the paper, a number of important issues with regard to the RFT interpretation of metaphor are addressed.

Derived relational responding as generalized operant behavior.

The major aim of the present study was to demonstrate that derived relational responding may be viewed as a form of generalized operant behavior. In Experiment 1, 4 subjects were divided into two conditions (2 in each condition). Using a two-comparison matching-to-sample procedure, all subjects were trained and tested for the formation of two combinatorially entailed relations. Subjects were trained and tested across multiple stimulus sets. Each set was composed of novel stimuli. Both Conditions 1 and 2 involved explicit performance-contingent feedback presented at the end of each block of test trials (i.e., delayed feedback). In Condition 1, feedback was accurate (consistent with the experimenter-designated relations) following exposure to the initial stimulus sets. When subjects' responding reached a predefined mastery criterion, the feedback then switched to inaccurate (not consistent with the experimenter-designated relations) until responding once again reached a predefined criterion. Condition 2 was similar to Condition 1, except that exposure to the initial stimulus sets was followed by inaccurate feedback and once the criterion was reached feedback switched to accurate. Once relational responding emerged and stabilized, response patterns on novel stimulus sets were controlled by the feedback delivered for previous stimulus sets. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, except that during Conditions 3 and 4 four comparison stimuli were employed during training and testing. Experiment 3 was similar to Condition 1 of Experiment 1, except that after the mastery criterion was reached for class-consistent responding, feedback alternated from accurate to inaccurate across each successive stimulus set. Experiment 4 involved two types of feedback, one type following tests for mutual entailment and the other type following tests for combinatorial entailment. Results from this experiment demonstrated that mutual and combinatorial entailment may be controlled independently by accurate and inaccurate feedback. Overall, the data support the suggestion, made by relational frame theory, that derived relational responding is a form of generalized operant behavior.

Relational frame theory and Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A possible synthesis.

The current article suggests a possible synthesis of Skinner's (1957) treatment of verbal behavior with the more recent behavioral interpretation of language known as relational frame theory. The rationale for attempting to combine these two approaches is first outlined. Subsequently, each of the verbal operants described by Skinner is examined and subjected to a relational frame analysis. In each case, two types of operants are identified; one based on direct contingencies of reinforcement and the other based on arbitrarily applicable relational responding. The latter operants are labeled verbal because they can be distinguished from other forms of social behavior, and they appear to possess the symbolic or referential qualities often ascribed to human language. By applying relational frame theory to Skinner's verbal operants, we aim to contribute towards the development of a modern behavior-analytic research agenda in human language and cognition.

Behavioral pragmatism: no place for reality and truth.

The current article begins by reviewing L. J. Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies on a correspondence-based truth criterion. To evaluate her claim, the concept of the observation sentence, proposed by the pragmatist philosopher W. V. Quine, is examined. The observation sentence appears to remove the issue of correspondence from Quine's pragmatist philosophy. Nevertheless, the issue of correspondence reemerges, as the problem of homology, when Quine appeals to agreement between or among observation sentences as the basis for truth. Quine also argues, however, that the problem of homology (i.e., correspondence) should be ignored on pragmatic grounds. Because the problem is simply ignored, but not resolved, there appears to be some substance to Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies ultimately on correspondence as a truth criterion. Behavioral pragmatism is then introduced to circumvent both Hayes's claim and Quine's implicit appeal to correspondence. Behavioral pragmatism avoids correspondence by appealing to the personal goals (i.e., the behavior) of the scientist or philosopher as the basis for establishing truth. One consequence of this approach, however, is that science and philosophy are robbed of any final or absolute objectives and thus may not be a satisfactory solution to philosophers. On balance, behavioral pragmatism avoids any appeal to correspondence-based truth, and thus it cannot be criticized for generating the same philosophical problems that have come to be associated with this truth criterion.