Specific autobiographical memories are a resource for identity strength among mature but not emerging adults.

Four studies, three pre-planned on Open Science Framework, with 2296 participants explored the potential role of recollecting autobiographical memories in enhancing the sense of identity. Among emerging adults (college students under age 25), recollecting important autobiographical memories did not strengthen sense of identity. Autobiographical memories failed to strengthen identity among emerging adults despite inducing low self-clarity first; despite attempts to prime self-consistent memories by having emerging adults report their stable self-aspects first; and despite attempts to inspire self-event connections by asking emerging adults to explain how the memories exemplified something enduring about the self. Among mature adults (age 25 and older), recollecting important autobiographical memories strengthened sense of identity. Identity was strengthened regardless of whether mature adults were asked to explain how the memories exemplified something enduring about the self. Differences in types of memories or motivation did not account for the differential effects of recollecting autobiographical memories in identity. In short, mature adults appear to readily use autobiographical memories as a resource for identity in a way that emerging adults have not yet mastered.

Sharing specific "We" autobiographical memories in close relationships: the role of contact frequency.

Sharing memories in conversations with close others is posited to be part of the social function of autobiographical memory. The present research focused on the sharing of a particular type of memory: Specific memories about one-time co-experienced events, which we termed Specific We memories. Two studies with 595 total participants examined the factors that lead to and/or are influenced by the sharing of Specific We memories. In Study 1, participants reported on their most recent conversation. Specific We memories were reportedly discussed most often in conversations with others who were close and with whom the participant had frequent communication. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned either to increase or to simply record the frequency of communication with a close other (parent). Increases in the frequency of reported sharing of Specific We memories as well as closeness to the parent resulted. Mediation analyses of both studies revealed causal relationships among reported sharing of Specific We memories and closeness. We discuss the relevance of these results for understanding the social function of autobiographical memory.

The effect of the order in which episodic autobiographical memories versus autobiographical knowledge are shared on feelings of closeness.

Autobiographical memories (AMs) can be used to create and maintain closeness with others [Alea, N., & Bluck, S. (2003). Why are you telling me that? A conceptual model of the social function of autobiographical memory. Memory, 11(2), 165-178]. However, the differential effects of memory specificity are not well established. Two studies with 148 participants tested whether the order in which autobiographical knowledge (AK) and specific episodic AM (EAM) are shared affects feelings of closeness. Participants read two memories hypothetically shared by each of four strangers. The strangers first shared either AK or an EAM, and then shared either AK or an EAM. Participants were randomly assigned to read either positive or negative AMs from the strangers. Findings suggest that people feel closer to those who share positive AMs in the same way they construct memories: starting with general and moving to specific.

Is sharing specific autobiographical memories a distinct form of self-disclosure?

Theories of autobiographical memory posit a social function, meaning that recollecting and sharing memories of specific discrete events creates and maintains relationship intimacy. Eight studies with 1,271 participants tested whether sharing specific autobiographical memories in conversations increases feelings of closeness among conversation partners, relative to sharing other self-related information. The first 2 studies revealed that conversations in which specific autobiographical memories were shared were also accompanied by feelings of closeness among conversation partners. The next 5 studies experimentally introduced specific autobiographical memories versus general information about the self into conversations between mostly unacquainted pairs of participants. Discussing specific autobiographical memories led to greater closeness among conversation partners than discussing nonself-related topics, but no greater closeness than discussing other, more general self-related information. In the final study unacquainted pairs in whom feelings of closeness had been experimentally induced through shared humor were more likely to discuss specific autobiographical memories than unacquainted control participant pairs. We conclude that sharing specific autobiographical memories may express more than create relationship closeness, and discuss how relationship closeness may afford sharing of specific autobiographical memories by providing common ground, a social display, or a safety signal.

Incentives increase the rate of false but not true secondary confessions from informants with an allegiance to a suspect.

One hundred ninety-two students participated in an experimental simulation testing whether incentives would reduce the reluctance of informants to implicate a close other. Half of the students were made to feel interpersonally close to a confederate who either admitted to or denied a misdeed. All students were interrogated and encouraged to sign a secondary confession stating that the confederate had confessed to the misdeed; half were offered an incentive to do so. Contrary to expectations, closeness did not induce reluctance. Instead, the offer of incentive increased the number of participants willing to sign a secondary confession implicating a close other. Further analyses revealed that this increase occurred only for false secondary confessions. Implications for interrogation practices are discussed.

Snitching, lies and computer crashes: an experimental investigation of secondary confessions.

Two laboratory studies with 332 student participants investigated secondary confessions (provided by an informant instead of the suspect). Participants allegedly caused or witnessed a simulated computer crash, then were asked to give primary or secondary confessions during interrogation. Study 1 replicated the false evidence effect for primary confessions. Secondary confessions were obtained at a high rate, which was increased by false evidence in combination with incentive to confess. In Study 2 a confederate either confessed to or denied crashing the computer. Incentive increased the rate of secondary confession only in the presence of a denial; that is, incentive increased the number of false secondary confessions only. Implications for the use of incentives during informant interrogation are discussed.

Closure of autobiographical memories moderates their directive effect on behaviour.

Specific autobiographical memories have been theorised to serve a directive function, whereby the content of the memory directs behaviour outside awareness. The present research tested whether the extent to which a memory feels low in closure, or psychologically not in the past, moderates this directive effect. A total of 163 participants in an online experiment were asked to recollect a specific autobiographical memory of a time they had failed to donate to charity, or were not asked to recollect a memory. Those who recollected a memory were randomly assigned to think of the memory as high versus low in closure. Recollecting an autobiographical memory made to feel low in closure led to more memory-relevant behaviour than either recollecting a memory made to feel high in closure, or no memory at all. Moreover, the directive effect of a low-closure memory occurred whether participants were made aware of an upcoming behavioural opportunity or not. Discussion centres on possible processes linking low closure and behaviour, as well as implications for the self-memory system theory of autobiographical memory.

What we regret most are lost opportunities: a theory of regret intensity.

A recent theory (Roese & Summerville, 2005) has suggested that regret is intensified by perceptions of future opportunity. In this work, however, it is proposed that feelings of regret are more likely elicited by perceptions of lost opportunity: People regret outcomes that could have been changed in the past but can no longer be changed and for which people experience low psychological closure. Consistent with the lost opportunity principle, Study 1 revealed that regretted experiences in the most commonly regretted life domains are perceived as offering the least opportunity for improvement in the future, Study 2 indicated that people experience the most regret for outcomes that are not repeatable, and Study 3 revealed that perceptions of higher past than future opportunities and low psychological closure predict regret intensity. Discussion focuses on the hope-inducing yet ephemeral nature of perceived future opportunity and on the relationship between dissonance reduction and closure.

Incomplete inhibition of emotion in specific autobiographical memories.

Emotional inhibition in recollection of specific autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) is investigated in two experiments. Less complete emotional inhibition was hypothesised to correspond to a reduced sense of psychological closure. Emotional inhibition was identified by comparing the effect of emotion words relative to lifetime period words as primes. In Experiment 1, emotion words facilitated recognition judgements of descriptions of remembered experiences rated low in closure. In Experiment 2, emotion words facilitated recognition judgements of descriptions of a laboratory experience made lower in closure. A sense of psychological closure may therefore be a prerequisite for strategic emotional inhibition. Implications for adjustment and goal pursuit are discussed.

Psychological closure as a memory phenomenon.

A theory is proposed that life events are remembered with a satisfying sense of closure when there is decreased emotional detail in the constructed autobiographical memory representation. The first three studies show that, although properties of the experienced event (such as valence and recency) accounted for some variance in participants' sense of closure, the amount of emotional detail in the memory was also a significant predictor. The third study shows that emotion-focused biased retelling of the experience increased emotional detail and decreased the sense of closure participants reported. Related approaches and implications for psychological adjustment are discussed.

"Blaming the victim" under memory load.

When presented with negative outcomes, people often engage in counterfactual thinking imagining various ways that events might have been different. This appears to be a spontaneous behavior, with considerable adaptive value. Nevertheless, counterfactual thinking may also engender systematic biases in various judgment tasks, such as allocating blame for a mishap, or deciding on the appropriate compensation to a victim. Thus, counterfactuals sometimes require thought suppression or discounting, potentially resource-demanding tasks. In this study. participants made mock-jury decisions about control and counterfactual versions of simple stories. The judgments of two groups of participants, differing in their respective levels of working memory capacity, were compared. In addition, all participants held memory loads during various stages of the primary task. Lower-span individuals were especially susceptible to bias associated with the counterfactual manipulation, but only when holding memory loads during judgment. The results suggest that counterfactual thoughts arise automatically, and may later require effortful, capacity-demanding suppression.