The extended development of mapping spatial demonstratives onto space.

Spatial demonstratives (this and that in English) convey distance relative to speaker (within reach vs. out of reach) and object characteristics such as ownership. Previous studies indicate that object characteristics affect adult demonstrative choice, for example, greater use of this for owned objects. Here, production of spatial demonstratives was studied developmentally to identify when demonstrative production is sensitive to both distance and ownership. In two experiments, 7-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults completed an object location memory task, and a language task eliciting this or that to indicate an object. Results indicate that adult-like demonstrative production starts around 7 years of age and continues to develop beyond 11 years. Nonlinguistic spatial memory did not vary significantly across age groups. Spatial demonstratives encode both semantic and spatial object characteristics throughout development, revealing the fundamental importance of semantic factors for demonstrative production.

Words of agency: Executed and observed vocal actions induce a temporal binding effect.

Humans generally experience a sense of agency over the outcomes produced by their motor actions. This has been well established in the case of manual actions that directly affect the physical environment. Vocalizations are also actions, but they typically have only indirect effects on the environment. In the present research, we explore whether the outcomes produced by vocalizations also elicit a sense of agency. In three experiments, using an interval reproduction task, we find that performing a vocal action that produced an auditory outcome caused participants to underestimate the amount of elapsed time between actions and outcomes (i.e., temporal binding), an implicit index of the sense of agency (Experiment 1). We also show that observing others produce vocal actions elicits temporal binding, but only when the observer has direct visual access to the vocal action being executed (Experiments 2 and 3). Taken together, our findings suggest that direct observation of an action is necessary to experience a temporal binding effect for actions performed by others, and that audio-visuomotor information may play a role in the generation of temporal compression experienced over observed actions (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The role of personal data value, culture and self-construal in online privacy behaviour.

Personal data is ubiquitous in the digital world, can be highly valuable in aggregate, and can lead to unintended intrusions for the data creator. However, individuals' expressions of concern about exposure of their personal information are generally not matched by their behavioural caution. One reason for this mismatch could be the varied and intangible value of personal data. We present three studies investigating the potential association between personal data value and privacy behaviour, assessing both individual and cross-cultural differences in personal data valuation, comparing collectivist and individualistic cultures. Study 1a, using a representative UK sample, found no relationship between personal data value and privacy behaviour. However, Study 1b found Indian (collectivist) participants' privacy behaviour was sensitive to personal data value, unlike US (individualist) participants. Study 2 showed that in a UK sample, privacy behaviour was sensitive to personal data value but only for individuals who think of themselves as more similar to others (i.e., self-construe as similar, rather than different). We suggest those who prioritise group memberships are more sensitive to unintentional disclosure harm and therefore behave in accordance with personal data valuations-which informs the privacy concern-behaviour relationship. Our findings can suggest approaches to encourage privacy behaviours.

Standing out from the crowd: Both cue numerosity and social information affect attention in multi-agent contexts.

Groups of people offer abundant opportunities for social interactions. We used a two-phase task to investigate how social cue numerosity and social information about an individual affected attentional allocation in such multi-agent settings. The learning phase was a standard gaze-cuing procedure in which a stimulus face could be either uninformative or informative about the upcoming target. The test phase was a group-cuing procedure in which the stimulus faces from the learning phase were presented in groups of three. The target could either be cued by the group minority (i.e., one face) or majority (i.e., two faces) or by uninformative or informative stimulus faces. Results showed an effect of cue numerosity, whereby responses were faster to targets cued by the group majority than the group minority. However, responses to targets cued by informative identities included in the group minority were as fast as responses to targets cued by the group majority. Thus, previously learned social information about an individual was able to offset the general enhancement of cue numerosity, revealing a complex interplay between cue numerosity and social information in guiding attention in multi-agent settings.

From Gaze Perception to Social Cognition: The Shared-Attention System.

When two people look at the same object in the environment and are aware of each other's attentional state, they find themselves in a shared-attention episode. This can occur through intentional or incidental signaling and, in either case, causes an exchange of information between the two parties about the environment and each other's mental states. In this article, we give an overview of what is known about the building blocks of shared attention (gaze perception and joint attention) and focus on bringing to bear new findings on the initiation of shared attention that complement knowledge about gaze following and incorporate new insights from research into the sense of agency. We also present a neurocognitive model, incorporating first-, second-, and third-order social cognitive processes (the shared-attention system, or SAS), building on previous models and approaches. The SAS model aims to encompass perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes that contribute to and follow on from the establishment of shared attention. These processes include fundamental components of social cognition such as reward, affective evaluation, agency, empathy, and theory of mind.

The N170 event-related potential differentiates congruent and incongruent gaze responses in gaze leading.

To facilitate social interactions, humans need to process the responses that other people make to their actions, including eye movements that could establish joint attention. Here, we investigated the neurophysiological correlates of the processing of observed gaze responses following the participants' own eye movement. These observed gaze responses could either establish, or fail to establish, joint attention. We implemented a gaze leading paradigm in which participants made a saccade from an on-screen face to an object, followed by the on-screen face either making a congruent or incongruent gaze shift. An N170 event-related potential was elicited by the peripherally located gaze shift stimulus. Critically, the N170 was greater for joint attention than non-joint gaze both when task-irrelevant (Experiment 1) and task-relevant (Experiment 2). These data suggest for the first time that the neurocognitive system responsible for structural encoding of face stimuli is affected by the establishment of participant-initiated joint attention.

Joint attention facilitates observed gaze direction discrimination.

Efficiently judging where someone else is looking is important for social interactions, allowing us a window into their mental state by establishing joint attention. Previous work has shown that judging the gaze direction of a non-foveally presented face is facilitated when the eyes of that face are directed towards the centre of the scene. This finding has been interpreted as an example of the human bias for misattributing observed ambiguous gaze signals as self-directed eye-contact. To test this interpretation against an alternative hypothesis that the facilitation is instead driven by the establishment of joint attention, we conducted two experiments in which we varied the participants' fixation location. In both experiments, we replicated the previous finding of facilitated gaze discrimination when the participants fixated centrally. However, this facilitation was abolished when participants fixated peripheral fixation crosses (Experiment 1) and reversed when participants fixated peripheral images of real-world objects (Experiment 2). Based on these data, we propose that the facilitation effect is consistent with the interpretation that gaze discrimination is facilitated when joint attention is established. This finding therefore extends previous work showing that engaging in joint attention facilitates a range of social cognitive processes.

Seeing eye-to-eye: Social gaze interactions influence gaze direction identification.

We tested whether gaze direction identification of individual faces can be modulated by prior social gaze encounters. In two experiments, participants first completed a joint-gaze learning task using a saccade/antisaccade paradigm. Participants would encounter some 'joint-gaze faces' that would consistently look at the participants saccade goal before participants looked there (Experiment 1) or would follow the participants gaze to the target (Experiment 2). 'Non-joint-gaze faces' would consistently look in the opposite direction. Participants then completed a second task in which they judged the gaze direction of the faces they had previously encountered. Participants were less likely to erroneously report faces with slightly deviated gaze as looking directly at them if the face had previously never engaged in joint gaze with them. However, this bias was only present when those faces had looked first (Experiment 1) and not when the faces looked after participants (Experiment 2). Comparing these data with gaze identification responses of a control group that did not complete any joint-gaze learning phase revealed that the difference in gaze identification in Experiment 1 is likely driven by a lowering of direct gaze bias in response to non-joint-gaze faces. Thus, previous joint-gaze experiences can affect gaze direction judgements at an identity-specific level. However, this modulation may rely on the socio-cognitive information available from viewing other's initiation behaviours, especially when they fail to engage in social contact.

Tracking the Leader: Gaze Behavior in Group Interactions.

Can social gaze behavior reveal the leader during real-world group interactions? To answer this question, we developed a novel tripartite approach combining (1) computer vision methods for remote gaze estimation, (2) a detailed taxonomy to encode the implicit semantics of multi-party gaze features, and (3) machine learning methods to establish dependencies between leadership and visual behaviors. We found that social gaze behavior distinctively identified group leaders. Crucially, the relationship between leadership and gaze behavior generalized across democratic and autocratic leadership styles under conditions of low and high time-pressure, suggesting that gaze can serve as a general marker of leadership. These findings provide the first direct evidence that group visual patterns can reveal leadership across different social behaviors and validate a new promising method for monitoring natural group interactions.

Gaze following in multiagent contexts: Evidence for a quorum-like principle.

Research shows that humans spontaneously follow another individual's gaze. However, little remains known on how they respond when multiple gaze cues diverge across members of a social group. To address this question, we presented participants with displays depicting three (Experiment 1) or five (Experiment 2) agents showing diverging social cues. In a three-person group, one individual looking at the target (33% of the group) was sufficient to elicit gaze-facilitated target responses. With a five-person group, however, three individuals looking at the target (60% of the group) were necessary to produce the same effect. Gaze following in small groups therefore appears to be based on a quorum-like principle, whereby the critical level of social information needed for gaze following is determined by a proportion of consistent social cues scaled as a function of group size. As group size grows, greater agreement is needed to evoke joint attention.

Eyes that bind us: Gaze leading induces an implicit sense of agency.

Humans feel a sense of agency over the effects their motor system causes. This is the case for manual actions such as pushing buttons, kicking footballs, and all acts that affect the physical environment. We ask whether initiating joint attention - causing another person to follow our eye movement - can elicit an implicit sense of agency over this congruent gaze response. Eye movements themselves cannot directly affect the physical environment, but joint attention is an example of how eye movements can indirectly cause social outcomes. Here we show that leading the gaze of an on-screen face induces an underestimation of the temporal gap between action and consequence (Experiments 1 and 2). This underestimation effect, named 'temporal binding,' is thought to be a measure of an implicit sense of agency. Experiment 3 asked whether merely making an eye movement in a non-agentic, non-social context might also affect temporal estimation, and no reliable effects were detected, implying that inconsequential oculomotor acts do not reliably affect temporal estimations under these conditions. Together, these findings suggest that an implicit sense of agency is generated when initiating joint attention interactions. This is important for understanding how humans can efficiently detect and understand the social consequences of their actions.

A few of my favorite things: circumscribed interests in autism are not accompanied by increased attentional salience on a personalized selective attention task.

BACKGROUND: Autistic individuals commonly show circumscribed or "special" interests: areas of obsessive interest in a specific category. The present study investigated what impact these interests have on attention, an aspect of autistic cognition often reported as altered. In neurotypical individuals, interest and expertise have been shown to result in an automatic attentional priority for related items. Here, we examine whether this change in salience is also seen in autism. METHODS: Adolescents and young adults with and without autism performed a personalized selective attention task assessing the level of attentional priority afforded to images related to the participant's specific interests. In addition, participants performed a similar task with generic images in order to isolate any effects of interest and expertise. Crucially, all autistic and non-autistic individuals recruited for this study held a strong passion or interest. As such, any differences in attention could not be solely attributed to differing prevalence of interests in the two groups. In both tasks, participants were asked to perform a central target-detection task while ignoring irrelevant distractors (related or unrelated to their interests). The level of distractor interference under various task conditions was taken as an indication of attentional priority. RESULTS: Neurotypical individuals showed the predicted attentional priority for the circumscribed interest images but not generic items, reflecting the impact of their interest and expertise. Contrary to predictions, autistic individuals did not show this priority: processing the interest-related stimuli only when task demands were low. Attention to images unrelated to circumscribed interests was equivalent in the two groups. CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest that despite autistic individuals holding an intense interest in a particular class of stimuli, there may be a reduced impact of this prior experience and expertise on attentional processing. The implications of this absence of automatic priority are discussed in terms of the behaviors associated with the condition.

Vulnerability to depression is associated with a failure to acquire implicit social appraisals.

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with disrupted relationships with partners, family, and peers. These problems can precipitate the onset of clinical illness, influence severity and the prospects for recovery. Here, we investigated whether individuals who have recovered from depression use interpersonal signals to form favourable appraisals of others as social partners. Twenty recovered-depressed adults (with >1 adult episode of MDD but euthymic and medication-free for six months) and 23 healthy, never-depressed adults completed a task in which the gaze direction of some faces reliably cued the location a target (valid faces), whereas other faces cued the opposite location (invalid faces). No participants reported awareness of this contingency, and both groups were significantly faster to categorise targets following valid compared with invalid gaze cueing faces. Following this task, participants judged the trustworthiness of the faces. Whereas the healthy never-depressed participants judged the valid faces to be significantly more trustworthy than the invalid faces; this implicit social appraisal was absent in the recovered-depressed participants. Individuals who have recovered from MDD are able to respond appropriately to joint attention with other people but appear to not use joint attention to form implicit trust appraisals of others as potential social partners.

Ownership Status Influences the Degree of Joint Facilitatory Behavior.

When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner's performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership-a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects-influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals' own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.

Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency.

We investigated the effect of effort on implicit agency ascription for actions performed under varying levels of physical effort or cognitive load. People are able to estimate the interval between two events accurately, but they underestimate the interval between their own actions and their outcomes. This effect is known as 'intentional binding', and may provide feedback regarding the consequences of our actions. Concurrently with the interval reproduction task, our participants pulled sports resistance bands at high and low resistance levels (Experiments 1 and 2), or performed a working memory task with high and low set-sizes (Experiment 3). Intentional binding was greater under low than high effort. When the effort was task-related (Experiment 1), this effect depended on the individual's explicit appraisal of exertion, while the effect of effort was evident at the group level when the effort was task-unrelated (physical, Experiment 2; mental, Experiment 3). These findings imply that the process of intentional binding is compromised when cognitive resources are depleted, either through physical or mental strain. We discuss this notion in relation to the integration of direct sensorimotor feedback with signals of agency and other instances of cognitive resource depletion and action control during strain.

Followers are not followed: Observed group interactions modulate subsequent social attention.

We asked whether previous observations of group interactions modulate subsequent social attention episodes. Participants first completed a learning phase with 2 conditions. In the "leader" condition 1 of 3 identities turned her gaze first, followed by the 2 other faces. In the "follower" condition, 1 of the identities turned her gaze after the 2 other faces had first shifted their gaze. Thus, participants observed that some individuals were consistently leaders and others followers of others' attention. In the test phase, the faces of leaders and followers were presented in a gaze cueing paradigm. Remarkably, the followers did not elicit gaze cueing. Our data demonstrate that individuals who do not guide group attention in exploring the environment are ineffective social attention directors in later encounters. Thus, the role played in previous group social attention interactions modulates the relative weight assigned to others' gaze: we ignore the gaze of group followers.

Re-encountering individuals who previously engaged in joint gaze modulates subsequent gaze cueing.

We assessed the extent to which previous experience of joint gaze with people (i.e., looking toward the same object) modulates later gaze cueing of attention elicited by those individuals. Participants in Experiments 1 and 2a/b first completed a saccade/antisaccade task while a to-be-ignored face either looked at, or away from, the participants' eye movement target. Two faces always engaged in joint gaze with the participant, whereas 2 other faces never engaged in joint gaze. Then, we assessed standard gaze cueing in response to these faces to ascertain the effect of these prior interactions on subsequent social attention episodes. In Experiment 1, the face's eyes moved before the participant's target appeared, meaning that the participant always gaze-followed 2 faces and never gaze-followed 2 other faces. We found that this prior experience modulated the timecourse of subsequent gaze cueing. In Experiments 2a/b, the participant looked at the target first, then was either followed (i.e., the participant initiated joint gaze), or was not followed. These participants then showed an overall decrement of gaze cueing with individuals who had previously followed participants' eyes (Experiment 2a), an effect that was associated with autism spectrum quotient scores and modulated perceived trustworthiness of the faces (Experiment 2b). Experiment 3 demonstrated that these modulations are unlikely to be because of the association of different levels of task difficulty with particular faces. These findings suggest that establishing joint gaze with others influences subsequent social attention processes that are generally thought to be relatively insensitive to learning from prior episodes.

Social orienting in gaze leading: a mechanism for shared attention.

Here, we report a novel social orienting response that occurs after viewing averted gaze. We show, in three experiments, that when a person looks from one location to an object, attention then shifts towards the face of an individual who has subsequently followed the person's gaze to that same object. That is, contrary to 'gaze following', attention instead orients in the opposite direction to observed gaze and towards the gazing face. The magnitude of attentional orienting towards a face that 'follows' the participant's gaze is also associated with self-reported autism-like traits. We propose that this gaze leading phenomenon implies the existence of a mechanism in the human social cognitive system for detecting when one's gaze has been followed, in order to establish 'shared attention' and maintain the ongoing interaction.

One is not enough: Group size modulates social gaze-induced object desirability effects.

Affective evaluations of objects are influenced by the preferences expressed by other people via their gaze direction, so that objects looked at are liked more than objects looked away from. But when can others' preferences be trusted? Here, we show that group size influences the extent to which individuals tend to conform to others' gaze preferences. We adopted the conventional gaze-cuing paradigm and modified the design in such a way that some objects were consistently cued by only one face (single-face condition), whereas other objects were consistently cued by several different faces (multiple-faces condition). While response time measures revealed equal gaze-cuing effects for both conditions, a boost in affective evaluation was observed only for objects looked at by several different faces. Objects looked at by a single face were not rated differently than objects looked away from. These findings suggest that observers make use of group size to evaluate the generalizability of the epistemic information conveyed by others' gaze: Objects looked at are liked more than objects looked away from, but only when they are looked at by multiple faces.